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When I think about how trans people are represented in terms of our sexuality 
we are very, very dehumanised. 
(Mr Fox – a Participant) 
 
This does represent… a confusion. But not a confusion for what I feel like and 
what how I see myself, but external society’s assumptions about me, can just 
be too, too heavy sometimes and it’s just… yeah psychologically it can be very 
demanding. That’s it. 
(Cee Cee – a Participant) 
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Abstract  
Trans people are those people who are not content to remain the gender they were assigned at birth. 
They may identify as men, or as women, or outside of the gender binary. As part of establishing oneself 
in a different gender from that assigned at birth, trans people may consider many aspects of their being-
in-the-world including embodiment, attendant intersubjectivity and, as part of that, sexuality. 
Trans people have been poorly served in the past regarding sexuality, with literatures suggesting that 
trans people necessarily sexualise transition; that trans people must be heterosexual in their identified 
gender; and that sexuality is a motivation for transition. These notions have mostly been driven by 
theoretical positions which have not fully encompassed trans people’s own conceptualisations of their 
sexuality.  
Consequently this research has investigated trans people’s sexuality from a phenomenological 
perspective in which trans people’s own understandings are to the fore. A phenomenological 
investigation with a group of eleven self-identified trans people was undertaken. Using Lego, the 
participants modelled their sexuality in order to avoid established narratives of trans and sexuality. The 
participants then explained their models and a group discussion was then held concerning trans and 
sexuality. The information thus elicited was subject to two hermeneutics – one of description; and one 
of ‘suspicion’ in which the participants contributions were tentatively contextualised within an 
existential philosophical framework. The resulting themes were Barriers; Time; Reference to 
multiplicity or binary identities; and Gender Identity Clinics. These themes were considered with 
reference to the implications they may have for counselling psychological practice. 
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Introduction 
Transgender people – most commonly referred to as simply trans people -  are just like cisgender1 
(non-trans) people in that the vast majority of life is spent doing the things that people do – working, 
studying, playing, laughing, crying, having sex, not having sex, eating buns – all the stuff of life. There 
are, however, a few key considerations relating to trans and it is some of these, especially to do with 
sexuality, which this thesis covers. 
But what is trans when used in this context? Briefly it is an umbrella term which includes a variety of 
different identities - all of which are concerned with a person living all, or a part, of the time in a gender 
other than that to which they were assigned at birth. Within the psychiatric literatures these have 
previously been split into differing groups: In the current World Health Organisation’s (WHO) 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) these are transsexualism, in which a person wishes to live 
all of the time in a gender other than they were assigned at birth; dual role transvestism in which a person 
lives in that manner for part of the time; and fetishistic transvestism in which there is a sexual component 
to taking on the role of another gender (WHO, 1992). It is likely that Transsexualism will be renamed 
Gender Incongruence in the forthcoming 2017 edition of the ICD (see below). The more recently 
published Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM 5) of the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 
2013a) elides the first two categories of transsexualism and dual role transvestism for diagnostic 
purposes under the category gender dysphoria which might also include people who identify as something 
other than male or female. The DSM 5 also includes the category of transvestic fetishism which roughly 
correlates with fetishistic transvestism in the ICD. In the DSM, but not in the ICD, there is a requirement 
that there be “…clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important 
areas of functioning” (APA, 2013a, p.702) however, somewhat unusually, the diagnosis is often made 
without this distress in order for robust and supported trans people to access to physical assistance to 
align their bodies with their minds (Murjan & Bouman, 2015). 
                                                 
1A cisgender person is a person who is content to remain the gender they were assigned at birth (Richards & Barker, 2013). 
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There is consequently much contention around having diagnoses associated with gender role and 
identity, given that there are not necessarily any problems with living associated with them (cf. Karasic 
& Drescher 2005). Indeed the terms transvestite and transsexual have a history of pathologisation 
associated with them (cf. Karasic & Drescher 2005) and these words are only partially reclaimed by 
some members of the communities - in the sense that some people are happy to use them and many 
are not. Nonetheless, shorn of pathology, these three rough groupings – people living full time in a 
gender other than that assigned at birth; people living part of the time in a different gender; and people 
for whom the endeavour appears to have a sexual component – can be a useful heuristic under some 
circumstances (Barrett, 2007; Ettner, Monstrey, & Eyler, 2007; Richards & Barker, 2013). 
Notwithstanding this, the APA (2013a) and WHO (1992) note that fetishistic stages can precede the 
wish to live in another gender role which makes clear demarcation between the different categories 
somewhat problematic; and further Lawrence (2013) [contentiously] asserts that, for trans women2 at 
least, it is highly likely that there is a sexual component to a cross gender [transsexual] identity.  
Two further rough groupings of people who may fall under the trans3 umbrella are gender neutral 
people – those people who identify with no gender - sometimes referred to as neutrois, agender, or 
gender neutral people (Richards, & Barker, 2013) - and non-binary or genderqueer people – Those 
people who have both genders simultaneously to varying degrees (or who disagree with the binary 
gender system) (Richards & Barker, 2013; Richards, Bouman, & Barker, forthcoming 2016). These 
groups of people are emerging communities and a burgeoning political force. Therefore, further 
research will be required into any necessary or useful assistance such as hormones, surgeries, therapy, 
etc., for these groups - which is one of the reasons the DSM 5, and likely the ICD 11 have included 
these gender forms in the diagnostic categories such that aid may be rendered as necessary. There is 
                                                 
2A trans woman is a person who identifies as a woman and who lives in a female role, but who was assigned male at birth. 
Similarly a trans man is a person who identifies as a man and who lives in a male role, but who was assigned female at birth. 
3 Some people have used the term trans* to refer to a wide variety of trans identities with the ‘*’ being a wildcard term from 
computer programming denoting a variety of possible endings, for example trans-sexual, -vestite, –gender, etc. It also 
includes a number of terms which don’t have the strict morpheme ‘trans’ in them, but which nonetheless fall in the same 
rough category, including gender neutral and non-binary gender. Useful as it may be, it can be difficult to read (especially 
aloud) and, most importantly, at a recent meeting of trans community leaders we convened as part of my clinic’s research 
for the WHO on the ICD 11 it was unanimously felt to be an exclusionary term which people not keyed into the latest 
developments in trans may be unaware of - and may therefore serve to marginalise people further. For this reason it is not 
used in this thesis. 
 3 
 
almost no research or writing on these gender forms, with the exception of Richards, et al (2016) 
Richards, Barker & Bouman (forthcoming 2016); student dissertations (Evans, 2011), and some 
community publications (e.g. Bergman & Bornstein, 2013; Diamond, 2011; Queen & Schimel, 19974) 
with what little there is generally falling under the wider umbrella of studies on trans identities5. 
Given this complexity, members of the trans communities6 themselves generally use the overarching 
term adopted in this paper – trans – to include all of these practices and identities (Bornstein & 
Bergman, 2010). Because of this, in this paper the concept of trans will be assumed to mean living some 
or all of the time in a gender not assigned at birth. Of course this does not fully encapsulate the difficult issue 
of identity, especially within an existential framework - of which more below; and indeed self-definition 
forms a key part of this phenomenological research. So while the working definition above is included 
for clarity, it should not be seen as a structural or theoretical imposition of meaning on participant 
realities. 
Similarly, sex and sexuality are complex and often ill-defined terms both within general discourse and in 
the grey and academic literatures. Sex, for example, might pertain to chromosomes, coitus, something 
like ‘gender’, etc. Sexuality is a little clearer with the Oxford English Dictionary defining is as “capacity 
for sexual feelings”; “a person’s sexual orientation or preference”; and “sexual activity” (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2015a) with sexual  pertinently further defined as; “Relating to the instincts, physiological 
processes, and activities connected with physical attraction or intimate physical contact between 
individuals” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015b). To complicate matters still further, asexuality – not 
experiencing sexual attraction (AVEN, 2015) is also often regarded as a ‘sexuality’ in much the same 
way atheism is often included within demography sheets under religion – and with all the same 
subtleties of degree and type that one might expect in any human practice or identity. Consequently, 
the definitions above are the broad working definitions used in this thesis, however, for the reasons 
                                                 
4 Which was twenty years ahead of its time. 
5 And occasionally getting wet as they are pushed out from under that umbrella when the street gets bumpy. 
6 I should note here that, while I shall touch upon cross cultural considerations below, I am referring to trans communities 
from high GDP Western countries for reasons of clarity. 
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touched upon above and detailed below, such matters are complex when considering trans people, and 
indeed it is this complexity which this research seeks to explore.  
These complexities around both trans and sexuality, and especially their intersections, have been 
addressed within literatures from a positivistic tradition (such as medicine and essentialist psychology); 
and theoretical academic literatures (including queer theory and postmodernism), both of which 
sometimes appear to utilise trans people’s realities for their own ends. Thus medicine has been accused 
of appropriating trans voices to buttress the gender dichotomy7 (Raymond, 1979); whereas, queer 
academics have been accused of appropriating trans experience to buttress arguments against the gender 
dichotomy (Richards, et al, 2014; Rubin, 1998). 
Where then is the counselling psychologist with a trans client to turn for information on trans 
experience which is free(er) from such theoretical (and so methodological) bias? Phenomenological 
enquiry may have an answer. Other valid methods are discussed below (as are issues with 
phenomenology itself), but the great strength of phenomenology is the rigorous investigation of ‘things 
as they are in themselves’ (Husserl, [1900] 1970) which would seem to be just what is needed amidst the 
brouhaha of enquiry into trans, both within the academy and beyond (cf. Green, 2008). 
Phenomenology also neatly intersects with the field of Counselling Psychology as it is a very common 
mode of therapeutic enquiry for Counselling Psychologists (Woolfe, Dryden & Strawbridge, 2003) -  
whose credo puts great value on the lived-experience of the client. This credo also recognises the 
centrality of intersubjectivity for counselling psychological practice (HCPC, 2012; Orlans & Van 
Scoyoc, 2009) which is something that, it may be argued, is best facilitated though a full 
phenomenological investigation of the clients’ ‘worlding’ (Spinelli, 2007). 
One important area of trans clients’ worlding is, as we have started to touch upon above, that of 
sexuality. Trans people’s sexuality forms much of the literatures on trans in general and indeed is one of 
most contentious topics within this field (Dreger, 2008). Again, phenomenology which privileges 
                                                 
7 The gender dichotomy is the notion that there are only two genders (male and female) which are different in kind rather 
than degree (Bockting, 2008). 
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meanings - rather than a theory-driven method which seeks certain ‘data’ (sometimes without due 
regard for individual differences - cf. Clarkson, 2008; Richards, forthcoming 2016b) may be a fecund 
mode of enquiry. Phenomenology alone, however, could risk leaving the experience of trans sexuality8 
in a vacuum. The endeavour to situate such experience within a philosophical framework therefore 
needs to avoid the pitfalls sketched out above in terms of theory driving research; but still needs to find 
some ‘firm ground’ from which to work without the use of ‘grand narratives’ (Lyotard, 1984). For this 
reason existentialism offers a philosophical base and hermeneutic (historically intertwined with 
phenomenology - van Deurzen & Adams, 2011) which may be used to tentatively investigate the 
phenomenology of trans sexuality, but which itself has few distorting theoretical a priori assumptions (of 
the ‘meaning’ of trans especially). 
This thesis therefore, is an existential-phenomenological investigation of a group of trans people’s 
sexualities. It critically considers the literature on trans sexuality and seeks to justify the method chosen 
for exploring trans sexuality with particular reference to ethical considerations of this generally 
psychologically robust but sometimes culturally marginalised and academically exploited, group. It then 
turns to the results of a study undertaken with a group of self-defining trans people and considers the 
theoretical context of these results within the discussion. There will necessarily be no reporting of 
‘answers’ fixed and true for all time, but rather a series of non-generalisable themes are highlighted, 
which should be held lightly to be properly seen (Richards, 2011a) thus becoming part of an ongoing 
and hopefully fruitful dialogue within academic, clinical and, it is to be hoped, community circles. 
Lastly, as they read I hope the reader will forgive my, at times, somewhat personal use of language - of 
reflections about my own work, thoughts and feelings. I feel that as a nascent Counselling Psychologist 
it behoves me, unless there is cause otherwise (see reflexivity below), and in so far as is possible, to 
speak to you the reader as a person (often as an expert also naturally!) – without endeavouring to hide 
the fact that we are both human - and so there will be some degree of intersubjectivity between us. This 
                                                 
8 Trans sexuality (the sexuality of trans people) should not be confused with transsexuality which is a diagnostic term 
pertaining to those people who live, or wish to live, permanently in a role other than that assigned at birth. 
 6 
 
will, of course, be rather limited by the medium and the fact that this is a doctoral thesis with all the 
pedagogical restrictions that imposes. Indeed as I am unable to respond to your reading except in my 
imagining of what that response may be, perhaps rather than actual intersubjectivity it would be better 
to say that I am endeavouring to respond to you as a person, as a reader with both your expert 
knowledges and our humanity available to us. I shall don my scientific tweed and passive voice as 
proves necessary then, but where I leave it hanging on the chair and speak to you directly I beg your 
forbearance as - to me at least - somewhere in all that is something important in being [in hoping to be] 
a Counselling Psychologist. 
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Literature review  
Literature search method 
The following literature review started, as many literature reviews do, with an accumulation of my 
literature on this topic to this point in time – the contents of my bookshelves and hard-drives if you 
will. Given my other academic work in this field, mentioned throughout this thesis and elsewhere (cf. 
Richards, 2014a), this seems a reasonable start to an overview of the field. I have also spoken to both 
academic and clinical colleagues in the field of trans and sexuality, as well as in counselling psychology, 
existentialism, and phenomenology who have suggested titles which I have pursued both in reference 
to other work and to this thesis specifically. Naturally, this has lead to a snowball literature search with 
pertinent references being sought as papers and books have been examined. 
In addition to the above, a formal literature search was carried out using search terms which seemed 
from a nominal perusal of the literature, and my prior work, to be pertinent to the current study. These 
were (in alphabetical order): Gender neutral; Non-Binary Trans; Trans*; Transgender; Transsexual; 
Transvestite. Additional terms which were added to these were Existentialism9; Phenomenology; Sex; 
Sexuality. These terms were used in the following research databases; AMED, BNI, CINAHL, Embase, 
HMIC: DH-Data and Kings Fund, Medline; PsychInfo; As well as Google Scholar and Ovid (see tables 
1 to 3 below). The term ‘Transsexual’ alone returned a very large number of results (3077) with many 
erroneous responses pertaining to other matters. Thus only papers with secondary specifiers were 
included. Of these, several, especially those containing the term Trans and Trans*, also returned large 
numbers of hits as the search engines didn’t discriminate between trans[sexual] and translator, trans-
acids, trans-disciplinary, etc., giving rise to erroneous hits regarding maize for example (Chandler 
Eggleston & Dorweiler, 2000). In these cases only the first hundred hits were reviewed as the papers 
were ordered by relevance and after this point the relevance markedly decreased. In addition, several of 
the search terms will overlap, for example trans and transsexuality often returned similar results, 
meaning the number of hits cannot be summed.  
                                                 
9 Many authors of papers returned by search engines use this to mean something like ‘deeply personal’ rather than the 
philosophical meaning used in this thesis. 
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Table 1. Number of returns on database search. 
 Additional specifier 
Gender form Existentialism10 Phenomenology11 Sex Sexuality 
Gender Neutral 0 3 554 59 
Non-Binary 0 0 4 3 
Trans 1  25 1940 151 
Trans* 110 3612 137598 8367 
Transgender 1 9 1561 8 
Transsexual 1 4 1216 136 
Transvestite 0 11 138 15 
 
Table 2. Number of returns on Google Scholar search. 
 Additional specifier 
Gender form Existentialism Phenomenology Sex Sexuality 
Gender Neutral 3300 3790 50,900 33,400 
Non-Binary 956 572 2270 2360 
Trans 25,500 187,000 2,280,000 342,000 
Trans* 25,700 183,000 2,310,000 338,000 
Transgender 5190 6110 41,700 34,500 
Transsexual 3190 3890 25,700 19,000 
Transvestite 3730 3160 18,100 12,300 
 
 
                                                 
10 The single hits here are my paper; Richards, 2011b. 
11 This term often meant something like; ‘the way it looks to me’ (e.g. Hofer, 1960) rather than in the technical sense used in 
this thesis.  
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Table 3. Number of returns on Ovid search. 
 Additional specifier 
Gender form Existentialism Phenomenology Sex Sexuality 
Gender Neutral 0 0 5 0 
Non-Binary 0 0 0 0 
Trans 251 3691 22559 3363 
Trans* 251 38475 784341 62450 
Transgender 16 231 7751 4442 
Transsexual 8 117 4378 1490 
Transvestite 2 32 604 257 
The search terms on their own did not return a sensible structure for this thesis and consequently the 
literature review incorporates all of the pertinent papers across the following sections as necessary. 
Naturally this starts with the history of trans people and some information on the place of trans people 
cross-culturally. It then turns to the rates of trans people within mainly contemporary Western 
populations as this is the primary demographic focus of this thesis. As one of the key foci of 
contemporary Western discourses of trans is the “psy” professions, it is to this we turn next - with 
sexuality and gender inflecting much of the work here. This is followed by an in-depth consideration of 
sexuality and gender specifically; which leads on to trans people’s partners, sex work and HIV risk. 
Although most of these literatures concern peer-reviewed work from within the academy, community 
literatures will also be considered before turning finally to the specifically existential canon regarding 
trans and sexuality. However it is the first of these - history and demography12, to which I now turn. 
 
 
                                                 
12 A term often used in the literature is epidemiology, however as this is associated with pathology, and as I am taking an 
explicitly non-pathologising stance here, it will not be used. 
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A history of trans people 
One might assume that trans people are such a rarity that they would not trouble the day-to-day work 
of the Counselling Psychologist, however, the literature appears to suggest otherwise: Trans people in 
the widest sense have been found in what might reasonably be referred to as all times and all places, 
dating from the stone age to the present day (Feinberg, 1996; Herdt, 1996). In addition, trans people 
have been found in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa, the middle East, Polynesia, and amongst the 
Inuit, to name just a few peoples - although, of course, the expression, and understandings, of gender 
varies widely with time and geographical location (Coleman, Colgan & Gooren, 1992; De Cuypere, 
1995; Feinberg, 1996; Gooren, 1984; 1990; HBIGDA, 2001; Herdt, 1996). Without wishing to write 
too much on the geographic and chronological distribution of trans people, a few examples will 
hopefully assist the reader in understanding the ubiquity of the distribution of trans people - however 
the following examples should in no way be considered to be exhaustive: 
One key example is in Northern India where the Hijra are a group of people who were assigned male at 
birth, but who live as ‘third gender’13, or quite often as women, and who are devotees of the Bahuchara 
Mata. They may carry out a variety of ceremonial purposes relating to Hindu religious practice (Kalraa 
& Shahb, 2013; Richards, forthcoming, 2016a). Hijra may gain their spiritual power through removal of 
their genitals and through living as women and often live in all-Hijra communities. However, as with 
many such identities, there are people who identify as Hijra outside of this strict definition, and some 
people who historically might have so identified may now be using the term khwaaja sira (meaning 
something like ‘eunuch’ or ‘transvestite’, but defying strict translation into English) instead of Hijra 
and/or identifying within the idea of transsexualism.  
Another group of people who may be considered to be trans in the wider sense are the ‘two-spirit’ 
people indigenous to America. Two spirit people may generally be birth-assigned males who take on 
aspects and roles of femininity, or birth-assigned females who take on aspects and roles of masculinity; 
but need not take on all of the aspects or roles of the ‘other’ sex. In a similar way to the hijra, two-spirit 
                                                 
13 This is a problematic term, assuming as it does a Western binary gender system (cf. Towle & Morgan, 2006) 
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people may traditionally have had a spiritual and healing role as a medicine person (in the first nation 
sense of the word) or as a nurse, etc., although this is by no means always be the case with two-sprit 
people holding a variety of roles within society. There are various terms used by first nation peoples for 
two-spirit people such as wíŋkte by the Lakota; hwame by the Mohave; nádleehé by the Navajo and 
ilhamana by the Zuni as well as several others. These terms are not exactly analogous and indeed 
ilhamana defies direct translation into English - a point which is worth bearing in mind for readers who 
are rooted in a two-sex/two-gender cultural system (cf Richards, forthcoming 2016a). Two-spirit itself 
is not a term which is universally accepted as it suggests a spiritual/cultural system which does not 
accord with all first nation understandings and is only used as a loose umbrella term here. Indeed it is 
worth noting that, such is the diversity of the peoples discussed, there will be many people who identify 
as something outwith the terms used here.  
Similar to the Hijra and the two spirit people the Samoan fa'afāfine (lit: the way of a woman) may be 
considered to be trans or ‘third gender’, although again in a different way and within a specific cultural 
context which inflects basic understandings about the world. For example, Herdt (1996) suggests that, 
while gender liminality in Polynesia is generally accepted, it is not afforded status of a third gender 
within cultural praxis. The fa'afāfine are usually birth-assigned males who foreground traditionally 
feminine behaviours at certain times and are often especially engaged with their community. Within 
Polynesia there are also other gender groups such as the māhū from Hawaii and Tahiti who are birth 
assigned males who have feminine gender identities and roles and are attracted to men; and the fakaletī 
of Tonga who are birth assigned males who identify as women. In Thailand the Kathoey are birth 
assigned males who either identify as feminine or female, and many therefore seek hormonal and 
surgical assistance to feminise their bodies. 
Historically, the Neolithic ‘goddess’ Çatalhöyük evolved into Cybele whose worship spread from Asia 
to Phrygia and into ancient Greece in about the 6th century BCE where she had a uniquely trans-female 
priesthood (Feinberg, 1996). Unrelatedly, but only a little after this in the fifth century BCE, Herodotus 
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refers to the Scythians being diseased with morbus feminarium in what was supposed to be divine 
retribution. He called them Anandrii (Murjan & Bouman, 2015) and described them as follows: 
“Their beard falls off; their genital organs atrophy; their amorous desires 
disappear; their voice becomes feeble; their body loses its force and energy, 
and at last they come to a condition where they partake of feminine costume, 
and assimilate to women in many of their occupations” (Beard, 1886).  
In Rome in 390 B.C.E laws were enacted condemning the “…infamy of the manly body transformed 
into the feminine one…” (Cantarella, 1992, p.177) suggesting that trans practices continued at that 
time. And indeed they continued thereafter. Staying within Europe (although of course trans practices 
and identities were occurring elsewhere also) trans was frequently elided with witchcraft and 
condemned by the Christian church, as in the synods of the sixth and seventh centuries. Indeed in the 
ninth century a popular guidebook dictated penance for men who cross dressed and in the thirteenth 
century an inquisitor in France denounced cross gender expression (Delcourt, 1961). All of this 
occurred, of course alongside a great number of phenotypically female ‘male’ saints such as Pelagia, 
Margarita, Marinus, Athanasia, Eugenia, Appollinaria, and many more, as well as the [in]famous 
legendary pope Joan. 
More recently, Feinberg (1996) reports that between 1707 and 1730 Societies for the Reformation of 
Manners launched attacks against “effeminate sodomites amongst the London poor” (Davis, 1975, 
pp.167-168) who were then called Mollies and who congregated in Molly Houses. Feinberg reports that 
on one occasion in 1725 (in a striking parallel to the Stonewall riots over three hundred years later) the 
oppressed [trans] ‘mollies’ “many of them in drag met the raid with determined and violent resistance” 
(ibid).  
In the modern era we can trace trans through a series of pinpoint examples of trans people who 
became known about in the wider culture from Elbe (Murjan & Bouman, 2015) to Cowell (Cowell, 
1954) to Mahlsdorf (Mahlsdorf, 1992) to Jorgensen (Jorgensen, 1967), to Cossey (Cossey 1992) to 
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Bornstein (Bornstein, 2012), Wilchins (Wilchins, 1997), Whittle (Self & Gamble, 2000) and so to 
Serano, (2007), Bergman (2009) and thus to Dana International, and later Conchita, winning the 
Eurovision song contest; Anna Grodzka being elected as a member of the Polish Parliament; and very 
recently trans woman Laverne Cox on the cover of Time magazine. 
Rates and ratios of trans people 
It seems, therefore, that trans people are fairly historically and globally ubiquitous, although actual rates 
of trans, and transsexuality specifically, in the general population are hard to obtain. This is because 
many trans people do not require or seek treatment, meaning they never come to the attention of 
demographers. Notwithstanding this, the World Professional Association for Transgender Health 
(WPATH) suggests that 1:12,000 birth assigned males14 are transsexual with 1:30,000 birth assigned 
females being so – giving a ratio of 1:2.5 (HBIGDA, 2001). The American Psychiatric Association put 
the [global] rates at 14:100,000 for birth assigned males and 3:100,000 for birth assigned females giving 
a ratio of 4.6:1, although they note that this varies between 6:1 and 1:1 with Japan and Poland having 
reversed sex ratios; and all figures likely to be rather low due to data collection methods used (APA, 
2013a). In Belgium De Cuypere, et al (2007) found rates of 1:11,900 birth assigned males and 1:30,400 
birth assigned females giving a ratio of 1:2.55 whereas in Singapore Tsoi (1988) found (comparatively 
high) rates of 1:2,900 birth assigned males and 1:8,300 birth assigned females giving a ratio of 1:2.86. 
These studies mainly concerned transsexual people approaching Gender Identity Clinics (GICs) which 
one might imagine would mean that the participants would be rather more committed to their trans 
identities or requiring of physical change than people drawn from other sources, and so would suggest 
a smaller ratio of trans to cisgender people in the general population. Indeed, in a primary care study in 
Scotland Wilson Sharp & Carr (1999) found rates of: 1:7440 for birth assigned males 1:31,153 for birth 
assigned females with a sex ratio of 1:4.1. Using similarly good quality data, the Calderdale NHS 
Primary Care Trust reported that 1:5000 (0.02%) of its population were seeking some form of trans-
                                                 
14‘Birth assigned’ referrers to birth assigned sex, thus a trans woman would be a ‘birth assigned male’. Referring to birth 
assigned sex in demographics such as these obviates the potential problem of referring to differences between gender 
identity (who one believes one is) and gender presentation (who one presents as being) later in life. 
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related healthcare at a ratio of 1:4 birth assigned males to birth assigned females respectively (NHS 
Calderdale, 2009); and using New Zealand passport holder’s information Veale (2008) found 
[estimated] rates of 1:3,639 birth assigned males and 1:22,714 birth assigned females giving a ratio of 
1:6.24; although Veale suggests this sex ratio may be due to an over inclusion of birth assigned females 
in the data set which did not have a gender marked. Within the US eminent psychologist Randi Ettner 
suggests that (although not necessarily identifying as transsexual or seeking services as in the examples 
above) some 8-10% of the United States population has a degree of gender dysphoria15 (Ettner, 1999). 
This implies that, far from being a niche concern, trans people are not uncommon, and indeed may be 
becoming more common (Reed, Rhodes, Schofield & Wylie, 2011) - or more likely, given some of the 
biological research on aetiology discussed below, simply more visible.  
Consequently, although trans people are no more likely than the general population to have any form 
of psychopathology (Cole, O'Boyle, Emory & Meyer III, 1997; Colizzi, Costa & Todarello, 2014; 
Haraldsen & Dahl, 2000; Hill, Rozanski, Carfagnini & Willoughby, 2005; Hoshiai et al, 2010; Kersting 
et al, 2003; Simon et al, 2011), given these population numbers it is likely that some trans people will 
seek the services of a counselling psychologist for a variety of matters, much as the rest of the 
population does (Firth, 2015), but may nonetheless still require sensitivities pertaining to their life 
circumstances, including their sexuality.  
The relation of trans people to the psy professions 
Unfortunately trans people have not been well served by psychology and psychiatry in the past 
(Dickinson, Cook, Playle and Hallett, 2012), especially in the time period where Western medicine took 
over from much religious teaching regarding morality. Prior to this, as seen above, trans expression was 
often prohibited by religious edict or exegesis and indeed it has been argued that much of the current 
medicalization of ‘paraphilias’ has been as a result of the secularisation of such ‘sin’ into a medical 
discourse (Bullough & Bullough, 1977). This was driven by such works as Krafft-Ebing’s (1886) 
                                                 
15The word ‘dysphoria’ is the antonym of ‘euphoria’. The term Gender Dysphoria is also a diagnostic term used in the DSM 
(APA, 2013a) which will be capitalised here to differentiate it and so aid clarity. 
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Psychopathia sexualis: Eine klinisch-forensische studie (Sexual psychopathy: A clinical-forensic study); Ellis’ 
(1897–1928) seven volume series Studies in the Psychology of Sex; and Hirschfeld’s (1938) Sexual Anomalies 
and Perversions which sought to bring into a ‘scientific’ medical framework sexual and gender variation 
which had previously been considered sinful or, occasionally (and usually prior to the eighteenth 
century), as part of natural variation. Thus as sin moves into medicine and out of ecclesiastical 
delineation it has become ‘perversion’ (Morgan & Ruszczynski, 2006), or ‘paraphilia’ as in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), Version 5 (APA, 2013a); and 
the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) current International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Version 
10 (WHO, 1992). More recently, there have been contentions around whether there should be medical 
intervention into some sexuality and gender matters at all - as in the imbroglios over masturbation, 
‘nymphomania’, and the removal of homosexuality from the DSM III (Minton, 2002).  
Historically there was little discrimination made in medical and public circles between transsexualism, 
same-sex attraction, and transvestitism. For example Krafft-Ebbing (1906) writes – nominally of 
homosexuality - “Feeling, thought, will the whole character, in cases of the complete development of 
the anomaly correspond with the peculiar sexual instinct, but not with those which the individual 
represents anatomically and physiologically” (p.336). Indeed the term transsexualismus was introduced as 
late as 1923 by German sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld, and American sexologist David Oliver Caudwell 
introduced the term transsexualism in 1949 only for those wishing to change physiological sex. However, 
he regarded surgery as an unacceptable treatment and advocated that transsexualism should be seen as a 
mental disorder.  
Consequently trans began being listed as a mental disorder in the ICD 8 (WHO, 1965) and the DSM 
III (APA, 1980) prior to which it was not considered to be a discrete condition (cf. Meyerowitz, 2002). 
There has been much debate around whether it should continue to be retained within a psychiatric 
taxonomy given (as detailed below) there is no attendant psychopathology beyond that associated with 
minority stress. This change in conceptualisation has led many people to suggest that it is inappropriate 
to continue to diagnose trans as a mental disorder (cf. Ault & Brzuzy, 2009; Bockting & Ehrbar, 2006; 
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Drescher, 2010; Karasic & Drescher, 2005; Lev, 2006; Meyer-Bahlburg, 2010; Winters & Ehrbar, 2010). 
Some people have argued, however, that trans feelings may be the cause of anxiety or distress, and so, 
while not in themselves psychopathological, they should be retained within the psychiatric taxonomies 
(APA, 2013b); While others, including myself, have responded by suggesting that psychiatric 
taxonomies do not (and should not) generally list causes of anxiety and depression, but rather 
symptoms and syndromes (Bentall, 2003; Richards, 2007; 2015) - and that were one to list all of the 
potential causes of distress in human beings, the DSM and ICD would be prohibitively long. Indeed it 
has been questioned why it is these particular causes of distress relating to gender and sexuality (and not 
other matters) which have been chosen for inclusion in these taxonomies; and arguments have been 
made that this is a moral judgement where removal would be a “…public relations disaster for 
psychiatry.” (Spitzer, 2005 cited in Kleinplatz & Moser, 2005 p.137). 
However, we might perhaps more charitably consider the bureaucratic need for some form of diagnosis 
for those people seeking assistance with associated distress in order to access treatment – the argument 
against this being that an Anxiety or Depressive Disorder alone would serve equally well, without the 
need for a stated cause in the diagnosis itself. Nonetheless, this argument for a bureaucratic and 
pragmatic need to retain the diagnoses is the one made by the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 
2013b) and so the diagnoses have been retained within the new DSM 5 (APA, 2013a) as Gender 
Dysphoria (replacing Gender Identity Disorder in recognition that people who are dysphoric about their 
gender are not defacto disordered) in a new eponymous chapter all its own; and Transvestic Disorder  
which remains within the Paraphilic Disorders chapter for those people who have an erotic association 
with wearing clothes not normally worn by people of that birth assigned sex. The diagnosis of 
Transvestic Disorder has specifiers relating to Fetishism and Autogynephilia16 (although not 
Autoandrophilia17) on the basis that fetishism is likely to decrease the likelihood of a birth assigned 
male developing gender dysphoria whereas autogynephilia increases that likelihood (APA, 2013a). 
                                                 
16 Erotic arousal at the thought of oneself as a woman. 
17 Erotic arousal at the thought of oneself as a man. 
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In contrast, it is likely that the World Health Organisation will replace the current term Transsexualism 
with Gender Incongruence (Bouman, Richards, Whitcomb, de Vries, & Kreukels, in prep) and remove it 
from the ‘Psychiatric disorders and diseases’ section and instead place it within a new section entitled; 
‘Conditions related to sexual and gender health’ in recognition of its lack of associated 
psychopathology. At present it is not envisaged that the ICD 11 will have a diagnosis pertaining to 
transvestitism at all as non-erotic transvestitism would be subsumed within the diagnosis of Gender 
Incongruence, which would be broadened to include it instead of being an updated version of 
Transsexualism. It is notable that both the proposed diagnosis of Gender Incongruence in the ICD and 
the extant diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria in the DSM contain provision for people outside the gender 
binary of male or female. For example, the diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria requires that one feels 
(among other things)18: 
…4. A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender different 
from one’s assigned gender) 
5. A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative gender 
different from one’s assigned gender) 
6. A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the 
other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender) (APA, 
2013a, p. 452)  
This shift towards a more nuanced view of both gender, and sexualities which eroticise transition, has 
been encapsulated not only in the proposed and extant movement and renaming in the ICD and DSM 
of Gender Incongruence and Gender Dysphoria respectively; and the proposed redaction of 
transvestism from the ICD; but also with the addition of a clear ‘Criterion B’ in the DSM 5. Criterion B 
is a distress or impairment criterion used in many diagnoses pertaining to sexuality in the DSM. It 
requires that in order for a diagnosis to be made (and so pathology to be assumed) “The fantasies, 
                                                 
18 Italics in the following quote are my own. 
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sexual urges, or behaviours [must] cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” (APA, 2013a, p. 702). Thus for someone 
assigned male at birth to simply enjoy wearing clothes usually worn by birth assigned females is no 
longer sufficient to merit a diagnosis. 
Historically this necessity for actual dysfunction prior to diagnosis was moot as early psychoanalytic 
theories posited de-facto neurosis in relation to an oedipal complex, castration complexes, and ‘faulty’ 
identification with the ‘opposite’ sex parent (Fenichel, 1930; Segal, 1965). Other early theories included 
ones concerning learning and development such as the influence of parents’ wish for a different sex 
child (Stoller, 1964), and social gender identity development (Money, Hampson & Hampson, 1957) (cf. 
Murjan & Bouman, 2015). While these theories have little or no evidence to support them, for some 
time they were considered valid and consequently both groups of people - those who have a permanent 
identity as another sex and those for whom the feeling is periodic - received treatment for ‘perversions’, 
‘deviance’, or ‘paraphilias’ -  sometimes because they were asked to by friends and family (Crown, 
1983); sometimes because there was a problem which it was felt needed addressing by professionals (as 
often in the clinical literatures, Junginger, 1997); and sometimes because the person themselves felt that 
they were in need of treatment due to social opprobrium when, in fact, their gender presentation or 
sexuality was harmless (Barrett, 2007).  
Treatments for atypical gender expression - whether sexually motivated or not - have included aversion 
‘therapy’ utilising classical conditioning in which the cross-sex stimuli (such as clothing) was paired with 
an aversive stimuli in order to form an association and so to make the cross-sex stimuli aversive. These 
‘therapies’ included the use of electric shocks (Marks & Gelder 1967; Marks, Rachman & Gelder 1967); 
nausea (Raymond, 1956; 1969); and foul odours (Junginger 1997; Laws 2001), however they had a 
limited [or no] efficacy and are understandably controversial (Krueger & Kaplan, 2002). More recently, 
operant conditioning designed to positively reinforce birth-assigned sex stereotypical behaviours has 
been, rather unsuccessfully, used through token economies in inpatient settings (Mukaddes, 2002; 
Schlonski & Adams, 1997). 
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As these approaches have been unsuccessful, enlightened clinicians have endeavoured to help trans 
people though physiological interventions. One of the first reported cases of surgical interventions was 
Dora-R in 1921 in Germany who, under the care of Hirschfeld, underwent genital surgery between 
1921 and 1930. The world wars also brought advances in plastic surgery which allowed penile 
construction for trans men. In 1948 Harry Benjamin, an American endocrinologist and sexologist, 
began treating trans women using Premarin, an equine oestrogen first formulated 1941. Testosterone 
was also used to treat trans males sometime after this - although the record is less clear in this regard. 
Harry Benjamin also formed the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (now 
the World Professional Association for Transgender Health, WPATH) which published its first 
treatment guidelines in 1979, and published the 7th edition in 2011. The first standards of care for trans 
people in the UK were published in 2013 (RCP, 2013) and are arguably more appropriate for a 
socialised healthcare system such as the National Health Service (NHS). Throughout the standards of 
care, the role of the psychologist, and other mental health practitioners, is emphasised, especially in 
terms of support and evaluation; and the role of the patient as an active participant in their own care is 
paramount. 
Due to this change in conceptualisation of trans away from the problem-based understanding detailed 
above, and towards one of empowerment and diversity (BPS, 2012; Lev, forthcoming 2016; Richards & 
Barker, 2013), there has also been a recent marked turn away from pathologisation discourses among 
those people who have such identities and practices and toward a sense of community building and 
support. This mirrors the community building and acceptance of homosexuality in many high per 
capita income nations since the late 1970s (Weeks, 1999; 2007). Such community building is often via 
the internet, although sometimes also through face-to-face group meetings - most commonly in large 
urban areas (cf. Wilchins, 1997; Bornstein & Bergman, 2010). Trans people, especially those who are 
part of such communities, are quite commonly aware of the debates and history regarding diagnosis 
and treatment which can therefore colour therapeutic relations. This is exacerbated when trans people 
see clinicians as a rather homogenous entity as is not uncommon both in the consulting room and the 
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literatures. For example, the literatures quite often refer to a position taken by ‘the medical model’ or 
‘the psy disciplines’ (e.g. Hines & Sanger, 2010) - thus not allowing for diversity of opinion within these 
disciplines, or indeed often the possibility that a person may be both trans and a clinician.  
Notwithstanding this, as we have seen, trans people have historically been ill-served by health 
professionals in relation to their gender and sexuality, perhaps especially within gender clinics. For 
example, trans people have historically had to be heterosexual in their identified gender to be thought 
appropriate for physical interventions – i.e. a trans man was required to be gynephilic and a trans 
woman androphilic (Green & Money, 1969). Similarly trans people were expected to wear rather gender 
dichotomous clothing in order to be accepted – trans women were expected to wear skirts, etc., 
although fortunately this is no longer the case within the United Kingdom (UK). Intersecting with this 
concern around the control of the lived realities of trans people’s lives by clinicians, is concern around 
the co-option of trans people’s narratives and understandings of their lives by clinicians - again perhaps 
especially those clinicians in gender clinics who have the capacity to grant or deny access to treatments 
required by the trans people.  
One key concern of many trans people in this area of clinical appropriation and misinterpretation of 
their lives, for example, is that of the concept of autogynephilia – the notion that a trans woman is 
erotically aroused at the thought of herself as a woman; and conversely (although with less political 
attention) the concept of autoandrophilia – the notion that a trans man is erotically aroused at the 
thought of himself as a man. Attendant to this is the use of the term ‘homosexual’ or ‘non-homosexual’ 
(relating to birth assigned sex) to refer to the trans person’s preferred sexual partners. The idea of 
autogynephilia was first popularised by Blanchard (1989) and was taken up by Bailey (2003) and 
Lawrence (2013) among others. Many people, however, vigorously disagree with the idea (e.g. Moser, 
2009; Serano, 2008; 2010) as it obviates trans people’s sense of gender as being to do with their felt 
sense of self - and not for reasons of eroticism. Similarly, the terms ‘homosexual’ or ‘non-homosexual’ 
obviate the gender of the trans person in their implicit suggestion that the birth assigned gender is the 
‘true’ gender. Peer reviewed papers in major international journals such as Levine’s (2014) What is more 
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bizarre: The transsexual or transsexual politics? And Green’s (2008) Lighten up ladies perhaps give some 
indication as to the tenor of the debate. Of particular note for our purposes here, however, is that 
notable clinician-researchers such as Prof Ken Zucker and Professor Peggy Cohen-Kettenis 
(psychologists based in Canada and the Netherlands respectively) have also engaged with the construct 
of autogynephilia and/or ‘homosexual’ and ‘non-homosexual’ (e.g. Wallien, Zucker, Steensma & 
Cohen-Kettenis, 2008; Zucker, et al. 2012) in their published literature, meaning that trans people who 
are familiar with the academic field (of which there are many, Barrett, 2007) are concerned that 
clinicians, both abroad and in the UK, are not respectful of their lived experiences. This naturally 
impacts upon clinical rapport; and further upon the constructions of trans people’s understandings and 
realities vis-a-vis gender clinics themselves (cf. Sanger, 2010). Indeed there was a demonstration of both 
psychologists and trans clients when Prof Zucker spoke at the BPS Clinical Psychology Conference in 
2011 (Tosh, 2011).  
This wariness around clinicians by trans people is exacerbated by clinicians who concentrate on gender 
identity to the exclusion of other factors (indicating a lack of horizontalisation at best) and so induce 
marginalisation and decreased rapport in the consulting room (Benson, 2013; Scarpella, 2011); possibly 
further marginalising trans people in their general outlook (Kidd, Veltman, Gately, Chan & Cohen, 
2011; Davy, 2010; cf. Moon, 2008). Indeed research with trans people in the UK cites fear of being 
discriminated against as one of the key barriers to seeking assistance - even when seeking therapy for 
unrelated matters (Hunt, 2014). There is also a lack of training on LGBTQ issues in general for 
psychotherapists (Rutherford, McIntyre, Daley & Ross, 2012) and nursing staff [among others] (Singer, 
2013), with general therapists often unfamiliar with needs of trans people (Lombardi, 2001) and 
therapists high on trait religiosity more likely to be biased against trans people (Wilson, et al, 2014). 
Further, therapists have been found to struggle with finding appropriate language (Langer, 2011), 
perhaps because sexuality and gender are complex issues which can make people uncomfortable and 
therefore less able to communicate effectively. On the part of the client this communication difficulty 
sometimes stems from fearing that they would be misunderstood (BPS, 2012); or that they may be 
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breaking a social taboo around speaking about sexuality and how it intersects with their gender (Davies 
& Neal, 1996). From the clinician’s perspective, there may similarly be fear around that taboo, and also 
concern that professional standing may be reduced through appearing ignorant (Neal & Davies, 2000). 
This failure to communicate effectively can sometimes lead to superficial relating in which empty, 
socially accepted, aphorisms are used in place of deeper interlocution and intersubjectivity (Richards, 
2014c). Buber (1958) refers to this as an I-It relating rather than and I-Thou relating. I-thou relating 
when applied to the work of a counselling psychologist and client in this area would mean weaving 
together an intersubjective experience relating to sexuality as it actually is. 
Given the history above, counselling psychologists would seem especially well placed to offer a place 
for therapy and assistance to trans people due to the fact that counselling psychology doesn’t seek to 
neatly encapsulate experience within a traditional [positivist] ‘scientific framework’ but instead “…has 
been theoretically influenced by postmodern thinking and pluralism” (Clarke and Loewenthal, 2015, 
p.281). It consequently endeavours to hold tensions – including between postmodern understandings 
and the wider “psy” field (Clarke and Loewenthal, 2015; Orlans & Van Scoyoc, 2009), and seeks to get 
‘alongside’ the client to explore their world phenomenologically; again something which is a step 
change from the impositions detailed above. 
Sexuality and gender 
One means of this getting alongside the client is a consideration of a number of different strands of 
knowledge: the academic, the applied, and the community literatures – a number of different 
epistemologies if you will. An understanding of these can act as a means of understanding the contexts 
of our clients and so moving towards the more intersubjective relating, that is the sine qua non of the 
counselling psychological practice (BPS, 2004). This will allow counselling psychologists to have 
knowledge of trans from a number of different angles such that the specific client’s difficulties are able 
to be tentatively contextualised - naturally with the client driving such contextualisation – and so good 
rapport established (Richards & Barker, 2013). This should allow for the counselling psychologist to see 
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the client in a fuller sense and for the client to feel the counselling psychologist is less ‘other’ – and so 
open the possibility of co-constructing an intersubjective mode of relating. On the part of counselling 
psychologist this requires epoché, (which, it has been argued, can never be total, Langdridge, 2007; 
2014) and reflexivity regarding biases (Etherington, 2004). Consequently it is necessary to ‘know [more 
of] what we do not know’ through an engagement with the literatures which will identify possible 
lacuna. It will also enable consideration and expansion of what we do indeed [tentatively] hold as a valid 
construction which will further our understandings in order that our clients are not educating us with 
basic information on a topic they are engaged with (BPS, 2012).  
Unfortunately for the counselling psychologist seeking simple, quality information on trans and 
sexuality to inform their practice, the professional literatures in this area have a tendency to be rather 
fraught and polemic as seen above (see also Hird, 2002a; 2002b; Wilton, 2002; and Sanger, 2010; 
Richards & Lenihan, 2012). As we have seen, this is particularly the case where some parties suggest 
that transsexual people (predominately trans women) necessarily sexualise their gender (e.g. Bailey, 
2003; Blanchard, 1991; Lawrence, 2013), whereas others vigorously disagree (e.g. Moser, 2009; Serano, 
2008), perhaps without either group necessarily fully giving due consideration to the feelings of many 
trans people themselves. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, such appropriation of trans voices 
has historical routes reaching back to Krafft-Ebing’s (1906) medical classification of trans people and 
beyond. Where most work agrees, however, is that trans people’s sexuality is heterogeneous, with trans 
people having any of the sexualities cisgender people may have (Barrett, 2007; Bockting, Benner & 
Coleman, 2009; Stryker, 2008). Indeed The Journal of Homosexuality included a special issue in 2014 on 
trans people’s sexuality which included (in no particular order) asexuality, threesomes, role-playing, 
BDSM, polyamory, stud, butch, femme, lesbian, gay, heterosexual, etc., to name only a few. Many of 
these papers are considered below, however some papers, such as Crawford’s (2014) Derivative plumbing: 
Redesigning washrooms, bodies, and trans affects in ds+r’s brasserie, need not concern us here; and others such 
as Bettcher (2014) are theoretical and so are included elsewhere. 
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One key paper in the special issue was Schilt and Windsor (2014) which included data from interviews 
with seventy-four trans men primarily about experiences within the workplace (Schilt, 2010) and within 
health care systems (Windsor, 2006); which was then aggregated concerning bodies and sexuality into 
their 2014 paper. Of course such aggregation carries with it issues of concern around whether the 
environment would influence the responses, and as such whether aggregation is appropriate. 
Notwithstanding this,  of note to us here is that they suggest that their participants, instead of having a 
‘body’ a ‘gender’ and a ‘sexuality’, have instead a “sexual habitus” which consists of; Embodiment; 
Gender identity; Erotic ideation; Lifetime of sexual practices; and Domain of potential partners. They 
posit that this is a dynamic process which evolves over the lifetime. It follows therefore that as this is a 
dynamic process it is likely to be heterogeneous across trans people, which is similar to that which we 
have seen above. 
Also noting a degree of heterogeneity are Doorduin, and Van Berlo (2014) who used semi-structured 
interviews with twelve participants roughly evenly divided between trans men and trans women. As I 
explore below, this split of gender is not easily achieved in an objective sense, except, perhaps through 
participant self-identification (which is, after all a very reasonable thing to accept, provided it is 
identified as such in the method). Accepting this split, Doorduin, and Van Berlo (2014) noted that 
some participants renegotiated their sexual identity as they transitioned – again in a dynamic process - 
with some identifying as asexual for some of the time and not at other times. Some participants 
reported experiences of sexual ambivalence; aversion; and sadness when considering the difference 
between their bodies and their identities in sexual situations. This suggested a link between 
sexuality/sexual expression and embodiment which Doorduin, and Van Berlo (2014) report did not 
always abate after hormones and/or surgeries – an interesting finding which leaves open questions of 
the nature of sexuality and embodiment. They also noted that sexual desire changed when people had 
cross-sex hormones and surgeries as people re-learned which activities brought pleasure; again 
suggesting that sexuality may change as people undertake their transitions, but not detailing how this 
might come about.  
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Maher (2011) also investigated the experience of transition. In her study she asked three African 
American trans women to produce two drawings – one of a bridge connecting one place to another 
place; and one illustrating their experience of gender transition. This was then followed by an interview. 
Although only working with three participants, Mahe identified four themes from the drawings: 
Identity; Identity formation/evolution; Change; and Restricted affect. Six themes were also identified 
from the interviews being: Importance of identity; Role of family; Dislike of labels; Transphobia and 
societal issues; Courage to transition; and Hormones and/or surgical interventions as a part of 
transition. These themes reflect the findings outlined from the other papers above; and of note here are 
the themes of evolution and change which may appear trivial in relation to trans people - but which 
upon closer inspection seem to have an almost fractal-like complex iteration the deeper one investigates 
and which have opened my thinking to the wider horizons of possibilities this implies.  
Ekins (1997) also noted this idea of change, although, as his study is early, it is perhaps less nuanced 
than those which built upon it. Ekins used grounded theory to investigate the lives of a number of birth 
assigned males engaged in “male-femaling” over seventeen years; and found that they progressed from 
what he termed “beginning femaling” through to “consolidating femaling” as they consolidated their 
female selves. This consisted of “body femaling”, “erotic femaling”, and “gender femaling” although as 
Davy (2008) notes, this was predominately in the contexts of transvestite subcultures and may not be 
generalisable to the trans people (female, male, or non-binary) who do not have an erotic motivation 
for their living or acting in a gender not of their birth assigned sex. 
Davy’s own (2008) work consisted of a thematic analysis of interviews with trans people in order to 
investigate trans people’s “bodily aesthetics” (p.1) which Davy characterises as “a set of discourses, 
practices, perceptions, and experiences of embodiment” (ibid). Davy again noted heterogeneity and 
wielded critical theory to suggest that, unlike Ekins (1997) postulate; trans peoples’ bodies can become 
part of their identities in a sort of feed-back loop - rather than necessarily only being a reflection of that 
identity. 
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Continuing with the theme of embodied identity, Lawrence (2005) undertook a quantitative 
questionnaire analysis of two-hundred and thirty-two patients of one genital surgeon. Lawrence found 
that before genital surgery 54% of participants were predominantly attracted to women and 9% to men; 
whereas after genital surgery, these figures were 25% and 34%, respectively. Of note is that 85% of 
participants experienced orgasm after genital surgeries. Sadly there are no papers which specifically 
record this data for trans men. Again this quantitative paper shows that, for those people undergoing 
genital surgeries at least, there is likely to be an evolving period of change involving the body, identity, 
and sexuality which form complex embodiment in the wider sense; and which leave open questions 
about the meanings of such embodiment for the people involved. 
Using the qualitative method of grounded theory again, Atnas, Milton and Archer (2015) investigated 
the transitioning experiences of eleven trans men. Atnas, Milton and Archer (2015) created a complex 
and incisive model of this process which will not be reproduced here for reasons of brevity; however it 
is notable that key themes were Authenticity; [finding] Knowledge and information; and Making the 
decision to change; - which again reflects the importance of time and change in the process of 
transition. Atnas, Milton and Archer’s (2015) participants identified as bisexual (4); straight (3); gay (2); 
and other (2) suggesting again a degree of heterogeneity in their authentic sexual selves which is at odds 
with older literatures which suggest trans people are necessarily heterosexual in their identified genders 
(e.g. Green, & Money, 1969). 
Following the theme of complex embodiment after a decision to transition, Rubin (2003) investigated 
twenty-two trans men using the Foucauldian method of genealogy to consider the similarities between 
trans and intersex19 people in the social world. He also used phenomenological enquiry to identify the 
men’s lived experience and the production of their knowledge and action for themselves (of which 
more below). As part of this, he considered the “body-for-the-self” - being the body one is aware of 
being; and the “body-for-others” - which is that which others perceive and which one may be alienated 
                                                 
19 Intersex is a term used to refer to the condition of having physiology which does not fall neatly into categories of either 
male or female. The term Diversity or Disorder of Sex Development (DSD) may also be used. (Richards & Barker, 2013) 
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from. Although Rubin (2003) does not mention this explicitly, this theory follows Husserl’s (1973) 
differentiation between Leib and Körper as a prereflective body and the experience of body respectively. 
Of course - as Rubin (2003) notes - this notion of the body-for-others (particularly when it is markedly 
disjointed from one’s notion of what it should be) is a key element in trans men’s lives – and we might 
argue that of trans women and non-binary people also. 
This disjoint between what one is and what one is to others was reflected in Iantaffi & Bockting’s 
(2011) internet based quantitative and qualitative study. Internet studies are useful, of course, in 
reaching many people – especially some who are hard to reach - but can sometimes lack the immediacy 
of face-to-face encounters. Nonetheless, they found that many trans people reference 
heteronormativity (and the bodily facets of this) in their relationships; but that those trans people with 
better mental health - as measured by a number of psychometric instruments - were less concerned by 
heteronormativity (and were therefore more heterogeneous). Iantaffi and Bockting (2011) suggest this 
puts trans people into something of a quandary as to whether to conform to societal [heteronormative] 
norms or to transgress these and so gain improved mental health – an important consideration in and 
of itself for counselling psychologists working with these client groups.  
We can see then that there are a number of studies on trans gender and sexuality using a variety of 
methodologies which often consider the complex interplay between body, sexuality, and identity and 
intriguingly - in the Iantaffi & Bockting (2011) study - to the notion that an acceptance of that 
complexity, especially in the social sphere, may be beneficial for mental health. This complexity, of 
course, will also play out in trans people’s intimate relationships and it is to this we turn next. 
Trans people’s partners 
There are a number of studies which examine the experienced of trans people’s intimate [usually sexual] 
partners. There are, however, few studies of trans people’s partnerships where both parties are trans. 
One of these is Idso (2009) who conducted a phenomenological analysis of two couples’ partnerships; 
in one, both parties were trans; and in the other, one person was trans and one cisgender. Although 
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only interviewing two couples, Idso identified the following themes as being important in maintaining 
the relationships: Acceptance, support, identity development, and intimacy – which appears to mirror 
Iantaffi & Bockting (2011) in that acceptance of oneself, and acceptance by others, is a key theme. 
Ettner (2007) also examined partnerships where both people were trans, interviewing 20 couples (40 
people) and finding that they met through gender related services (i.e. a gender clinic waiting room) and 
had later sexual encounters than the general population – they also rated communication and talking as 
far more important than physical sexual encounters. Ettner noted that the relationships were enduring 
ones and that after ten years the relationships continued. Half Ettner’s participants attributed this to 
feeling like the relationship was a “last chance”; whereas half found “…the abandonment of gender 
stereotypical role behavior exhilarating” (Ettner, 2007, p. 115) showing that abandonment of 
heteronormativity seems to be a key theme in several studies. This is interesting as such focus is has 
been placed on adherence to gender norms previously (e.g. Gelder & Marks, 1969; Raymond, 1979). 
In contrast to these studies, many researchers (e.g. Sanger, 2010) seek to explain the phenomena of a 
cisgender person being in a relationship with a trans person without due consideration of the ethical 
place of the very endeavour of enquiry which positions intimacy between a trans and a cisgender 
person as being something requiring of research (Richards & Lenihan, 2012). This includes such studies 
as Freegard, (2000) who examined the phenomenology of ‘Living with a transvestite20’; and Hunt & 
Main (1997) who considered the “Sexual orientation confusion21 among spouses of transvestites and 
transsexuals following disclosure of spouse's gender dysphoria” (p.39). In general such studies found 
that the cisgender partners of trans people negotiate complex discourses both within themselves and 
with wider societies in order to maintain their sense of psychic and social integrity.  
Such studies did not, however, question the role of the studies themselves in impacting that integrity 
though implicitly suggesting that such partnerships were worthy of study and therefore potentially 
outside of the norm. For this reason there has been a call in some literature to study the everyday, 
                                                 
20 For ethical clarity it can be useful to hypothetically transpose another fundamentally innocuous demographic which 
people may offend . Imagine the ethical conundrum of proposing to study ‘living with a black person’ for example. 
21 Italics my own. 
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including cisgender heterosexuality (Rich, 1980; Warner, 2000) - a gender and sexuality which have their 
own set of clinical difficulties (Farvid; 2015; Mc Geeney and Harvey, 2015; Richards & Barker, 2013) 
and which bear inquiry into their own realities and understandings - as well as such research being a 
political act of balancing against that of inquiry into trans and non-heterosexual lives. The justification 
for the current work in this light will, of course, be considered below.  
In a similar vein Weinberg & Williams (2010) studied “Men sexually interested in transwomen22 
(MSTW)” positioning the cisgender men largely as the subject of inquiry, but not questioning fully why 
trans women may be interested in cisgender men; and retaining the ‘exoticism’ of the body of the trans 
women as the cultural object inscribed with meaning by the MSTW and the researchers - but not, 
crucially, the trans women themselves. This obviation of trans women’s self meaning making (in an 
embodied and social sense) was reflected in Forde (2011) who, as seen above, drew on the experiences 
of trans people’s partners’ attraction to trans people to question evolutionary theory and suggested that 
the primary reason for intimate relationships with trans people was to offer them support (in 
contravention of mate selection theories of evolution regarding reproduction). Of course, this obviates 
many trans people’s realities as people of their identified gender (e.g. Boylan, 2003; Jorgensen, 1967), 
and the wish of many trans people and their partners for reproductive options, assistive or otherwise 
(Richards & Seal, 2014; T’Sjoen, Van Caenegem & Wierckx, 2013; De Roo, Tilleman, T’Sjoen, & De 
Sutter, 2016). Indeed, these studies of the partners of trans people struggle to capture this experience of 
gendered authenticity by positioning trans people as others to be cared for by their [cisgender] partners. 
Tompkins (2014) argued strongly against this and used an ethnographic approach analysing YouTube 
videos and trans conferences to research the matter. Of course there are issues with using YouTube 
videos in that people will present in a certain way for that medium; however this need not necessarily 
be at odds with their identities elsewhere. He determined that - for a cohort consisting mainly of trans 
men and their cisgender female partners - the partners have an erotic, affective, and romantic 
                                                 
22 Interestingly this is usually separated as ‘trans women’ (as I have done here) such that trans is a specifier of a group of 
women - women with a trans history if you will – rather than a discrete category of humanity: Men, women, transwomen, 
[transmen]. 
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preference for them which is not fetishistic in nature. Tompkins therefore suggests a sex positive trans 
politics (and research) will incorporate trans people as a viable sexual partner without resorting to 
objectification of their trans status. Of note, also, is that most the of cisgender partners in these studies 
were female partners of trans women who were transitioning and this is, of course, a specific cohort 
and as such findings may vary with different gender forms and people at different stages of their life. 
Sex work and HIV risk 
This objectification within some of research above can unsurprisingly also been seen in accounts of 
trans people’s sex work. Just as much work on trans people’s partners considers sexuality, but not trans 
people’s own sexuality per se; sadly so too does the consideration of trans people’s sex work which 
does not always fully explore the subjective experience and desires of the trans people themselves. 
Trans people undertaking sex work is more common in countries without nationalised healthcare as the 
funds needed for physical changes, especially genital surgeries, are beyond the amounts most people, 
trans or otherwise, could hope to afford. For this reason much of the research has been done on trans 
people in the US where, until recently, Medicaid did not cover trans related treatments. As trans sex 
work is so common in such economic regions rates of HIV are correspondingly high (with shared 
needle use adding to the issue as people address their dysphoria though narcotics); one US study, for 
example, put HIV at a prevalence of 2.7% in trans women and 0.5% of trans men (Habarta, et al 2015). 
The reasons for this appear to be manifold – for example Clements, Kitano & Wilkinson (1997) found 
that low self esteem in trans women led to risky behaviours in sex and that, in trans men there was a 
higher rate of risky sex (Kenagy & Hsieh, 2005). Trans women were also more likely than trans men to 
use protection in sex work (Kenagy & Hsieh, 2005); however Nemoto, Operario, Keatley & Villegas 
(2004) noted that trans women also used unprotected sex to demonstrate love and commitment just as 
many heteronormatively married people do. Herbst, et al, (2008) found that 48.3% of trans females had 
casual sex; Bockting, Rosser & Coleman, (2000) found that trans males had poor sex negotiating skills; 
and shockingly Clements-Nolle, et al, (2001) found that 59% of trans males had been raped. 
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The disturbing figures above are not representative of the bulk of trans experiences of sexuality 
(Lenihan, Kainth & Dundas, 2015; Richards & Barker 2013), however they are worth bearing in mind 
as they inflect some of the community discourses around sexuality even in countries with nationalised 
healthcare; and also reflect the some of the academic literatures on this topic. This is especially the case 
in terms of the heteronormativly derived discourse around the hypersexualisation of trans women and 
the difficulties many literatures have with considering trans men to have a sexuality at all. 
Community discourses 
One area where counselling psychologists could be well served in their wish to get alongside their 
clients is through a consideration of the phenomenological literature detailed here, and also the ‘grey 
literatures’, community literatures, and biographies that form the body of work which represents trans 
people’s experiences from a different epistemological stance to that found within much of the academy. 
Indeed, Milton (2014a) comments that: “Counselling Psychology prides itself on its grasp of more than 
one narrow therapeutic literature” (p.17) and my hope is that this brief community literature review 
assists with that. In particular my intent is that it will aid in the pursuit of the ethical thread which, it is 
hoped, is woven throughout this work - that the respect thus paid weighs somewhat against the 
imposition (appropriation?) of the academy in trans people’s lives and therefore inflects both practice 
and research. As this is an [empirical] doctoral thesis a thorough review of literature found outside the 
academy will not be undertaken, but for the reasons above and also as a resource for the interested 
reader, community literatures are included below:  
The first of the early biographies by trans people tended to be ‘revelations’ about people’s trans lives 
such as Lili Elbe’s Man into woman. An authentic record of a change of sex: The true story of the miraculous 
transformation of the Danish painter Einar Wegener-Andreas Sparre (Hoyer, 1933) about one of the first 
recorded person to undergo genital reconstruction within modern western medicine; Mario Martino 
and harriett’s (1977) biography (one of the first about a trans man) Emergence: A transsexual autobiography; 
and Christine Jorgensen’s (1967) A Personal Autobiography which made much of her being a soldier when 
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in fact she had extremely limited military service. Jan Morris’ (1974) Conundrum: From James to Jan: An 
extraordinary personal narrative of transsexualism also included an interesting account of her work as a Times 
reporter on the successful ascent of Chomolungma (Everest). Within this time period Virginia Prince’s 
(1971) How to be a woman though male was a seminal ‘how to’ book for trans women, and men who 
expressed femininity. These biographies and Prince’s work nonetheless helped shape popular ideas 
about trans people as people and away from simply being grotesques or medical curiosities and are useful 
material for a consideration on where some contemporary discourses on trans have come from. This 
work continued with excellent autobiographies such as Dr Jenny Boylan’s (2003) She’s not there: A life in 
two genders and Dr Jamison Green’s (2004) superb Becoming a visible man. As with many of those above, 
trans people have often written biographies in which their trans status was accompanied by some other 
notable feature such as Mark Rees’ (1996). Dear sir or madam: The autobiography of a female-to-male 
transsexual which told of his struggle for legal recognition; and similarly Caroline Cossey’s (1992) My 
story in which she too detailed her efforts to gain legal recognition for her gender. Also notable was 
Charlotte von Mahlsdorf’s (1995 [1992]) Ich bin meine eigene frau which tells of her life under both the 
Nazis and National Socialism. 
In the 1990s the rise of postmodernism brought with it some biographies and biographical work which 
challenged the binary orthodoxy and its limitations, some of which included recollections of activist 
work by the authors. These included Leslie Feinberg’s (1993) ground breaking semi-autobiographical 
novel Stone Butch Blues; Kate Bornstein’s (2004) wonderful, seminal, Gender Outlaw and Riki Wilchins 
excellent (1997) Read my lips: Sexual subversion and the end of gender; as well as Queen and Schimel’s (1997) 
biographical edited collection PoMoSexuals. This trend has continued with Bornstein’s (2012) updated 
biography A queer and pleasant danger and Bornstein and Bergman’s (2010) edited collection Gender 
outlaws: The next generation. This is not to say that all biographical writing by, or about, trans people is 
now postmodern or non-binary as, while referencing such concepts, work such as Will Self’s 
investigation of masculinity Perfidious Man (which includes biographical work on professor Stephen 
Whittle, Self and Gamble, 2000), and Julia Serano’s (2007) Whipping Girl, are avowedly in support of 
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people’s self identity whether within the binary or otherwise. There are, of course, many more texts we 
could consider here both historically and in the present day; including many from within magazines and 
the internet such as Janet Mock and other’s increasingly visible work. Hopefully, however, these 
literatures will have given a snapshot of the recording of trans people’s lives within contemporary 
Western context. They are invaluable as they detail the lives of trans people very much as they are - 
albeit with the usual journalistic bias and risk of an overly positive light to mitigate the problems of 
these oft-marginalised groups. Notwithstanding this, the vast majority of these texts are remarkably 
candid and non-hagiographic. As such I find that it is useful to consider them as a means of 
understanding and relating to trans people as they are, in addition to the usual lens of a particular 
philosophical or professional discourse - and for this reason a number are referred to in this thesis.  
Existential literatures 
We can seen then that in many literatures trans people are seen as objects on which culturally inflected 
messages regarding heteronormativity (resisted or otherwise) are writ large. For example, in Winberg & 
Williams’ (2010) assumption that trans woman’s penises are ignored if their male partner is heterosexual 
or incorporated if he is bisexual. As stated above, despite their heterogeneity, the experience of the 
trans people themselves are often lost in academic studies as cultural assumptions are played out on 
their [embodied] selves and lives both by any cisgender participants and by the researchers – all too 
often without due consideration of the ethical implications of this discourse. 
What of the specifically existential literature then? Unfortunately, the existential literature on sexuality 
in general is still sparse (Acton, 2010; Crabtree, 2009) - with the exception of Milton’s oeuvre (Milton 
1997; 2005 2007; 2014abc; Milton & Coyle, 2003). Indeed Cohn (2014 [1997]) notes that “Sexuality has 
been strangely neglected” (p.62) and Spinelli (2014) states that: “Contemporary existential authors had 
said little on this enormous topic” (p.22). Although it is notable that Cohn’s words from his much 
referenced article were reproduced in Milton’s (2014b) recent (and seminal) edited collection and some 
of the work touched upon below in relation to homosexuality (Medina, 2008) and affirmative therapy 
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(Langdridge, 2014) for example, are evidence of a developing field to which this thesis hopes to add. 
There have also been papers within the existential tradition such as Chung (1994) and Kahr (1994) on 
child sexual abuse by cisgender people, but that topic is outwith the remit of this thesis which considers 
only consensual sexual matters and so will not be discussed further. The existential literature on trans 
people’s sexuality specifically is almost non-existent - with only Richards (2011b; 2014b; 2014c) and, as 
we see below, Leighton (1999), touching on this theme to my knowledge; and then only really as part of 
a consideration of trans people’s experiences in the wider sense.  
What extant work there is on sexuality in general in the existential canon often concerns the old 
argument as to whether such things as sexuality and gender can be considered to be ‘givens’ in the 
stable, fixed, existential sense; or more ephemeral (although still deeply felt) expressions of the thrown 
world, which have the possibility of manifold expression. For example Cohn (2014 [1997]) argues that 
existential sexuality does not allow such things as a fixed identity as a gay man, lesbian woman, or 
indeed heterosexual person because “An existential-phenomenological perspective cannot accept the 
imposition of such an inflexible socio-cultural grid – without any regard for interaction, history or 
context – or existence.”(p.66) and further that; “For the existential psychotherapist, homosexuality is 
not a condition brought about by specific factors, but a way of being in which whatever is ‘given’ is 
most delicately intertwined with our responses” (p.67). Houghtaling (2013) expands upon this by 
theorising “…sexuality through an ontology of becoming that takes into account the diverse, multi-
faceted nature of sexuality as a series of temporal experiences, attractions, desires, sensations, practices, 
and identities” (p. ii) and that; “Because both the body and the self are contingent becomings that are 
open to instability and change, so too is sexuality.” (ibid). In a similar vein Leighton (1999) argues that 
existential philosophy implies that trans people should expand their idea of a given gender (which 
Houghtaling, 2013, characterises as a ‘contingent becoming’), rather than endeavouring to transition 
into another gender, as seen in his statement that: “I want to see men who have ‘felt they were women’ 
challenging the boundaries of what it means to be a man” (p.160). This differs from Schilt and Windsor 
 35 
 
(2014) above, who suggest that trans men’s sexual habitus is an evolving part of the self which includes 
embodiment, but which also allows for a stable identity as a man. 
To me this suggestion that gender (and perhaps especially trans gender) is not a coherent entity reads as 
another appropriation of trans (and implicitly non-heterosexual) lives in the service of a stance or 
philosophy just as we have seen above – in this case existential philosophy rather than positivist science 
or postmodern queer theory. This is troubling as - while these arguments may theoretically be extended 
to cisgender and heterosexuality also - because cisgender and heterosexuality are culturally accepted 
norms the arguments do not have the effect of culturally destabilising them in the same way; indeed 
such arguments about cisgender and heterosexuality are seldom made explicit. These arguments 
concerning trans and non-heterosexual lives also appear to simply ignore the lived experience of many 
trans and non-heterosexual people who do indeed feel as if they are gay, or are of their identified (but 
not birth-assigned) gender. To see why such arguments are made, however, (to understand the notation 
of the tunes the devil is playing if you will) it is useful to consider the underlying philosophy: 
This philosophy of existential sexuality is arguably often centred within Sartre’s notions of sexuality as 
objectification (2003 [1943]) in which one acquires and is acquired by the Other. This notion of being 
acquired by the Other is effectively an inter-objective phenomenon which appears somewhat at odds with 
his later thought on the influence of social context on the ‘self’. Nonetheless it suggests that sexuality is 
an effect of this process of acquisition and is not, in itself, a given qua any particular individual – 
certainly not in the sense of Being. Sartre also suggests that an attempt to consider a sexuality (whether 
gay or straight for example) is not existentially correct, as desire must be contingent and situated – one 
does not desire all people of a given sex for example. As I explore below, there are significant issues 
with this as the sense of having a specific identity, linked to desire, is precisely what many people do 
have. Indeed de Beauvoir made similar complex arguments when considering being a woman – while 
being a woman is contingent “One is not born but rather becomes a woman” (de Beauvoir, 1997 
[1949] p.301) to argue that many people are not, in a fundamental sense, ‘a woman’, seems specious and 
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indeed de Beauvoir herself identified so and [tautologically] required the identity to be available in order 
to make the arguments she did about a certain group of people and their desires. 
The other significant stream of existential thought on sexuality is Spinelli’s (2013, 2014) work (which 
again I explore below) and which builds upon his earlier work (Spinelli, 1996), which itself is based 
upon Merleau-Ponty’s consideration of sexuality in his Phenomenology of Perception ([1945] 2002). In this, 
Merleau-Ponty viewed sexuality not as a biologically driven series of acts and feelings, but as a means of 
necessarily intersubjective [bodily] experience which was intertwined with existence. He stated that: 
“Even in the case of sexuality, which has nevertheless long been regarded as pre-eminently the type of 
bodily function, we are concerned, not with a peripheral involuntary action, but with an intentionality 
which follows the general flow of existence and yields to its movements.” ([1945] 2002, p.181). He goes 
on: “In so far as a man’s sexual history provides a key to his life, it is because in his sexuality is 
projected his manner of being towards the world, that is, towards time and other men (sic).” ([1945] 
2002, p.183). Merleau-Ponty saw sexuality as fundamentally embodied, in the sense that the body was 
both a real thing in the world and at the same time the meaning it had for us: “…the [sexual] bodily 
event always has a psychic meaning23…” ([1945] 2002, p.185) and: “The body’s role is to ensure… 
metamorphosis. It transforms ideas into things…The body can symbolize existence because it realizes 
it and is its actuality. It sustains its dual existential action of systole and diastole.” ([1945] 2002, p.190). 
Spinelli (2013, 2014) largely agrees noting that [embodied] beings are necessarily intersubjective through 
sexuality, in the sense of sexuality being an existential phenomenon, rather than being solely an act of 
biological reproduction. He states that: “[Sexuality’s] importance lies in its ability to ‘awaken’ each of us 
to our inter-relational being” (Spinelli, 2013, p.302), in line with Pearce (2011) who describes sex as 
“…expression of an interacting dialectical process…between our given and our becoming, between 
interiority and exteriority” (p.238). This is similar to Clarke (2011) who comments that “In the sexual 
relationship the individual goes out from himself (sic) to the other in a unity of being-with-the-other” 
(p.247). Presumably the authors are considering partnered sex, or solo sex with a partner in mind (as 
                                                 
23 Italics in the original. 
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Pearce, 2011 explicitly states), but not the, perhaps less common, sexualities which do not involve 
partners. 
In recognising sexuality as an existential and inter-subjective phenomenon a priori labelled genders and 
sexualities are therefore naturally drawn into question as being fixed and at risk of creating a 
sedimentation, and subsequent bad faith, of what is a matter of unfixed Being (e.g. Acton, 2010). For 
example, Spinelli states that: “It becomes evident that the correlation of sexual acts with the 
construction of a ‘sexual identity’ (be it heterosexual or LGBT24) imposes significant restrictions and 
divisions upon the human experience of being sexual.” (2013, p.305). He makes the same point 
regarding gender stating that “…the basis for the maintenance of such constructs [as male or female] is 
nothing more or less than existential choice25” (ibid). Rodrigues (2014) agrees stating that: 
“While we cannot even imagine existence without being temporal or embodied 
for instance, we can perfectly imagine it, without contradiction, without 
sexuality, simply because sexuality belongs to the ontic, not the ontological 
realm”(p.46).  
However I, for one, cannot imagine human existence without sexuality – we would be so different as to 
not be the beings which we are – in this way I assert sexuality belongs to the ontological human realm. 
Du Plock, however, appears to situate his argument concerning this somewhere in the middle - with 
sexuality somewhere downstream of Being and associated Givens, but still with a quite fundamental 
flavour: “…sexual orientation may originate in a pre-reflexive manner as part of an individual’s 
fundamental project and then26 become expressed via a myriad of quotidian choices” (du Plock, 2014 
[1997], p.153) which might be depicted as something like: 
Existence  Essence  Fundamental project  Choices. 
                                                 
24 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender. 
25 Italics in original. 
26 Italics in original. 
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However Medina disagrees, arguing that “…an individual may experience their sexual preference as a 
natural given and furthermore something that has always been and will always be fixed” (2008, p.13) 
and that “…self labelling, emanating from a feeling of fixedness, provides a platform upon which each 
individual, despite uncertainty and doubt, can meaningfully and authentically engage in the personal 
challenge of being here.” (Medina, 2014, p.132). Rather pragmatically with regards to what this means 
for clients Hicks & Milton (2010) note that “We need to recognise that there is a difference between 
the hallows of academic enquiry and people's experiences 'on the street'” (p.262). 
The difficulty with these arguments concerning essence is that there is some neuronal evidence which 
supports the notion of fundamental brain differences for trans people. How these differences are 
expressed is, of course, a different matter – but that some trans people are thrown into an embodied 
self which is a priori trans can no longer be in doubt. For example post mortem neuronal numbers in 
the central subdivision of the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis in the hypothalamus (BSTc) of trans 
women has been shown to be in the cisgender female range (Zhou et al, 1995; Kruijver et al, 2000; 
2004) and white matter in various brain regions of trans men has been shown to be in the cisgender 
male range (Swaab & Garcia-Fulgeuras, 2008) and grey matter sexually dimorphic regions of both male 
and female trans adolescents have been shown to be aligned with the gender of identity rather than 
birth assignation (Hoekzema, et al, 2015). Many other studies have similar findings in which brain 
regions have shown statistical similarity to the participants gender of identity, rather than birth 
assignation (e.g. Bao & Swaab, 2011; Cheung et al, 2002; Garcia-Falgueras & Swaab, 2008; Saraswat, 
Weinand & Safer, 2015). These brain regions will interact with the [social] world epistemically and so 
existential arguments about gender and sexuality (which are unpicked further below in relation to the 
intersubjective relational world, Being, and existence) should hold within them the current evidence of 
a biological aetiology of trans for some people. 
The need for the present research in the area of trans sexuality 
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This notion that gender and sexuality are existential phenomena has particular pertinence for trans 
people as their gender (and often sexuality) is not given by society at birth (indeed it may also be an 
existential ‘given’ as discussed above) but must instead be explicitly considered such that it is both 
personally congruent and socially navigable. In particular, a trans person’s considered gender and 
sexuality appear to intersect, both on a personal and a social level. As we have seen, this is often not 
fully captured by a literature which is too often driven by the theorization of trans people at the 
expense of trans people’s own voices being heard - and it is this lacuna in the literature which this 
research seeks to address. For the reasons stated above, the research question is not framed in a 
manner which drew on positivist ontology or theory, but rather is as open as possible in order to draw 
in as much of the phenomena as possible. It therefore consists of a simple question: 
“[As a trans person] what is your sexuality?” 
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Method 
Epistemological Framework  
As I have illustrated above, most past research on trans has been grounded in either a positivist, or 
explicitly theoretically oriented, epistemological framework. It may be argued that these are entirely 
reasonable approaches if the desired outcome is, respectively, to obtain 'generalisable' information 
about trans, or to understand its place within wider theories of gender. This section will briefly set out 
why such frameworks were not deemed appropriate for the current research, and why an existential-
phenomenological counselling psychological hermeneutic framework was employed instead. 
Research on trans people utilising a positivist methodology has often been problematic in that it has 
attempted to explain perceived 'difference' and not the experience in its own right, devoid of such 
comparison; further it most usually has also not been of explicit benefit to trans people themselves 
(Meyerowitz, 2002). In terms of methodological difficulties, a major issue with quantitative positivist 
research is that it requires discrete categories prior to the research (Coolican, 1994, Langdridge & 
Hagger-Johnson, 2009). These categories must, of course, be derived from some a priori source, which 
are usually from the researcher's assumptions and/or the established literature, which, as seen above, 
can be contentious (e.g. Lawrence, 2005; Weyers et al, 2009 Veale, Clarke & Lomax, 2008). For 
example, a research design which provides a limited set of possible categories for a trans participant’s 
sexuality (e.g. heterosexual, bisexual, homosexual) may not reflect the lived experience of the 
participant who defines using terms outside of this range (such as queer, kink, furry, leather, etc.). 
On occasion scientists from the positivist tradition who laud quantitative approaches suggest that the 
alternative qualitative human sciences approach is necessarily flawed as it is open to bias and (they 
argue) due to having insufficiently rigorous method it is inaccurate and therefore not ‘Science’. Leaving 
aside mitigating efforts such as reflexivity considered elsewhere, one challenge to this is that some 
subjects are not amenable to a quantitative research simply because some things cannot be quantified in 
any sense in which they remain recognisably the subject under investigation. How much (numerically) 
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love do we have; beauty do we find; meaning can we create? How much sexuality do we have? How 
much [trans]gender? 
Further, we can address this quantitative bias within its own terms. Quantitative scientific method, of 
whatever sort, strives after perfect data - perfect measurement of discrete units with no confounding 
variables. Good scientists recognise this as an ideal – a striving towards a perfect method which cannot 
be reached; but the endeavour of which is nonetheless worthwhile. Accepting that there is ‘fuzz’ in 
whatever data we examine then; the argument against the rigour in qualitative analysis becomes a matter 
of degree and so falls down on those terms – whether qualitative or quantitative there is fuzz in the 
data and an attempt to mitigate it. The nature of the matters under investigation in qualitative analysis 
may mean that there is more fuzz from a positivist standpoint (just as there is more meaning from a 
[existential] philosophical qualitative one), but this does not make it worse, simply different - as it is a 
means of investigating a different matter. 
Qualitative approaches, might then be a reasonable option for researching aspects of such things as 
sexuality and gender. In contrast to quantitative approaches considered above, theoretically-based 
qualitative research on trans generally takes a position regarding whether trans is transgressive or not 
(e.g. Hird, 2002a & b, Wilton, 2002), and often problematically suggests that the theory is independent 
of the theorist (cf. van Manen, 1997; 2014). As seen above, in some research, it also sets up a false 
dichotomy between trans as something to be celebrated (for subverting gender norms in sexual 
practice, for example) or to be criticised (for failing in such radical potential). Indeed, the complex 
experience of participants seems to be shoehorned into such a dichotomy, with a lack of attention paid 
to lived experience or to the wider discourses (Barker, Richards & Bowes-Catton, 2012; Richards, 
Barker, Lenihan & Iantaffi, 2014). Of course examining lived experience is valuable in and of itself as 
the humanising, individual, and contextual dimensions of what this group of people (this ‘research 
cohort’ in quantitative terms) lives is of immeasurable benefit to wider society; as well as to clinicians of 
a wide variety of backgrounds in assisting them to realise who the people they are seeing are. 
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For these reasons, it was felt to be important that this research investigates the lived experience of trans 
people and their sexualities with as little bias and a priori assumption as possible. Phenomenology, 
which is grounded in a stance of cautious inquiry and reflective epoché (Husserl, 1900] 1970), would 
seem the appropriate means of addressing such a topic and indeed a number of researchers have 
published on trans (although not trans sexuality) using phenomenology as their mode of enquiry (e.g. 
Davy, 2008; Salamon, 2010), with Idso, (2009) and Forde (2011) touching on trans sexuality as part of 
an exploration of couple’s intimacy as seen above.  
Some workers have recognised, however, that the “rich description” obtained through phenomenology 
often lacks a philosophical location and, as such, does not necessarily reflect the human contexts in 
which it is produced (Gillespie & Cornish, 2009; Langdridge, 2013). A viable compromise may lie in an 
interpretative and - to some extent - context-aware analysis (rather than simply descriptive analysis, 
Silverman, 1984), which can remain embedded within the meanings which are produced by 
participants. Indeed regarding counselling work, Milton (2014c) defines affirmative practice as being 
“context aware” (p.6) which points to an ethical basis for such a stance. Such an approach follows 
existential thinkers such as Sartre and De Beauvoir in attempting to identify the authentic themes in a 
person’s accounts through interrogating them and being aware of the meanings that those people may 
be drawing upon in the world around them - since we are born into “an already meaningful world 
which reflects to me meanings which I have not put into it” (Sartre, [1943] 2003, p.531). For these 
reasons, a philosophically grounded double hermeneutic27 of description28, followed by ‘suspicion’29 
(which Langdridge, 2014 describes as “…the use of an external framework to uncover further layers of 
meaning”. p.163) may be usefully applied in analysing such material (Ricoeur, 1970). In this case, 
existential theory may be employed as the hermeneutic of suspicion, as its respectful grounding in 
human being-in-the-world-with-others (Heidegger, 2008 [1962]); allowance of heterogeneity; and 
                                                 
27 Note I am following Ricoeur (1970) and Langdridge (2007) use of the term here rather than Giddens (1984) use of the 
term ‘double hermeneutic’ to mean a social entity which is both being understood by social sciences and reciprocally 
understands social science (and so is changed by that understanding). 
28 It may be argued that description is not properly a hermeneutic. However, I bow to accepted usage in this thesis and also 
note that it may be argued that, however rigorous my epoché for my attempts at pure description, inevitably a degree of 
interpretation will inflect (at least my choice of) descriptive terms. 
29 Although the usual term ‘suspicion’ may more usefully perhaps be described as contextualisation. 
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freedom, choice, and responsibility (Sartre, [1943] 2003) seem most appropriate to the material of trans 
people’s sexuality (Richards, 2011b). Note that this does not mean the imposition of ‘expert knowledge’ 
onto the phenomena. Rather it is a cautious awareness of the possible contexts of the phenomena - 
which requires the rigorous application of method and reflexivity examined in the section on reflexivity 
below. 
Additionally, phenomenology alone does not necessarily render pragmatically useful information. Given 
that trans peoples' experiences have been used to further researchers' ends and to their benefit, possibly 
at the expense of the participants and communities (Richards, et al, 2014), it seems reasonable to situate 
the information so elicited within a critical counselling psychological framework (BPS; 2004; Woolfe, 
Dryden & Strawbridge, 2003) such that the voices of the participants may be utilised to the definite 
pragmatic end of informing counselling psychological practice. For this reason also, the common and 
generally useful method of Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (Smith, 2008) was not used as it 
does not explicitly utilise a double hermeneutic (in which a hermeneutic is specifically informed by a 
particular philosophy), and does not engage with the political-philosophical aspects in the way a 
method such as Langdridge’s (2007) Critical Narrative Analysis does; although the use of narratives, 
rather than themes is restrictive here. Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) similarly, while being 
especially careful to be ‘true’ to the participants’ data - and eschewing the use of narrative specifically - 
does not explicitly situate that data within a philosophical, pragmatic, or social context. Consequently 
the method chosen of phenomenology using a double hermeneutic endeavoured to fulfil each of these 
requirements – the specifics of which, and degree to which it was successful, are discussed below.  
Design 
The design was intended to elicit useful information from the participants in a manner which was as 
comfortable as possible within the pragmatic bounds and ethical opportunities available. This involved 
collecting data from a group of self-defining trans people by means of visual methodology which 
involved the creation of models depicting participants' sexualities in LEGO® (cf. Gauntlett, 2008) and 
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which, in turn, formed the basis of subsequent explanation and discussion by the participants. This was 
transcribed, checked by the participants, and then analysed by the researcher. This design drew on van 
Manen's (1997) suggestions for human sciences research, and utilised the double hermeneutic detailed 
in the analytic method section below (Langdridge, 2013, after Ricoeur, 1970). Van Manen (1997, pp 30-
31) makes a series of suggestions for human sciences research which have been adapted for this 
research in light of his specific focus on pedagogy rather than trans sexuality. Note that van Manen 
does not prescribe that these suggestions need be followed in this specific order nor that they need all 
be explicit and mechanistic. For clarity, however, they are discussed explicitly and separately here: 
1. Turning to a phenomenon which seriously interests us and commits us to the world; 
The phenomenon of trans sexuality is one of great import in my work within two NHS gender clinics, 
as it forms a key element of my clinical practice. In addition, I have a keen interest and engagement in 
research, policy, and practice in this area. For example I am a co-lead researcher on a research project 
for the World Health Organisation concerned with the revision of the diagnosis of Transsexualism in 
the forthcoming ICD 11; and I represent the British Psychological Society at the NHS Clinical 
Reference Group for Gender Identity Services. 
2. Investigating experience as we30 live it rather than as we conceptualise it; 
As detailed above, the epistemological grounding, and use of phenomenology without (as far as 
possible) an a priori theoretical bias, has informed this research throughout. In my clinical and 
academic work in this area I have also endeavoured to be aware of the cultural milieu surrounding 
myself, and my participants (and which may appear ‘ready-made’, de Beauvoir, 1986 [1947]) by, for 
example, analysing media texts and popular cultural depictions (e.g. Richards, forthcoming 2016c). 
3. Reflecting on the essential themes which characterise the phenomenon; 
Van Manan’s use of the word ‘essential’ is problematic here as it might imply an ‘essentialist’ 
philosophical discourse with specifically delimited knowledges. Instead this research seeks to be 
                                                 
30 Van Manan (1997) is making a general point about experience rather than conceptualisation here. I have interpreted his 
‘we’ to mean humanity in its diversity, rather than a similarity of experience. 
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reflective of the concerns of the participants. Further, the use of phenomenology, and the process of 
analysis, is intended to establish some such themes (although no ‘Truth’ is true for all times and places); 
as well as contextualising those themes to situate them in a wider manner within both the participant’s 
discourses and wider discourses.  
4. Describing through the art of writing and rewriting; 
The double hermeneutic was applied throughout the process of transcription and through identification 
of themes within the texts after transcription by a process of marginal notation. As this report was 
written, a further process of refining the identified themes took place. 
5. Maintaining a strong and oriented phenomenological-existential and counselling 
psychological relation to the phenomenon; 
Van Manen’s word ‘pedagogical’ has been replaced with ‘phenomenological-existential and counselling 
psychological’ here as these are the concerns of this work. The strength of the orientation has been 
maintained through a rigorous philosophical stance towards the epistemological framework, the design 
of the research, and the analysis; particularly through an iterative process of engaging with the literature 
while undertaking the research. 
6. Balancing research context by considering parts and whole. 
This was addressed through the use of a method which includes a ‘double hermeneutic’ of description 
and of ‘suspicion’ (Langdridge, 2007; Ricoeur, 1970) to capture both the parts in the participants 
contributions, and also the broader context through the use of a hermeneutic of suspicion as outlined 
in the analytic method below. In addition, the context of the research itself, for example the previous 
co-option of trans voices, has informed the design. 
The use of visual methodologies and the use of a group 
Visual methodologies are particularly valuable in phenomenological research because they enable 
participants to provide accounts which differ from the standard scripts which are readily available 
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through cultural and sub-cultural discourse; and in this way they may be closer to their lived experience 
(Bowes-Catton, Richards & Barker, 2011). A common visual method is to use photographs and indeed 
Davidmann, (2014) has used this approach with trans people specifically, although this was a more of 
an artistic project with no epistemology underlying the analysis, no formal ethical approval stated, etc. 
Social scientists have used photography within a formal framework however, with the usual method 
being to ask participants to bring photographs to speak to (Harper, 2002) and indeed this has also been 
used with trans people specifically in the past (Davy, 2008). Photographs can, however, be a very 
identifiable method which can cause ethical issues as some trans people may consent to having photos 
published as part of research and then regret having done so as their lives move on. One way around 
this, as in Davy (2008), is not to publish the photos, however this too has difficulties in that the reader 
is then not privy to the photos the participants are speaking to. The additional problem of participants 
bringing photos to the researcher is that it allows for participants to prepare their responses 
beforehand. This was explicitly not the aim of the method for this thesis where it is intended that the 
item the participants create to speak to is constructed at the time so as to avoid accreted or prepared 
scripts.  
Of the possible materials for such construction LEGO® then was chosen because it does not require 
artistic ability, is playful, and is likely to be familiar to participants (Gauntlett, 2007) and will therefore 
be a comfortable form of medium for anyone who may be concerned about their artistic ability 
(Reavey, 2011). Indeed, such methods have been employed previously with sexually diverse groups with 
much success (Barker, Richards & Bowes-Catton, 2012). There are limitations to this medium in that it 
is pre-formed and not as fluid as a material such as plasticine - and may therefore limit possible 
representations. However participants in the Barker, Richards & Bowes-Catton (2012) reported that 
having some structure pre-formed was useful in acting as a jumping off point for their models. 
Similarly, group discussion following individual explanations of the models, rather than simply 
individual interviews or questionnaires, was employed because this has been viewed as particularly 
appropriate for research with people from communities who are positioned outside of the mainstream 
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(Basch, 1987) - as many trans people are. In contrast to individual interviews which can also elicit very 
rich data, group discussions are also appropriate for “exploratory research in areas where little is 
known” (Frith, 2000, p.291), which is certainly the case with trans people’s sexuality. Myers (1998) 
suggests that groups are useful for assessing opinions, attitudes, and experiences concerning a specific 
issue or context and the use of a group for trans people’s sexuality would seem to fit this closely. 
Another benefit of the group discussion is that it has the potential to generate perspectives which may 
not have been captured in each participant’s individual rich descriptions. This follows Langdridge's 
(2007) group methodology and previous research in the area such as Iantaffi & Bockting (2011). 
Perhaps for this reason groups have often been used in counselling research more widely (e.g. Carew, 
2009; Widdowson, 2012). 
Trans participants are likely to already know one another, as there are small numbers of out trans 
people who will be willing to participate in any given location. Consequently, one potential drawback, 
of using such a group is that people may feel pressure to conform to a group norm (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991; Parsons & Greenwood, 2000; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990) meaning that individual meanings 
may not be elicited in deference to the meanings of the wider group. Conversely, in some group 
settings people can feel supported to communicate due to being a part of a group in ways which they 
would feel uncomfortable about were they the sole focus of enquiry. Indeed, past research on sexuality 
suggests that prior knowledge within a group is often positive because participants support, and gently 
challenge, each other based on shared knowledge, which is a useful dynamic (Kitzinger, 1994). Further, 
interaction between participants – whether they know one another or not - is a recognised advantage of 
groups over individual interviews (Merton, Fiske & Kendall, 1990) as participants can react to one 
another and build upon other people’s contributions (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990), as well as inducing 
memories for other participants (McParland & Flowers, 2012). Such advantages also allow ‘naturally 
occurring’ phenomena to arise between participants, which may not otherwise occur (Kitzinger, 1994). 
Notwithstanding the above, to address possible conformity bias it was made clear in the information 
sheet given to participants and during the session that: 
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 “It is important that everyone’s views are respected and allowed – even if they 
are not agreed with by other group members. No one will say what your model 
means except you - neither the researcher nor the group members”.  
In addition, possible conformity was addressed by the use of visual methodologies, which encourages 
acceptance of multiple viewpoints and experiences in the same way that multiple artworks can be very 
different but equally beautiful (Bowes-Catton, Barker & Richards, 2011; Barker, Richards, & Bowes-
Catton, 2012; Reavey, 2011; Reavey & Johnson, 2008). Of course these measures may not have been 
completely efficacious in ameliorating group conformity bias and it is hoped that the benefits of using a 
group detailed above outweigh the potential difficulties of bias. 
Aside from bias, one of the difficulties with using groups can be that it makes transcribing more 
difficult (Krueger, 1994) especially if participants speak over one another (Wilkinson, 2008). This was 
addressed through extremely careful transcription and repeated listening to any unclear phrases. 
Fortunately the participants in the current study were clear and courteous in their turn-taking, which 
aided matters greatly. 
I adhered to the guidance which indicates that four to eleven participants are the optimum number for 
ensuring both free discussion and a sense of safety amongst the participants (c.f. Kitzinger, 1994; 
Morgan, 1997). The participants were homogenous in respect to their trans status (as recommended by 
Basch, 1987), however, Kitzinger (1994) has also found that some degree of heterogeneity is useful for 
participant dialogue so homogeneity was not imposed beyond this. Indeed, participants were 
encouraged, both on the information sheet and in the group, to respect one another’s views in order 
that divergence was not suppressed. For this reason, as in other studies of trans people’s experience 
(e.g. Levitt & Ippolito, 2014), trans men, women, and non-binary people were able to be recruited as it 
is the experience of sexuality as a trans person which is under investigation. Further, as seen above, 
when researching with trans participants defining the boundaries a priori between what constitutes men 
and women can understandably lead to difficulties - both with rapport and in terms of analysis - and so 
this was not undertaken.  
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Analytic method 
The transcript of the participants’ explanations of their models and subsequent discussion was analysed 
within the epistemological framework of phenomenology and the double hermeneutic described above. 
This involved reading and rereading with a deep engagement with the text as presented, and continual 
(rather than simply a priori) researcher reflexivity. On each occasion the transcript was engaged with two 
passes were taken and marginal notions of emerging themes were made. Each pass employed a 
hermeneutic of description and then a hermeneutic of ‘suspicion’, first to the data of individuals within 
the group, and then to the data from the group as a whole. Existential and phenomenological literature 
informed the hermeneutic of suspicion, as did understandings from the discipline of counselling 
psychology. This was inflected by engagement with dominant cultural meanings elicited from both the 
literature review and the author's other work on mainstream representations of trans people (e.g. 
Richards, forthcoming 2016c). Of course this “inflection” does not in any sense mean assumed prior 
knowledge about the participant’s world views - rather that some tentative contexts and situations for 
the researcher’s understanding had been accessed beforehand. These contexts and situations were 
intended, therefore, to create a situated not-knowing rather than as a means for the proof or disproof 
of a priori assumptions on the part of the researcher.  
The double hermeneutic used is in line with Langdridge’s Critical Narrative Analysis (2007) after 
Ricoeur (1970). However, in a departure from Langdridge (2007), but in line with van Manen (1997; 
2014), the hermeneutic involved the identification of themes rather than narratives. Langdridge (2007) 
as well as Plummer (1995) identify the use of narratives in the ‘sexual stories’ of certain groups, 
however, the current design is specifically intended not to elicit stories as it aims to circumnavigate 
certain narratives (such as those which are perpetuated about trans experience). Therefore, it seems 
apposite to identify themes in line with Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (Smith, 2008) or 
Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
This identification of themes, further involves contextualisation, as stated above. To this end I have, 
naturally utilised the existential literature as the primary lens for the hermeneutic of ‘suspicion’ situated 
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within the wider contexts of counselling psychological understandings relating to intersubjectivity and 
phenomenology (i.e. Woolfe, Dryden & Strawbridge, 2003); and the field of trans studies which seeks 
to document and explore trans people’s experience (i.e. Stryker & Whittle, 2006). With regard to the 
existential elements being considered, which will naturally be reviewed in full in the Analysis below I 
have drawn upon Van Manen’s (2014) notions of the ‘existentials’ of relationality; corporeality; 
spatiality; temporality as well as materiality; death and dying; language; and mood. Van Manen (2014) 
characterises them thus: “Existentials are helpful universal ‘themes’ to explore meaning aspects of our 
lifeworld, and of the particular phenomena that we may be studying” (p.303). Although in his 2014 
work, as in his 1997 work referred to above, he is at pains to note that in examining these facets of the 
ontic and the ontological it is unnecessary to consider all of these existentials in a mechanistic manner 
in relation to each utterance of a participant - but rather to hold them in mind during the analysis. 
Consequently this was the method chosen for this study, especially (linked to wider existential theory) 
in the second pass hermeneutic of suspicion.  
It is important to note, however, that, unlike Maher (2011) it was not the models themselves that were 
subject to analysis by the researcher. Rather it was the participant descriptions of their own models, 
along with subsequent group discussion, which were analysed. This is vital as imposing meanings on 
somebody else’s creation is not appropriate within phenomenological analysis and could also be 
experienced negatively by participants. Indeed imposing meanings ignores the difficulties with shared 
(sub)cultural (indeed personal) understandings of what the ‘red brick on the top left’ generally means as 
there is, of course, no general meaning for it. It must necessarily be the participant’s own meaning 
(which was the very reason for using visual methods in this research) which obviates any attempt to 
analyse the red brick’s meaning directly by the researcher. Words, however, necessarily have some sort of 
shared cultural meaning as they are intended for communication - albeit that there is no necessarily 
concrete connection between intent and meaning when a given word or (with exponentially more 
complexity) a phrase is used. In this latter case phenomenology seeks meaning – but that hunt is at least 
not seen as a fool’s errand! (I hope…). Consequently, images of the models are included in the Analysis 
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below in order to clarify what participants are describing rather than to aid the clarity of the analysis 
itself. 
Reflexivity 
This study utilises a phenomenological mode of enquiry (Husserl, [1931] 1967), however, it does not 
endeavour the complete bracketing of the researcher’s position. This is because, while bracketing to the 
degree to which it is possible is most important, in line with Langdridge (2007) I take the view that it is 
impossible to have complete epoché as something of the researcher always leaks through. Indeed it 
seems the utmost hubris to assert that I am so self-aware as to be able to know and contain my 
influences – and not only that but to have no hidden areas of influence on the analysis of which I am 
unaware (Luft, & Ingham, 1955). Consequently the scientific rigour of the endeavour is effected 
through reflexivity (Etherington, 2004) and a rigorous engagement with the process of enquiry. Such 
reflexivity involves both personal reflection by the researcher on assumptions brought to the work, and 
awareness of the socio-political situation in relation to the topic of enquiry. This engagement of 
reflexivity and with the phenomena of the participants is iterative, in that both are returned to again and 
again - always endeavouring to ensure that the participant’s voices shine through and that such of the 
researcher as is visible is so as a matter of decision, or a matter of clear necessity. Of course this process 
too will be incomplete and so the research should be read as a conversation, with the reader taking a 
critical eye to the matters above (Richards, 2011a). 
With specific regards to my own reflexivity about the topic under consideration; my approach is 
grounded by my personal interest in the field and my current career as the Senior Specialist Psychology 
Associate at an NHS Gender Clinic and Clinical Research Fellow at another; as well as being something 
of an academic in this area. It is for this reason that whenever necessary I have indicated my own 
published work in this thesis such that I am open to the reader evaluating my published position on the 
topics under discussion. Of course having such an engagement with the field might lead to ‘experience 
assumptions’ in which my prior experience inflects the work. To some extent this is precisely what is 
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called for in the methodology used as, in line with Langridge’s (2007) CNA, contextual awareness is a 
requirement of the design.  
Nonetheless it is, of course, imperative that the phenomena given by the participants is viewed with a 
‘fresh eye’ to avoid undue bias in the elicitation and analysis. In supervision and elsewhere I 
consequently spent considerable time thinking about how to stand aside from what I have learned 
before as a student, as a clinician, and as an author - and so to be genuinely curious about the 
experiences (and indeed such continued curiosity seems to be eudemonic for me). I sought to recognise 
my dissatisfaction with the extant literatures which seem to be incomplete in exploring trans people’s 
sexualities. In recognising that lacuna and endeavouring to consider how what the participants have to 
say might fill it – as well as contextualising participant experiences within what discourses and literature 
there are – I hoped to come to the information provided by these participants in a fresh and open 
manner. For instance, I was aware of my assumptions being overturned when I came across a 
contraindication to a previous assumption I had had about the use of identity labels being primarily for 
personal rather than political ends - which proved not to be the case. Further, I am aware that over the 
course of writing this thesis my thinking has changed, not so much as an epiphany, but rather than a 
process of slow evolution which I have no doubt will continue - leading not so much towards some 
definite end, but rather as a part, - perhaps the heart - of being (if the reader will allow me my hubris) 
something of a scholar and, more importantly, a person engaged with the world.  
In addition, (obviously) like my participants I too have a gender and sexuality. I have discussed the 
intersections of these with my clinical and academic work both in supervision and individual personal 
therapy, including specific reflection in relation to this study. Such explorations enable me to approach 
the data in a manner that is reflexively aware “…of my own thoughts, feelings, culture, environment 
and social and personal history…” (Etherington, 2004, p.32). It is sometimes argued that researchers 
should be explicit about their own identity and history when writing up qualitative research. There are, 
however, significant issues with including such reflexivity in academic environments and publications 
(cf. Richards, 2015b). Participants are, of course, generally anonymised and therefore [to some extent] 
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protected in what they have contributed to the research, however, this protection is necessarily not 
extended to the researcher, whose explicit reflexivity becomes a matter of public record upon 
publication (Etherington, 2004) – which will include, of course, a thesis lodged within a learned 
institution which is consequently published in that sense. Thus the researcher is forced into taking a 
public [political] position about their own identity. 
Researchers, and indeed people more broadly, who fit societally normative categories (i.e. heterosexual 
and cisgender people) are still far more able to be easily explicit about these than those whose identities 
and practices remain marginalised and stigmatised. For the heteronormative cisgender person 
investigating trans sexuality, for example, ‘reflexivity’ is often simply a matter of disavowing direct 
association with the matter under consideration – giving a shrugged mea culpa if you will (cf. Smith, 
2013) – which at once excoriates and exonerates in that it suggests that there will inevitably be faults 
due to that personal distance from the subject, but that the heteronormative cisgender researcher 
cannot be to blame as they will inevitably incur these faults due to their [different, normative] identity. 
This done they may then continue with the business at hand content that they have ‘Done Reflexivity’. 
(And conversely heterosexual cisgender researchers of good intent may be decried for not being able to 
understand, when in fact they can). This then puts reflexivity in an explicitly political position as an 
undertaking – and a political position which highlights a heteronormative bias to the method.  
In contrast, non-heterosexual people and trans people (who may also be non-heterosexual of course) 
are placed in a different position in that they risk being accused of (and indeed enacting) bias from 
within the groups under consideration. The difficulty is that the mea culpa defence seems less open to 
these groups - perhaps because trans isn’t a norm from which to operate, but is often seen as a 
Minority31 or Other which is requiring of explanation, or indeed excuse (Hall, 1995; Shepherd & 
Sjoberg, 2012). Indeed as Barker (2006) asserts, people from outside normative categories risk telling 
'confessional' stories as they are frequently called upon to 'explain' themselves in a way that others are 
not. Public (as opposed to private) reflexivity is consequently a rather different thing for these groups 
                                                 
31 Note the capital. 
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with an expectation for explicit reflexivity by publishers also potentially falling foul of the Single 
Equality Act 2010 (HMSO, 2010) in the UK on the grounds that there is a biased material difference in 
favour of heterosexual cisgender people. 
For both heteronormative cisgender and non-heteronormative trans researchers, who are also clinicians 
such as counselling psychologists, there is also the risk that if clients access published reflexivity that 
could adversely affect the therapeutic alliance before it can be established. This would mean that for 
those clinicians who practice in modalities which require a tabular rasa such as psychoanalysis, research 
would effectively be precluded; and clinicians practicing from other modalities would risk their 
therapeutic alliance and clinical practice with each publication. This is perhaps even more the case the 
further a researcher moves from normativity - if a researcher wished to investigate infantilism32, for 
example, it could pose grave difficulties for them to be explicitly reflexive about their own practice 
within the research. This would leave the academy in an uncomfortably discriminatory position where 
only heteronormative cisgender people would be able to carry out research as only they could be 
generally able to be open about their gender and sexuality – although again here I am skating over the 
bias heteronormative cisgender people may face from queer communities if they are open about their 
heteronormative cisgender status. This means that explicit reflexivity is not a politically neutral 
endeavour and that there is therefore an argument that researchers, whether normative or not, should 
be extremely cautious about explicit published reflexivity as otherwise only those people whose 
personal and economic situations allow them (such as those within private practice in niche 
communities and those senior academics protected by tenure) will be able to be explicitly reflexive and 
therefore able to undertake research. 
Consequently, in the current study researcher reflexivity was undertaken throughout the process, 
including “examining personal ... reactions” (Finlay & Gough, 2003, p.16), but has not always been 
made explicit in written form (cf. Richards, forthcoming 2016b). As a pedagogical aid, however, I have 
                                                 
32 This is the practice of an adult identifying as a young child or baby for purposes of relaxation or sexuality. It is quite 
different from paedophilia in that it does not involve children, attraction to children, or coercion of any sort. (cf. Richards & 
Barker, 2013; Richards, 2015) 
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included affidavits from my clinical supervisors as to the veracity of the claim that explicit reflexivity 
regarding this research has been undertaken (see Appendix 7). Of course this does not allow the reader 
to consider the interpretations of the researcher given below: But given the difficulties outlined above, 
and given this method of reflexivity meant it was not necessary to consider the, potentially 
opprobrious, opinions of clients or fellow academics during the process - and indeed utilised a method 
which required an ongoing supported process with three other professionals, it may be the least worst 
option. Indeed because of this it may have actually increased the degree of real reflexivity which was 
undertaken and so, hopefully gives the best outcome, on balance, in terms of the validity of the 
research. 
Ethical, moral, and legal considerations 
My personal position regarding the ethics of research has continued to develop and has been discussed 
within supervision (Langdridge, 2007), as outlined in the section on reflexivity above. I am aware that I 
have a broadly positive view of trans people and so am keen to avoid further marginalising this often 
marginalised group (McNeil, Bailey, Ellis, Morton & Regan, 2012). Additionally I am determined not to 
co-opt trans voices, as has happened too often in previous research (Richards et al. 2014) - for example 
see Forde (2011) who utilised trans people’s intimate partnerships to question evolutionary theory. I am 
also mindful that I am a clinician who is paid to see trans people in a professional capacity, which 
means that the necessity of maintaining rapport with my clients must be balanced against the aim of 
revealing some, albeit tentative, findings from the research. I am cautiously hopeful that the design will 
enable this as it precludes current or former clients from taking part.  
As stated above, trans people are no more psychologically vulnerable than cisgender people (Cole et al., 
1997; Haraldsen & Dahl, 2000; Hill et al, 2005; Hoshiai, 2010; Kersting et al, 2003; Simon et al, 2011) 
perhaps because, while the process of transition can be trying for some, this is not necessarily so and 
indeed the process of ‘becoming oneself’ can involve a range of strengths and satisfactions. Trans 
people are, however, potentially more open to exploitation and attack (Lombardi, Wilchins, Priesing & 
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Malouf, 2001), which could lead to anxiety and depression - and therefore ethical considerations in this 
study centre around ensuring that participants are not exploited, especially regarding a matter as 
intimate as sexuality – instead of protecting them from psychological consequences in a way which 
would differ to the rest of the general public. Nonetheless it was made explicit on the consent forms 
and debrief sheets that if anyone found the research difficult they could seek reassurance from myself 
as a researcher and/or approach their GP, the Samaritans, or various other organisations listed on the 
forms (See Appendices 3, 4, 5). It was also explained in detail to the participants how the data would be 
used such that they were reassured that the process would not be exploitative, and would potentially be 
of some gain for trans people in general. 
In addition, in order to assist with the ethical issues of the co-option of trans voices the design includes 
the opportunity for participants (but not the researcher) to review and edit the transcripts - although 
none elected to do so. Obviously there is a risk that useful data may be inconveniently redacted by the 
participants as participant and researcher understandings may differ. However, for the reasons outlined 
above I believe it is imperative that academic considerations do not trump ethical issues, even 
inadvertently, and so any ‘interesting’ data lost in this manner is an acceptable loss when balanced 
against such ethical considerations. For this reason also, the research will be ‘given back’ to the relevant 
communities through presenting it in an accessible format at community events and in community 
literatures (Hagger-Johnson, Hegarty, Barker & Richards, 2013). 
One issue of particular concern is the identification of trans individuals as trans, given that this would 
constitute dissemination of Protected Information under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (HMSO, 
2004). This was addressed through meticulous anonymisation of participant identification. Under the 
Act trans people are, of course, allowed to disclose their trans status themselves and so disclosure 
within the group settings were legal given that membership of the groups was predicated upon people 
identifying themselves as trans. 
The study conformed to all the BPS guidelines on the ethical treatment of participants (BPS, 2009; 
2010) and the Middlesex University ethical guidelines including the Guide to Ethical Approval For 
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Psychology Research Projects Middlesex University, and was approved by the Ethics Committee overseeing 
doctoral research projects. Of note is that the study design required no deception. Participants were 
fully informed about the nature of the study prior to taking part, and their consent elicited utilising 
consent forms signed by participant and researcher (see Appendix 2 Consent Form). All participant 
details were fully anonymised and stored securely in encrypted form. In addition, a criterion of the 
consent form was that participants agree not to discuss other participants or their contributions, 
outside of the group. Finally, participants were reminded that they could withdraw at any time from the 
research.  
Recruitment and Procedure  
The procedure was originally piloted with four trans people and then adapted (see below). In the final 
research, data were collected from a group of eleven trans people, who were recruited through 
advertising a workshop at the BiCon convention in 2013. The advertisement was simply a slot in the 
programme entitled Trans Sexualities and the Information Sheet (See Appendix 1.) was made available 
beforehand. 
BiCon is an annual community event originally connected directly with bisexuality, but which now 
creates an open space for people from a variety of sexual and gender backgrounds aside from 
bisexuality, as can be seen from the participant demographics in appendix 6, the analysis below and 
Barker, Bowes-Catton, Iantaffi, Cassidy & Brewer (2008). The group was, of necessity, a convenience 
sample. The use of a convenience sample is common in sexuality and gender work where participants 
are hard to reach (Barker, Richards, & Bowes-Catton, 2012), however it naturally carries with it 
difficulties in that the context the convenience sample is drawn from may influence the nature of the 
participants. It is hoped that the National reach of BiCon mitigated this to some degree and the 
heterogeneity of the participants reflected this (see Participants below). Indeed all sampling methods 
bring with them bias – with internet requests for participants reaching people from specific groups who 
are necessarily computer literate for example. 
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 It was made clear on contact, and on the consent form, that the participants must be over the age of 
majority (18 years of age); out about being trans; could not be current or past clients of the researcher; 
and could not be in an in an intimate relationship with another group member (see Appendix 2 
Consent Form).  
Participants were consented, in line with the BPS code of ethics and conduct (2010). They were advised that 
they may withdraw at any time with no penalty (see Appendix 2 Consent Form) and asked for a 
pseudonym and basic demographic information which, with the exception of age bands, consisted of 
open fields in an attempt to capture the nuance of the participant’s identities. The participants were 
then asked to create a model of their sexuality using LEGO®usng the phrase “Please model your 
sexuality. Thank you.” They would have been able to clarify what I meant by sexuality, however none 
did. All understood that they should not collaborate, however some would occasionally pass a specific 
piece if it was out of reach and it was requested. In terms of the range of pieces available – there were 
several thousand of a wide variety of different shapes and types, with many multiples of each so as not 
to constrain the participants in their choice. 
They had approximately twenty minutes to make the models which occurred largely in silence, with the 
exception of a few requests for pieces to be passed as mentioned above; after which they were asked to 
describe their model, and what it represented, to the group. The accounts were audio recorded, as was 
the subsequent group discussion of the themes which emerged during the descriptions. The models 
were also photographed. The participants were finally debriefed and thanked (see Appendix 3 Debrief 
after Group). 
The recording was then transcribed and emailed to those participants who elected to give the researcher 
their email address in order to check the veracity of the transcription. There were no changes at this 
stage. Following transcription, the data were subject to a hermeneutic analysis and written up. 
Consequently the procedure may be summarised as: 
 11 participants who self-identify as trans recruited (information given, consented, etc.) 
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 Introduction to the research provided by researcher. Potential to explore understandings of 
‘sexuality’ if participants were unclear about what this meant (none were). 
 Demographics recorded. 
 Participants chose their own pseudonyms. 
 Each participant made a model of their sexuality and then described it. 
 The whole group then discussed trans sexuality using the models as a ‘jumping off point’. 
 Models were photographed, explanations and discussions were recorded. 
 Participants were debriefed. 
 Transcripts were sent to participants to adapt as necessary within a two week time limit (none 
elected to). 
 Transcripts were subjected the hermeneutic analysis detailed below. 
 Themes were written up in the context of published work. 
 Writing to be adapted for non-academic audiences and disseminated. 
Adaptation after pilot study 
The above design and associated considerations were originally piloted with a group of four trans 
people. This was a largely successful endeavour which elicited rich information, not least that some 
trans people feel extant language is inadequate to describe their lived experience.  This is not to say that 
they could not speak in the research, but that what they spoke about was the inadequacy of words, 
perhaps specifically labels, when it comes to trans experience. As one might imagine, this left me in 
something of a quandary given that my aim is a phenomenological exploration of trans people’s 
sexuality – which necessarily seeks to put into some form of words the worlding of trans people as 
relating to their sexuality. My hope is that my caveats above regarding my eschewing of ‘grand 
narratives’ and my utilisation of direct quotes; and my careful contextualisation of the hermeneutic of 
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suspicion will do some justice to my participant’s voices and will not impose inappropriate meaning on 
the words they chose to use. 
The other key area which was addressed after the pilot was that two of the participants were partners 
and, while prior knowledge of one another can be useful as we have seen above, it was felt this was too 
high a degree of intimacy for the group to function as a coherent whole as it instead seemed to leave a 
‘partnership’ subgroup and a ‘non-partnership’ subgroup. For this reason partners were explicitly 
excluded from the final group whose phenomena are analysed here. 
Participants 
A table of demographic details may be found in Appendix 6. 
Eleven participants elected to take part, several identified disabilities, but none felt that these would 
affect them in taking part, or required any special provision to be provided for them during the 
research. Ethnicity and religion were asked as matters of standard demography, but did not arise in the 
data and are consequently not considered in depth in the analysis.  
The participants (in order of presentation in the transcript and of course utilising their chosen 
pseudonyms) were:  
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe  who put their age in the 28-32 bracket and who identified as a caucasian- 
Irish single female with autism, and as an Atheist;  
Martin who put their age in the 33-37 bracket and who identified as a white-British poly with wife + 
boyfriend + lovers trans man with hearing difficulties, and Pagan religion;  
Charlie who put their age in the 28-32 bracket and who identified as a white single female bodied 
person with no disability, and Buddhist religion;  
Mr Fox who put their age in the 38-42 bracket and who identified as a white-British single/in poly 
relationship male- trans man with no disability, and no religion;  
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Cee Cee who put their age in the 28-32 bracket and who identified as a African Scot single gender 
queer person with mental health issues, and spirituality [religion];  
Scot Sam who put their age in the 28-32 bracket and who identified as a white-UK poly33 trans-man 
with no disability, and Pagan religion;  
Sack Boy who put their age in the 23-27 bracket and who identified as a white-British in an open 
relationship male with arthrogryposis, and no religion;  
Haramit who put their age in the 18-22 bracket and who identified as a white-Scottish Taken (in a 
monogamous relationship) trans (almost) male bodied person with no disability, and no religion:  
Tara who put their age in the 33-37 bracket and who identified as a Scottish single female with 
borderline personality traits, and Roman Catholic (Non-practicing) religion;  
Jane Crocker who put their age in the 28-32 bracket and who identified as a Jewish-Hispanic 
Polyamorous (2 current partners) female with clinical depression, and no religion;  
Ezio who put their age in the 23-27 bracket and who identified as a white-British single male with a 
[non specific] learning difficulty, and no religion.  
                                                 
33Poly is generally short for Polyamory – having multiple intimate partners (Easton & Lizst, 1997). Naturally, see Analysis 
and Transcript for the nuance of each participant’s understandings of this term. 
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Analysis 
The following analysis was undertaken using the design above and consequently each participant is 
discussed in turn initially. A picture of their model is shown for reference followed by a hermeneutic of 
description and then a hermeneutic of suspicion. Following this, themes from across the whole group 
are considered, again in the form of a hermeneutic of description and then a hermeneutic of suspicion. 
This explicit use of the double hermeneutic will, of necessity, include a small amount of repetition; 
however the clear separation of description from suspicion should allow the reader to be more fully 
aware of the areas simply detailing themes which have arisen from the participants explanations of their 
models; and those areas which I, as a researcher, have contextualised the material presented.  
This structure of reporting is important because, as detailed above, trans people have historically been 
misused by the academy and I contend that the method of reporting itself can be marginalising if it 
obscures the individuality and humanity of the people who have participated. Thus, hopefully, this 
method of sequential reporting of participants in the analysis (rather than the usual method of a single 
narrative structure only referencing each participant when necessary; Moustakas, 1994) will allow the 
reader to see each person’s unique experience rather than only as a chunk or chunks of information 
within a theoretical discussion which risks losing the individual participant voice. Similarly, explicitly 
showing the themes separated from the imposition of theory will allow the participant’s contributions to 
‘stand on their own’ before I intervene. Hopefully the reporting structure used below will therefore 
ensure that any structural exclusion or dehumanisation is minimised. 
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Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe 
 
Figure 1. Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe’s model 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe’s themes included gender influencing sexuality; gender transition and the 
use of colour to represent singularity and multiplicity. 
Hermeneutic of description 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe made use of colour to represent multiplicity stating that “the gender one is 
one solid colour” and “the one that represents sexuality is lots of different colours”. Colour was also 
linked to limitation and expansion; “the uh sexuality one kind of fades to grey at the top… because, it’s 
all gone a bit dry recently.”  
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe also made reference to the influence of gender on sexuality stating that: 
“my, uh… gender does, influence my sexuality” and “pretransition… during sort of sexual experience… 
my physical sex and how I felt sort of inside my head… there was kind of like interference… post, um 
physical, uh transition, it... provided more… avenues for enjoyment.” This also reflected a necessary 
element of physical transition as an expression of gender as did her statement: “so, being aware of sort 
of my physical sex was previously distraction, negative, taking away from any experiences and these 
days is more of a, a positive, thing…” 
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This idea of difference pre and post transition – that is difference over time, marked by the event and 
process of transition was referenced though noting how things were “pretransition” and “post, um 
physical, uh transition…” 
Hermeneutic of suspicion  
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe appeared to be considering how her embodied self altered over the course 
of her transition in that her possibilities for sexual expression were opened up through his change of 
physical body. This is not to say that her sexuality per se changed (although there is evidence for this 
too in the literature, Auer, et al, 2014; Cerwenka, et al, 2014; Coleman & Bockting, 1989; Lawrence, 
2005; Rowniak & Chesla, 2013), but rather that, if we take her embodiment as being a physical-
psychological entity, it allowed a fuller expression of his self and her worlding. Pearce (2014) 
characterises embodiment in this sense as:  
“Embodiment implies that we are a totality of emotional, cognitive and 
physiological processes that are interacting dialectically and constantly to 
produce the constantly changing entity we manifest at each moment in time” 
(p.108).  
Embodiment in this sense might best be thought of as being expressed through an intertwined 
umwelt–eigenwelt (naturally with attendant überwelt and mitwelt). This will be culturally expressed, in 
that the expression of sexuality and gender varies across time and space - as seen above. This is 
reflected in Sartre’s comment that “…the nature of our body for us entirely escapes us to the extent 
that we can take upon it the Other’s point of view” (Sartre, 1943 [19960, p.358). Thus Jenbury 
Handlebar-Smythe alludes, both to her own wish to realise her sexuality through the medium of a 
congruent body, but also to a wish to be more accurately apprehended by the [culturally situated] Other 
whose point of view inscribes erroneous meaning upon it. Of course, Sartre is making the point that we 
cannot control, or even apprehend, the meaning the Other is inscribing upon us, but Jenbury 
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Handlebar-Smythe appears to be refuting this in her sexuality-gender. She is, in a sense, saying that not 
all animals are equal in the degree to which the Other’s apprehension escapes us and vice versa. 
Of course, this is existential ‘heresy’. The idea that the Other can know us better subverts the notion of 
their being Other. Indeed, Smith-Pickard (2014) characteristics existential sexuality as that “…we 
appropriate and are appropriated by the other.” (Smith-Pickard, 2014, p.90) thus keeping the Other 
intact through the need to appropriate rather than to meet (even Gadamer, 2004 [1960] suggests the 
fusion of horizons). However, I argue that it appears for Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe, that the 
intersubjective binding of being-in-the-world-with-others (Heidegger, 2008 [1962]) means that we can 
enhance this intersubjectivity though our comprehensibility – in this case in an embodied manner. 
Perhaps the message for counselling psychologists here is that this linking of sexuality to gender to 
gender expression in the service of self-expression, and so comprehensibility, is a key part of 
intersubjectivity; and so is a key part of our understanding (and so relating to) trans people and their 
embodied sexuality.  
Of note is that Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe characterises her pre-transition sexuality as “distraction” 
which we might read as inauthenticity in that she is distracted by a part (yet not a part for her) of 
herself. That one should be distracted by what is a key part of the self for many people (and indeed 
which Merleau-Ponty states is an integral part of the self (Merleau-Ponty, [1945] 2002) suggests that the 
distractor (in this case disembodied sexuality) is being cast as an (albeit internal) Other. In this sense it 
is, as it were, a fragmentary I-Me form of relating (cf. Cooper, 2003) to this ‘part’ of the [not]self where 
the self is not regarded as coherent and so the incongruent aspect is split off. This may smack of 
Laingian psychic dis-integration, but recall from above that with trans people the body is not coherent 
with the brain/mind (and so then on to social intersubjectivity), rather than the person not being 
intersubjectivly interrelated with society a priori. For many trans people however, and for Jenbury 
Handlebar-Smythe as we see in her transcript, bodily coherence brings about social coherence - as least 
as regards sexuality with “…more avenues for enjoyment”. 
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Martin 
 
Figure 2. Martin’s model 
Martin’s themes included being unique; overcoming barriers; time and the process of transition; and the 
gaze of the other. 
Hermeneutic of description 
Martin made reference to being unique stating that “I’ve got a snowflake, because each one is 
unique…and that is definitely me” and that “I realised that I could be unique, as a boy”. In a similar 
way to Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe, Martin used different colours to represent multiplicity: “lots of 
different colours because there’s lots more in terms of my identity rather than just being this one boy” 
This was also reflected in his explanation (and explicit knowledge of) of the different parts of his 
identity and practice:  
“I identify as queer and I think that’s a (laughs) really good way of explaining it, 
because it doesn’t stay in one place or space, so my gender identity is queerish, 
my sexuality is queer, my sexual orientation within that is queer, my um, the 
way that I have relationships is also, could be seen as queer, so that kind of fits 
within that.” 
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Martin also noted a barrier (in the form of a wall) which an epiphany, (represented in the form of a 
door) overcame, stating that: “The blue thing yeah – is um, is me kind of bricked in, and it’s specifically 
blue because I am supposed to be a boy, and I am supposed to do boy things, which is blue.” But then 
noting; “Um so this is kind of pretransition and pre…discovery of me… the door represents that kind 
of line, so you come through the door and the the wall bits are now exploded out…”. This explosion, 
he explained, was where he had an epiphany; “I don’t care what sort of man I’m seen as, as long as I’m 
seen as male, although, (laughs) I’ve evolved in terms of my identity since then, but as long as I’m seen 
as male then actually I can be whatever that means to me”. 
This overcoming of the barrier and his reference to there being a “process” since transition also 
references the place of time in Martin’s understandings of himself. 
His use of “what sort of man I’m seen as...” also references the gaze of other people in how he 
understands his identity as independent from them (“I don’t care…”) but also necessarily in reference 
to them. 
Hermeneutic of suspicion  
Martin poses clear questions to the orthodoxy of labelled identity taxonomies and so understandings. 
He, like Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe, makes reference to multiplicity rather than the dyadicism of male 
and female and the associated sexualities of heterosexuality and homosexuality. In this he implicitly 
references the postmodernism of Butler’s (1988; 1999) deconstructions of gender and sexuality away 
from neatly explicable entities and into queer ontology which troubles both traditional gender and 
sexuality categories, and also the very notion that such categories exist. Indeed Martin explicitly 
references being “queer” in various ways (as in the quote above) on several occasions. Notwithstanding 
this, he is also aware of how others (Others?) might see him and disavows their power to ‘appropriate’ 
him (Smith- Pickard, 2014) as a certain sort of man, provided he fits within the broad label of male in 
their minds; and further states that he has moved on from that position now too. 
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This is an important point for counselling psychologists. Words, labels, have great political power - 
from the intimate sphere (including within one’s own mind) out to the widest of political spheres, 
having a label to put on an identity brings with it possibilities for the acquisition of power and control 
over one’s own identity - and so place in the world. For those people who identify as cisgender and 
heterosexual these labels may have been given at birth and so never have needed to be acquired by an 
individual for themselves. For trans and non-heterosexual people (who may be trans of course) labels 
must be acquired, but in the acquisition work must be done to see the points of fit and the spaces of 
disjoint from common stereotypes. Here Martin claims the label Male just as many trans men do, but 
also recognises that there are many aspects of his being-in-the-world which are specific to him. He 
continues: “As long as I’m seen as male I can be whatever that means to me34” thus reinforcing the 
primacy of his own conception of male for him – rather than a received delineation from others, be it 
media or wider society. This is at odds with commentators, mostly from the psychoanalytic tradition 
who suggest that trans people are mostly concerned with stereotyped fantasies (e.g. Chiland, 2005). In 
contrast to Chiland and others’ erroneous conceptualisations, it is more often the case that trans people 
- having had the time for consideration detailed above - will come to nuanced views concerning gender 
much as Martin has done here. Trans people may, of course, go through a stereotyped [pseudo-
authentic] stage when trying on identities at the start of the realisation of their gender (Richards & 
Barker, 2013) - but then, of course, cisgender people do this too, for example during adolescence. 
Time is another theme which occurs within Martin’s explanation. He recalls the epiphany he has while 
viewing the sunrise that he could be his sort of man; he speaks of his evolving identity – thus 
identifying transition as being a process across time. The idea that transition takes time is rather trivial 
of course. However, within that triviality is the more complex notion of the way people’s pasts and 
futures are wrapped up together in an ever-evolving self-in-time. Martin references a memory of a plan 
for the future - his being is still emerging from the recollection which he carries with him for how he 
may be in the future. This sort of existential understanding of time (cf. Cox, 2009) can usefully inform 
                                                 
34 Italics my own. 
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the understanding of transition over time as being not as a series of static sequential events – but as an 
ongoing iterative and retroactively iterative process which continues after transition. Again it is useful 
to be careful here, for this is a specific trans example of a process which people – trans or cisgender – 
undertake with regards to all manner of events, not merely transition. There are, after all, a great many 
transitions in all sorts of domains one might undertake. This is not ‘something trans people do’ which 
should be attended to when seeing trans clients only, but which has wider application for the practice 
of counselling psychology – perhaps we all have “[a] door [which] represents that kind of line”? 
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Charlie 
 
Figure 3. Charlie’s model 
Charlie’s themes included change over time and the overcoming of past barriers; the hope for growth 
and personal comfort; and a consideration of choices.  
Hermeneutic of description 
Charlie also made mention of there being a “process” and the notion of time – going so far as to 
include a clock in the middle of their model. 
Charlie also used colour to represent limitation, although in contrast to Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe who 
used grey to represent a lack of sexual contact, Charlie used it to refer to “I suppose a sexuality that I 
have had, that I have, told was supposed to be a certain way and a sexuality and a body that I’ve never 
connected with so I avoided it pretty much all together.”  
Charlie also referenced limitations through the form of a “kind of a grey blank wall” but went on to 
express the hope that; “if I have a body that I’m more comfortable with then the trees and the flowers 
on this side represent that I might be able to grow and and kind of flourish a bit further down the line”. 
Which again referenced the notion of there being a process in time which included the hope for growth 
and also personal comfort.  
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This use of time was reflected in their statements that; “I feel like I’ve lost a lot of time I suppose, I’m 
[early thirties] now. Um, time I’ve uh, I’m waiting for my appointment for the Gender Identity Clinic in 
[place] so it’s the time now and the patience of having, having to wait. Um and at [early thirties] I know 
that the time that I have ahead of me and the rest of my life and how I want to live with that so.” 
There was also, in the quote above, reference to a Gender Identity Clinic as being part of the process 
necessary to the growth Charlie was hoping for, and the time involved in attending there. 
Hermeneutic of suspicion  
Charlie’s primary themes concerned growth and, necessarily, time. I’ll not needlessly reiterate the 
consideration of time above, but simply note that the wider philosophical understanding sketched 
above applies here too. The notion of growth, however, perhaps bears further consideration. 
Existential growth or potential had, until the second world war, seemed rather acontextual – for 
example Nietzsche’s (1882) Daemon offered the opportunity to live one’s life again and be praised or 
cursed for so doing. This is reflected, and perhaps updated, in the modern retelling of Nietzsche’s 
Daemon in the popular television show Red Dwarf episode The Inquisitor (Naylor et al, 1992) wherein a 
self-repairing replicant travels through time deleting people who have not lived a worthwhile life and 
replaces them with people who never had a chance to live. The difference between Nietzsche’s 
Deamon and the Inquisitor arises in that the Inquisitor will only delete you if you fail to fulfil your 
potential, not if you fail to hit some universal marker of what constitutes a ‘worthwhile life’ (Richards, 
in review). A moment’s thought reveals that this is far more profound – Existentially it’s not the hand 
you are dealt; it’s how you play your cards.  
For many trans people being trans means that there is a good deal of work to be done simply to get to 
square one, at least in regards to gender and sexuality; and this work, of course, precludes time for work 
on other matters. When Charlie speaks of “the patience of having to wait” he’s waiting to [start to] play 
his hand and in the final evaluation it’s important to recognise that this is the case. For this reason 
counselling psychologists can perhaps usefully consider this potential starting position after their 
phenomenological inquiry into the context for the phenomena (as I have done here). This is because 
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the temptation is so often to live with reference to the lives of others – as Charlie says; “glimpses of a 
sexuality I could have…” Indeed it may also simply take more time as there is more to do (gaining a 
coherent body for example). Therefore, while frustration with past change (or lack of it) is pertinent in 
such work, it can be useful to remember Schmich’s (1997) wise quote; “The race is long, and in the end 
it’s only with yourself”. 
Charlie also makes reference to the gender clinics in terms of the wait for personal growth. Much has 
been written about this context, mostly in terms of blogs and NHS overviews such as the NHS Citizen 
Stocktake Gender Identity Services (NHS Citizen, 2015), and some theoretical work concerning 
governmentality such as Davy (2010; 2015) and Sanger (2010). This will be discussed in the analysis 
below, but suffice to say here that they concern both [lack of] recourses meaning that there is a 
troublesome wait as in Charlie’s account above; and also a query as to whether (and if so how) trans 
bodies and lives should regulated by the medico-legal system. Of note here is that Charlie refers to “...a 
sexuality and a body that I’ve never connected with” linking the two in that as he thought about gender 
he thought about sexuality too. Thus this governmentality of transgender from GICs, while ostensibly 
about bodies, extends to sexuality for many patients as we have seen above and will see below and 
dictates how many trans people, as for Charlie, may “grow and and kind of flourish a bit further down 
the line.” 
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Mr Fox 
 
 
Figure 4. Mr Fox’s model 
Mr Fox’s themes included the positioning of his sexuality as strictly binary rather than queer; He made 
reference to other notions of sexuality impinging on his own; and explained that the process of his 
transition had allowed him to express his sexuality in what was now an ongoing exploration. 
Hermeneutic of description 
Mr Fox made specific reference to his sexuality stating that it was a “butch motorcycle fetish type 
thing”. He also exemplified some of the diversity of identity and opinion in the group, making clear 
that while he was; “very confident and competent in understanding [queer theory]” he was not queer 
but rather bisexual (hence the two islands). He stated that; “[queer] doesn’t describe my experience at 
all in terms of sexuality. My sexuality is very binary, I have a very binary sexuality which is why I 
identify as bisexual and not queer”. 
His use of the islands also referenced multiplicity, but a multiplicity within groups (in this case “men” 
and “women”) – rather than a purely fluid multiplicity. He voiced subtleties within this stating that he 
prefers; “Masculine men” and; “femme [rather than feminine] women”. He also identified; “fetish and 
kink” as being part of his sexuality independent of the gender of the people he is attracted to. 
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He situated his understanding of his identity in reference to wider narratives regarding sexuality stating 
that:  
“I feel there is a bit of a sort of a tyranny of cool in the sense that there is a 
pressure to kind of be pansexual, to be open to people on the spectrum of 
genders and sexualities and that and kind of stuff, and that’s absolutely cool if 
that works for you, but it doesn’t work for me. I’m very much on those um 
binaries.” 
He also made reference to how his sexuality was inflected by his gender;  
“I couldn’t have sex with men, or relate sexually to men, when I was living as a 
woman. Just not possible to do. I did and it was rubbish, and I hated it and 
didn’t do it for a long time. Now that I’m, you know, I’m a man and I’m kind 
of in my own masculinity that form of relating becomes possible, whereas it 
wasn’t before.”  
Again noting that time and the process of transition (with the time of transition especially) was 
important; “…pretransition this [masculine] world was closed to me…”, but that this was also ongoing; 
“And now that I’m comfortable with my gender I can explore my sexuality fully in a way that I couldn’t 
before.” 
Mr Fox made reference to the limitations of the medium of LEGO® stating that “They’ve all got bad 
hair by the way but I didn’t have any control over that [laughter].” But later finding that the addition of a 
black leather hat resolved matters; “I can get rid of his rubbish hair now. Oh he’s lovely!”. 
Hermeneutic of suspicion 
Mr Fox again considered time and the nature of transition within the philosophical contexts detailed 
above – noting that he was unable to relate sexually to men before becoming one himself and thus 
intertwining sexuality and gender as others have done. It was clear that, for him, sexual expression with 
men must be mediated through his own masculinity and, especially, though his own expression of his 
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masculinity – for example he states that; “Now… I’m a man and I’m in my own masculinity that form 
of [masculine sexual] relating becomes possible” This sexual relating was wider than simply 
heterosexual or gay androphilic attraction as he spoke about “masculine energy” within the leather 
scene also. Of note though, is his telling phrase; the tyranny of cool regarding queer identities where he, 
while noting he understands and accepts it for others, eschews it for himself. In this he rebuts Butler’s 
(1999) philosophical deconstruction of gender (and as I argue here, sexuality therefore) in that his 
sexuality is dyadic rather than multiplicitous. Indeed he specifically references queer theory as well as 
queer identities, stating that he understands it, but disagrees with it for him personally.  
Of course Butler’s postmodernist (and indeed poststructuralist) arguments regarding gender and 
sexuality differ from Merleau-Ponty in that for Merleau-Ponty sexuality, separate from gender, 
permeates intersubjectivity: Whereas for Butler sexuality, and especially gendered sexuality, is secondary 
to a form of performative gender within a [social] context. Because the meaning of gender changes 
according to time, place, and person Butler argues it doesn’t have an inherent a priori meaning, and 
certainly isn’t linked to biological sex. This may be taken further to give a postmodernist read that 
gender and sexuality in this context have no discreet coherent nature outside of power relations in 
which they are [temporarily] constituted. Butler (1999) follows Foucault here stating that “[Foucault] 
understands the category of sex and of identity generally to be the effect and instrument of a regulatory 
regime” (p.137) - in that regime gender, especially being female, is created though power relations 
wherein certain people are inscribed as women, or ‘not men’. This is why Irigaray (1985 [1977]) states 
that women’s sexuality is derived from men’s. The difficulty here, of course, is that we have to use 
labels (words) such as ‘women’s’ which might seem to have a reductionist meaning even though the 
author and I do not intend that to be so. Nonetheless we therefore have two understandings of 
sexuality which are pertinent – the Merleau-Pontyian intersubjective and the Butlerian postmodernist. 
However, Mr Fox’s understanding of his sexuality appears to be at odds with both conceptions as his 
binary orientation also includes masculine [leather] sexuality which transgresses the strict bounds of 
heterosexuality or gay sexuality, in that it falls, at least partly, outside them as a separate entity. This 
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complex interweaving only makes no sense if we look at it from a logical standpoint (that this entity 
cannot not be that and at the same time also be it). However we are explicitly considering the 
deconstruction of positivist viewpoints by including postmodernism, and so recourse to a meta-
positivism in considering this epistemology seems disingenuous. Thus there are two options: 1. That 
Mr Fox is eschewing queer identities for him while including leather masculinity within his masculine 
sexuality: or 2. That he both has a dyadic masculine sexuality and a ‘queer’ (read postmodern) masculine 
leather sexuality as part of that - though he does not name it so. Philosophically these are equally valid, 
so perhaps we might use ethics as a final arbiter - given the argument above about appropriating trans 
people’s voices: Mr Fox states he is not queer - it is therefore not for me to say he is from my 
comfortable seat in my academic ivory tower. Thus he has a bisexual sexuality within masculinity and 
has leather as a part of that. Simply that. 
While identifying within a binary conception of sexuality Mr Fox also, like others, links sexuality to 
gender noting that he is attracted to “masculine men” and “femme rather than feminine [women]”. 
While some people have a sexuality which is independent of a gender of attraction, or a personal 
gender (e.g. BDSM or infantilism; Richards & Barker 2013; 2015), for Mr Fox and others the two are 
fundamentally intertwined. Further, Mr Fox made clear, again as others did, that realising his gender in 
the world was a key aspect of his sexuality becoming able to be established and acted upon. In the 
simple sense this would obviously affect who can do what sexually and with whom - what means one 
has to appropriate the Other if you will. But in the subtle sense offered in the existential sexuality of 
Merleau-Ponty in which sexuality is; “a fundamental element of encounter and intersubjectivity” 
(Smith-Pickard, 2014) and where; “as an ambiguous atmosphere, sexuality is co-extensive with life” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1996 p.169) something different occurs. Mr Fox’s [emergent] sexuality is seen as a key 
part of his [inter]subjectivity and his gender is a key part of that - as he states; “in my own form of 
masculinity… relating becomes possible”. 
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Cee Cee 
 
Figure 5. Cee Cee’s model 
Cee Cee’s themes included multiplicity of gender and sexuality, with sexuality relating to two groupings 
of masculinity and femininity. They also expressed tiredness at living within societal expectations and 
made clear that this tiredness was not due to any sense of confusion on their part, but was instead to do 
with the trials of living within a society which is confused about them.  
Hermeneutic of description 
Cee Cee identified as “genderqueer genderfluid” and recognised multiplicity within this; “whereas for 
me I feel… I neither feel female or male. I like playing around, but with all types of images of 
masculinity and femininity”. This multiplicity recognised rough groupings within it, especially around 
“masculinity and femininity” which led Cee Cee to define as “Bisexual” – however the use of “all types 
of images of [masculinity and femininity]” suggested that bisexuality here was not being used in a 
strictly binary sense. 
Indeed, Cee Cee recognised their identity as being in a discursive environment which was perhaps not 
fully reflective of them; “If I spent every single time saying no I’m not I’m a girl, no I’m not I’m this de 
de de. You know, I’d be worn out by now. So it’s kind of I accept things from society, but sometimes 
it’s out of convenience rather than because it’s rather than because I’m actually ok with it.” Cee Cee 
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also made reference to the significance of bodies and representation of gender here; “if I’ve got really 
very short hair I’m treated as male, assumed to be male. If my hair is a bit longer I’ve got earrings in 
I’m assumed to be female”.    
Cee Cee also referenced nature as hope [for a change] in order that they; “…would love just to be… 
Cee Cee. Or and if I feel like being Cee Cee, my first name, but had the um choice to use a different 
name if I want to, um and be sexually free… of labels, sexuality labels.” 
This hope to be free of labels and wish to be free of societal expectations, or to be socially intelligible 
while being themselves, was represented by a barrier in the form of a fence and a wall - the living with 
which Cee Cee stated was tiring. Cee Cee was careful to point out that this difficulty was not due to 
confusion on their part – rather that it was difficult to deal with society’s confusion; “I want to, um and 
be sexually free… of labels, sexuality labels. And be free of having to define my gender either way. But 
this does represent… a confusion. But not a confusion for what I feel like and what how I see myself, 
but external society’s assumptions about me, can just be too, too heavy sometimes and it’s just… yeah 
psychologically it can be very demanding. That’s it.” 
Hermeneutic of suspicion  
Cee Cee makes especial reference to labels and being labelled by others, finding the assumptions 
associated with this to be “psychologically very demanding”. Of course the psy professions can 
sometimes be seen as reflecting, or as part of, the society from which these demanding assumptions 
arise and it is notable that the phenomenological approach of counselling psychology attempts to avoid 
this through viewing things as they ‘are’. Nonetheless Cee Cee’s lived experience is just that, in general, 
people are unable to meet Cee Cee as Cee Cee because reliance on already established labels makes this 
difficult – indeed in my avoidance of using gendered pronouns here contemporary language somewhat 
creaks35. Butler (2005) considers this in Giving an Account of Oneself where the very notion of being fully 
comprehensible in one’s account of oneself to others is questioned due to the fact that we are 
                                                 
35 I could, of course, use Zie, Hir etc as gender neutral pronouns (cf. Richards & Barker, 2013), however for readability I 
have avoided this. 
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necessarily constituted as ‘selves’ in childhood prior to our full awareness of what that means; and 
further the language with which we communicate means that “the ‘mineness’ of life is not necessarily 
its story form. The ‘I’ who begins to tell its story can do it only according to recognisable forms of life 
narration [labels]” (Ibid. p.52). Thus everyone is trapped in being somewhat inexplicable through not 
having a language which is at once both reflective of our unique experience, and at the same time 
communicative to anOther of that experience. In the case of non-binary or genderqueer experience, as 
with Cee Cee, it may be argued that language allows still less of an account to be given. This leads to 
being even more marginalised - and we are aware that being in a minority can be psychologically 
stressful (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Sherif, 1956); and that members of minority groups can be subject to 
what Sue (2010) call microaggressions wherein everyday interactions can become trying though social 
scripts not recognising people from a given minority. Once again we butt up against the constraints of 
language as a poor tool for intersubjective relating, but unfortunately it is one of the very few tools we 
have, and the usual one for translation of non-verbal relating and identity in its recounting. 
Perhaps in line with their subtleties of gender identity, Cee Cee also separates out their sexual attraction 
for males and masculinity as well as for females and femininity - rather than simply assuming an elision 
between male and masculinity or between female and femininity. Cee Cee is clearly aware, however, of 
the cultural signifiers of each referring to having earrings as meaning they will be assumed to be a 
female, for example – but determining not to challenge people all of the time as this would be 
psychologically exhausting. Again, here we can see that philosophy is contextualised within lived 
experience. Cee Cee is perhaps meeting many philosophical criteria of existentialism in that they are not 
claiming gender as a fixed entity – as a given (Cohn, 2014 [1997]). In this case this is not at odds with 
their internal identity either, as it so often is with people who identify as ‘a man;’ or ‘a woman’. 
However Cee Cee must live in the world and as such their reality is constrained. Consequently, they 
choose when to foreground their non-binary identity and when not to. This is a useful consideration 
for clinical practice where philosophy and the lived experience of the client may be at odds and we 
don’t want our clients to be “You know… worn out by now”.  
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Scot Sam 
 
Figure 6. Scot Sam’s model 
Scot Sam’s themes included adaptation within the medium of LEGO®; a recognition and overcoming 
of a barrier placed upon him by the world and culture; change over time, and a move to a more positive 
place. 
Hermeneutic of description 
Scot Sam found some limitations with the medium; “[the mini figure36] inside is um the closest thing to a 
girlie LEGO® thing that I could find” which he appeared able to overcome though using the figure as 
a jumping off point for the explanation. He also skilfully used the items as metaphors; “the sort of girlie 
figure in there is sort of sandwiched between two chests [laughs] and a skeleton [laughter].” 
Scot Sam also used walls to reference a cultural barrier; “the fortress thing kind of represents the 
constraints that were placed on me by the world and the culture in which I live” and an embodied 
barrier; “…the way I was constrained from being able to do that by having the body that I had”. 
Scot Sam also referenced time; stating that now “It’s brilliant and really exciting and that’s kind of 
where I feel I am now in comparison to where I was.” 
                                                 
36 This is the name given by LEGO® to their small humanoid figures. 
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This change over time was linked to nature – a “garden” - being a positive environment where Scott 
Sam was able to express himself including the multiplicity of; “a mixture of kind of different gendered 
figures in different ways,” and a variety of sexualities; “some of them have like whips, some of them 
have, kind of dykey, some are fluffy girlie, some are S and M leather men, it’s kind of a bit of a 
mixture.” These were; “not that deep”. 
Hermeneutic of suspicion  
Scot Sam linked his body to cultural constraints – embodied constraints if you will. In addition, he 
identified a number of different identities which were available after transition: “… a mixture of 
different gendered figures in different ways and… everyone’s having a party and it’s brilliant and really 
exciting and that’s where I feel I am now.” Unlike some of the other participants Scot Sam didn’t find 
this theme of multiplicity to be culturally inexplicable – simply that he couldn’t access it in the body he 
previously inhabited. He used the word constrained twice and the word contained also, implying that he 
was aware of this multiplicity beforehand, but could not express it until he had made a physical 
transition. This is the common discourse of X trapped in Y body (Wilchins, 1997), although in Scot 
Sam’s case it was X(trans man+ various gender and sexuality forms) trapped in Y(Female) body. 
It is notable that Scot Sam explicitly notes various sexuality forms; kind of dykey, fluffy girlie, S&M37, 
leather men - some of which have necessarily gendered component and some which do not. Thus while 
Scot Sam required a personally congruent body in order to express his sexuality it was not as an 
objectively necessary part of these forms of sexual attraction, but rather because it was necessary for him. 
This is a slightly different take on the considerations detailed here with other participants which noted 
that some sexuality forms are only explicable for certain genders, and that sexuality may be taken as 
postmodernist (Butler), or as a part of intersubjectivity (Merleau-Ponty). While all of these, and perhaps 
especially sexuality-as-intersubjectivity, do fit here to some extent, Scot Sam simply wishes to express 
                                                 
37 This usually means consensual erotic power and/or sensation exchange: Bondage and Discipline, Dominance and 
Submission, and Sadomasochism (BDSM)/Kink often shortened to S&M (Richards & Barker, 2013). 
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his sexuality, at least in part, in an embodied manner – once again his [gendered] body is an integral part 
of his sexuality. As Joseph (2009) notes:  
“Existential phenomenologists describe intersubjectivity as if it is constituted 
through our embodied subject’s interaction with another embodied subject of 
the same kind, overlooking the sexually specific differences of the two subjects 
– both sensory and morphological” (p.12-13) 
Overlooking the heterosexism of this statement38 Joseph’s point is well made, in that embodied 
intersubjectivity is necessary if bodies are to be involved, and further that the specific attributes of 
those bodies matter. In terms of the sexualities Scot Sam delineates, they matter in terms of the physical 
capabilities, and also (perhaps tautologically given the Irigarayian formulation of gender given above) in 
terms of the gendered meanings and particularly meanings in terms of power relations which they 
inhere and communicate. These are for Scot Sam, as for many people, the “constraints that were placed 
on me by the world and the culture in which I live”. 
                                                 
38 And note here that I am doing the onerous work many participants describe in attempting to make explicable non-
heteronormative accounts in a heterosexist society. 
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Sack Boy 
 
Figure 7. Sack Boy’s model 
Sack Boy’s themes included attraction irrespective of genitalia; Identifying openness in relation to his 
primary dyad; Change over time in relationship structure, but not intent or identity. 
Hermeneutic of description 
Sack Boy referenced the two genders of him and his partner stating that they are; “a man and a 
woman”, but did not have gender as the defining feature of his sexuality, or indeed make reference to 
gender being related to sexuality in any way. He further stated of physicality that: “I’m attracted to the 
person, and whatever’s in their pants is… whatever”. He included both a “man” (indicated by a beard) 
and a “sort of gender-queer, person with, no bits, uh who’s genitals don’t really mean anything to me” 
as possible partners outside of his primary dyad. He placed this dyad upon “a sort of pedestal” 
surmounting a “sort of open field sort of represents that openness [of an open relationship]”.  
Referencing change over time in terms of the form of his current relationship, but not his intent, he 
stated that: “From being single for quite a few years I’m now in a sort of relatively stable relationship 
and I feel at home and a bit safe with her”. 
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Hermeneutic of suspicion  
Sack Boy viewed his sexuality through the possibilities afforded him by his relationship, both in terms 
of its current stability and also in terms of wider non-monogamies. This is reflected in Richards (2010) 
who showed that some trans people use non-monogamies as a means of foregrounding different 
genders within different partnerships. Sack Boy included two people in the field, one male and one 
genderqueer; and while Sack Boy’s express intention with regards to his own gender was not explicit, it 
is possible that his mode of [gendered-sexual] relating would be affected by the gender of his partners. 
Indeed, Smith-Pickard (2014) notes that; “…existential sexuality is a system of reciprocity whereby we 
fascinate and are fascinated by each other, we appropriate and are appropriated by each other, and what 
we desire is that the other person should desire us in return in mutual reciprocity.” While, as stated 
above, I am unsure if this hard notion of ‘appropriation’ of the other is reasonable, there is some merit 
in noting how the fuzzy boundaries of our beings intersect (cf. Kosko, 1994), and how this intersection 
is likely to be inflected by the gender of the people involved. 
Sack Boy also makes reference to how the safety of his primary dyad allows him to explore 
relationships more widely. As with all human relating, and perhaps especially sexual relating, the step 
into the unknown will necessarily be a leap to faith (Kierkegaard, 1980 [1844]) as the outcome can 
never be predetermined. However – within his model his primary partnership is literally “raised up” to 
create a firm base from which such a leap into the [non-monogamous] unknown can be made. From 
within the tradition of counselling psychology the therapeutic space may be seen as such a base for our 
clients to make a similar leap to faith; and philosophically the place of such spaces within people’s lives 
and within the therapy room - as well as such leaps themselves - is perhaps noteworthy, as we shall see 
below with reference to the gender clinics. Notwithstanding this, it might be nice if we as clinicians 
could offer somewhere to make such leaps where our clients too could, as necessary; “…feel at home 
and a bit safe”. 
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Haramit 
 
Figure 8. Haramit’s model 
Haramit’s themes included careful, safe, change over time; fluidity; awareness of the gaze of others, but 
without the need to conform to it; a distinction between romanticism and physical sexuality; a freedom 
when being brought up; and a resistance to any chronological imperative for self-discovery. 
Hermeneutic of description 
Haramit referenced change over time and especially whether “everything is like… going to plan and 
stuff.” This was in reference to; “family and socialisation,” and was presented as being done in a safe 
manner: “And it’s wearing a helmet because, safety… obviously.” 
They also made reference to living in two worlds of gender and moving between them, with some 
difficulty, through the addition of a frog: “So it’s kind of like they can, they live in sort of two different 
worlds. Kind of… Which is how I kind of feel sometimes with regards to… my gender.” 
They acknowledged the gaze of the other as not being personally important, but nonetheless inflecting 
their lived experience; “because I don’t really, I don’t really care too much about my own gender or how 
people perceive me. But it seems that other people are a lot more interested in whether I am a boy or a 
girl or something else.” 
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They also drew a distinction between physical sexuality and romanticism, stating that: “I am far more 
inclined to form a romantic relationship with someone rather than physical.” 
They also identified as fluid, utilising a car as indicative of movement (rather than multiple discrete 
categories) in gender, sexuality, and beyond stating that; “it kind of it kind of represents a bit of, fluidity 
and freedom, in kind of… everything…” 
Haramit attributed some of this freedom of identity to “the way I was brought up was very, it was in a 
slightly more… there was less pressure on me to conform to one particular gender. Erm I was very free 
to, erm play with male or female toys or dress how I wanted to dress so long as I looked presentable.” 
This freedom from some societal constraints was still bound by time with Haramit stating that: “I’ve 
never really felt too much in the ways of pressures starting trying to conform me into anything until I 
hit puberty”. However Haramit was able to resist this chronological imperative stating that; “I will 
discover who I am when I’m ready to discover who I am.” And so “Erm, so I’ve always been quite free 
and accepting of myself.” 
Hermeneutic of suspicion  
As with some others, Haramit also referenced time in his explanation, explaining that the pressure to 
confirm to the expectations of the Others occurred at puberty – something which many trans people 
have recounted in their histories (Barrett, 2007) with greater gender latitude being afforded to people in 
their pre-adolescent childhood. Oftentimes puberty is when secondary sexual characteristics become 
visible (i.e. female bodied children being required to put tops on and wear more gender-specific 
clothing). Again here we can see a link between gender and sexuality and the impact of society upon 
this. For many trans people this can be an especially distressing time as they are forced down an 
uncomfortable [wrong] track. Haramit, however, noted that they did not feel this pressure to conform 
from their immediate family, but rather from wider society. In this Haramit was similar to a number of 
participants who felt such an imposition. Haramit, however - perhaps because of their more 
comfortable upbringing - felt able to be ‘amphibious’ in terms of their ability to live in two different 
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worlds without undue distress. Indeed their explanation was one of psychological robustness noting “I 
don’t really care too much about my own gender or how others perceive me”. In this way they were 
able to differentiate themself from some existential philosophy which suggests that they would 
necessarily be constituted by others. Instead they were I-I relating (Cooper, 2003) suggesting that they 
were constituted primarily by themselves in this way and were comfortable with that, stating; “I’ve 
always been quite free and accepting of myself”. 
This freedom; “…a bit of fluidity and freedom in kind of …everything” is at odds with some narratives 
of trans development which suggest that, almost universally, there is a process of coming to acceptance 
of oneself (i.e. Bockting & Coleman, 2007) which is not posited for cisgender people. This 
heterogeneity of trans experience is important, not only here as we discuss themes in qualitative 
research, but, as noted above, also in quantitative research in which difference can be lost in the 
variance – as well as in the consulting room during therapy. 
Haramit also notes that; “I am far more inclined to form a romantic relationship with someone than 
physical”. The common name for this, given their fluidity noted above, would be panromantic, although 
Haramit does not use this label – again possibly due to their preference for fluidity with labels being 
notoriously limiting on this as we have seen. This brings another aspect to sexuality – romance – which 
has not explicitly been mentioned before, but which nonetheless falls within, or adjunctive to, its 
domain (Carrigan, 2015; Richards & Barker, 2013). There has been little written about solo-romance in 
the way in which solo-sex (masturbation) has been written, but we might easily see how such a 
reconstrual could be made as a means of relating to oneself. Consequently, whether partnered or solo, 
we could see how romance might be a form of intersubjective relating which intersects with sexuality in 
the wider existential sense of the word discussed above; and in this way be respectful in our practice of 
people who are; “inclined to form a romantic relationship with someone rather than physical”. 
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Tara 
 
Figure 9. Tara’s model 
Tara’s themes involved her responses to her perception of a critical society; and her concern that she 
must have an identity to navigate society. 
Hermeneutic of description 
Tara recognised the part her online identity played in her life stating that she picked her pseudonym as; 
“Tara because of my imagination, my original name that I think I ever used on the internet years and 
years ago”. 
She also recognised she had a barrier around her relating to her sexuality and gender which she 
represented in the form of a fort; “that’s what it is, it’s it’s something I keep locked away from people 
and don’t share with, um people.” She stated the flag represented; “[what] people see that they’ll 
assume is what I am and who I am, but it’s not what I am.” And that in a similar theme the cannon; 
“…is representing the fact that I can be quite, um, can be quite aggressively protective of my own 
sexuality and gender”. 
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In this the gaze of Others was apparent “they’ll assume is what I am and who I am” as well as the need 
to navigate that gaze; “it’s just what I put on to actually navigate society because you have to have an 
identity. Um, so it’s I guess it’s the one that’s sort of forced on you by the assumptions in society on 
what you want to do, and the one that’s most useful for navigating it.” Tara maintained her control 
over her representation to society stating; “I let them see what I want them to see and that’s about it.” 
Hermeneutic of suspicion  
Tara spoke primarily about the ‘fort’ which she used to protect her from Others seeing her sexual 
identity. In speaking about this protection it is notable that she also avoided speaking about her 
sexuality directly as part of this research. She also spoke about the flag being what she wanted people to 
see – and again the flag was used to draw attention from her sexuality in the research. Nonetheless this 
was the phenomena presented in response to the research question and though this media. As Medina 
(2014) says;  
“…In the end it is the individuals experience that is key and the 
phenomenological approach must deal solely with the phenomenon that our 
[participants39] actually present.”  
Tara must, after all, wish to speak about her fort and flag as she chose to participate and not to redact 
the transcript. She states that she can be; “quite aggressively protective of my own sexuality and 
gender” – that ‘own’ being important in that it is not subject to the gaze of the societal Other and 
therefore their approval or disapproval. One might argue that this is bad faith (Sartre, 1996 [1943]) in 
that she is not presenting her authentic self, however, of course, no one presents their authentic self all 
the time – it is simply a matter of degree. Notwithstanding this, Tara’s sexual and gender self may feel 
too unsafe to expose to the view of critical others and so may feel safer hidden. In this she may follow 
some of the stages of coming out detailed in Bockting & Coleman (2007) or Richards (2011) in which 
                                                 
39 Medina uses ‘clients’ here, but – just as kata becomes kumite – so in my view the phenomenological method 
philosophically flows from therapeutic client ‘research’ to (nominally) non-therapeutic participant research. 
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trans people feel the need to be discreet about their gender (and intertwined sexuality) until such time 
as their circumstances (both inter- and extra-psychic) allow for further disclosure. 
She also notes that the flag is; “…not who or what I am, just what I put out to navigate society” – once 
again citing the gaze of the societal Other as the restrictive constituent of her outward appearing. Note 
that she is still being constituted by Society in this way, in a very different manner from Haramit above 
who acknowledges the societal gaze, but opts to eschew it. As a (nascent) existentialist I’m naturally 
drawn towards the notion of the waiter’s apron, or the fin de siècle man’s moustache which Sartre took 
such exception to, however, again I’m not sure this rings true. While Tara notes that her flag represents 
things which are; “…forced on you by the assumptions in society on what you want to do” she also 
notes that it is; “…the one that’s most useful for navigating it”- It might not be authentic, but it has 
utilitarian value. For me, it is useful to be wary of a sort of sub-cultural post-colonialism in which those 
of us working with marginalised communities impose possibilities derived from philosophy which may 
not be pragmatically viable. People do what they do according to their capacities, both personally and 
socially. Of course it makes sense to evaluate these from time to time, but I’ll not sit here in my 
pseudo-Café de Flore and judge. 
Tara also mentions the internet as being the place she first used her pseudonym. Since the advent of 
the internet it has not been uncommon that trans people have first come out online and inhabit 
cyberspace in their preferred avatar (Bornstein, 1994; Wilchins, 1997). This is troubling for some 
existential thinkers who suggest that we are necessarily physically embodied without recognising that in 
such instances our embodiment in the chair is simply a medium for accessing the internet and so, 
whatever adaptive technology one uses to access it, our presence is the same. Thus while authors such 
as Serning (2012) have argued that what is ready-to-hand online is constrained by our physicality, I 
argue that  - for the gaze of the Other - what is ready-to-hand is simply the content of the online 
environment which also co-constitutes the person within it. Thus our self in such an environment 
might actually be a dragon, or a soldier… or a woman. Tara, of course, suggests that she chose her 
[ready to hand] name; “…because of my imagination, my original name that I used on the internet”. 
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Jane Crocker 
 
Figure 10. Jane Crocker’s model 
Jane Crocker’s themes involved a complex interplay between binary understandings of masculinity and 
femininity and fluid notions of gender and sexuality. There was also a complex notion of adaptation 
over time while retaining latent parts of previous identities. Lastly there was reference to kink and how 
it crossed genders - but perhaps was manifest differently in each. 
Hermeneutic of description 
Jane Crocker used LEGO® mini figures to represent a complex interplay between a binary of 
masculinity and femininity, and a fluidity of genders and sexualities. She stated of her own transition: “I 
transitioned from, uh to put it in a very, what I would consider to be a binary way, I have transitioned 
from male to female” but also stated; “there’s certainly a binary there in terms of femininity and 
masculinity but um, the rotation is what makes, uh the whole thing like fluid” and went on to say that 
this fluidity; “…can be like slow and pleasant or really, really fast and violent”. 
Jane Crocker also makes reference to the accoutrements of gender; “lipstick and … makeup.” But 
intertwined with this is complexity as these figures also have a sword and magic. Indeed, Jane Crocker 
states that: “The two more kind of feminine figures, um they both have like, um kind of beauty and 
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they have magic and power and and they and they’re strong.” Differentiating the masculine figures by 
stating that they have: “…armour which is more – I find – defensive” and noting of one of the masculine 
figures in armour that it: “represents the times that I have used kind of masculinity as a kind of like as a 
protection both in the past and in the present, and so before and after, uh, transition.” 
The “…past and in the present…” here represents an acknowledgement of time passing, although not 
necessarily with change at the threshold of transition (in this matter at least) as masculinity was used 
defensively “before and after, uh, transition.” Some part of a process over time was reflected in her 
statement: “… both like what is past in my life but also like the remaining insecurities uh that have 
come with transition…” This is evident in her reference to masculine power both being past and still 
latent; “kind of the dead king [the skeleton in the crown] is like some of the privilege I I feel that I have 
lost that um um, that is gone and kind of like that past that is gone. But at the same time it is still there 
and has a crown so it is like, it has power so it’s kind of like, you could see it as a sort of skeleton in the 
closet sort of thing.” 
Jane Crocker also made reference to kink, which crossed gender boundaries: “Um the the other one, 
the noble man represents a kind of like a masculinity that is that I find more related to sex and hence 
the handcuffs, so kind of like kinky and such. Um um and so there’s the [female] magician who also has 
the little bag of tricks that also represents like um kink and stuff and toys and such things.” 
Hermeneutic of suspicion  
Jane Crocker made reference to both the gender binary and fluidity in her model. Of the binary she 
mentioned the accoutrements of femininity perhaps nodding to De Beauvoir’s’ famous quote “One is 
not born, but rather becomes a woman” (1997 [1949] p.301). However, she also referenced the sword 
as an accoutrement of masculinity, suggesting that – in a departure from Irigarayan philosophy, but 
arguably in line with Butlerian – both male and female are somewhat culturally constructed, rather than 
only femininity being in reference to masculinity. These are, of course, cultural signifiers which will 
differ cross-culturally in terms of their place in personal intelligibility within a culture. 
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Notwithstanding this, Jane Crocker undertakes a complex move in situating the gender binary on a 
turntable to represent fluidity. Again something which cannot be reduced either to logical positivist or 
postmodernist philosophies is represented. It is both binary and fluid – and I cannot allow myself to 
simply suggest that this (on a meta level) is a postmodernist deconstruction of binaries as this would 
privilege that philosophical position in a way which Jane Crocker clearly has not done. This appears to 
need a new philosophy (or more likely one I am not aware of) – the closest in my mind being Zen 
Buddhism in which the apparent paradox of the binary and the non-binary are simply different facets 
of an underlying reality which is unknowable (Suzuki, 2011 [1970]). This foray into philosophy is 
important because phenomenologically it fits the presenting reality – to impose either a logical positivist 
or postmodernist philosophy through misapplication of power would be inappropriate here and, by 
extension, within the consulting room. 
Jane Crocker also makes reference to the power inherent in masculinity with her ‘skeleton king’ 
representing the hidden power which she previously accessed and indeed since transition also accesses. 
Although acknowledging that the female figures are “strong” she also sees masculinity as being “more 
defensive”, which she represents by giving her mini figures armour. This vulnerable-feminine 
defensive-masculine split of course is culturally coherent back to [pre]history and is one of the complex 
areas which trans people must navigate in order to remain culturally coherent, while at the same time 
authentic. Serano (2007), for example considers the double bind of trans women who are required to be 
very feminine in order to defend their [questioned] femininity; while at the same time being told that 
being very feminine is not authentic as they are simply overly acquiring cultural accoutrements of 
femininity in order to buttress their [false] female identity. Conversely a trans woman taking on 
masculinity is also not authentic as they are not acting like a ‘real woman’. Consequently the taking on 
of gendered characteristics not normally associated with their gender is arguably more difficult for trans 
people. 
In utilising male figures in this way Jane Crocker appears to be separating identity from the expression, 
or perhaps better, utilisation of a gender form – and so is acknowledging the social encultured 
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understandings of gender. Thus we have a separation of body, gender, and utilitarian gender expression 
as Jane Crocker states that she has; “transitioned in a very binary way from male to female”. This 
position then is effectively feminist in the political sense of the word. Again this is more complex than 
the traditional notion of trans gender as expression of an inherent internal gender (Benjamin, 1966). 
Jane Crocker does this, but is also able to express gender or gendered attributes – in this case 
masculinity – for their utilitarian instrumental ends. 
Jane Crocker also references masculinity as related to [kinky] sex noting it is related to; “handcuffs, so 
kind of like kinky and such”. Kink or BDSM of course, are concerned with the consensual exchange of 
power (Taormino, 2012) and as such are power relations are writ large. Easton and Hardy (2001; 2002; 
2005) consider the gendered power relations in wider society we have been examining above, within the 
context of the explicitly negotiated BDSM environment, and the meanings inscribed upon gendered 
bodies in them - especially when a male top or dominant partner has a female submissive partner. This 
is because the implicit gender power relations within wider society may not have been negotiated within 
the BDSM relationship. Jane Crocker brings further philosophical complexity to this in that she is 
carrying over the masculine protective power assigned her at birth to the kink environment in an 
instrumental way, as detailed above. She also, however, has feminine figures associated with kink who 
have; “…a little bag of tricks that represents like kink and stuff and toys…” such that she can represent 
her feminine self within kink environments. In this way she can represent both herself (female) and 
instrumental masculinity both within vanilla (non-kink) environments and also in kink environments - 
so upsetting the notion of the single inherent gender expression being all that is available to trans 
people 
Jane Crocker notes that power has changed over time in relation to her transition – hence the dead king. 
She characterises this as; “some of the privilege I feel I have lost” from transitioning from male to 
female. And also acknowledges; “what is past in my life [and] the insecurities which have come with 
transition”. Here again time - in the non-linear sense of the past and future inflecting the present and 
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one another – is a key component of transition in terms of gender, identity, sexuality, and also 
[gendered] “power”. 
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Ezio 
 
Figure 11. Ezio’s model 
Ezio’s themes included a complex relation to time in which different aspects of a number of identities 
were foregrounded. They also referenced the past event of transition inflecting an engagement with the 
Bear40 community which had occurred in the time since his transition. 
Hermeneutic of description 
Ezio utilised “…lots of little different heads in with different faces” to represent different facets of his 
identity. He included a boat to represent some, perhaps fluid, movement between these;  
“it’s a boat because it can travel between all the different bits um. And that’s 
on a board with different colours… um, so really I’ve just sort of envisaged 
myself sort of going between these different parts and these are different 
aspects of my life. Uh where I sort of have different, or act differently or have 
different um ways of being myself in different situations.” 
He also recognised barriers, especially within the Bear community; “I feel that there are barriers there 
because I get to a certain point and I don’t feel comfortable or say anything that’s to do with um my 
                                                 
40 The Bear community is a gay male subculture which involves hirsute males and evolved from blue-collar workers 
especially. 
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trans history or um, like bits and bobs of genitals and different ways of how I feel about my body. Um so 
maybe yeah that’s the um, the sort of barriers that I hit on…”  
Ezio also situated his gender in time, citing his trans reality as being in the past, albeit inflecting his 
lived experience in the present with his difficulties with the Bear community cited above. His use of 
“now” in; “…like the gay male sort of Bears which I am I very much consider myself a part of now” 
points to his recognition of time playing a factor in his identity - with a more complex relation to 
multiple, fluid identities needing to be foregrounded at different times: “But yeah the idea is at the boat 
will travel round to different ones at different times and be a certain way in a different situation. Uh but 
I don’t feel that I can be all that at one point in time.”   
Hermeneutic of suspicion  
Like other participants, Ezio references multiplicity in several ways: With regards to his identity – his 
“different parts”; how he expresses himself – how he “acts differently” in different situations; and also 
simply the different parts of his life. Again this might be regarded as rather disorganised in traditional 
psychotherapeutic modalities, but here it appears to represent the rather more reasonable position of 
presenting in a different way in different situations much as we all do. For trans people (as, one might 
image for other groups of people who are careful with their pasts such as indigenous people in 
occupied countries and members of persecuted religions) there is often a necessity to foreground 
certain identities in order to feel safe and to be culturally comprehensible. 
Ezio particularly notes this in relation to the Bear community which, grounded as it is in gay male 
masculinity (c.f. Richards & Barker, 2015), Ezio feels would not be accepting of some aspects of his 
trans identity. He shows this in the form of a barrier, and includes various other barriers concerning 
other aspects of his desired life (which he can see through the window included in his model). He 
notes; “I don’t feel comfortable or say anything that’s to do with my trans history or um like bits and 
bobs of genitals and different ways of how I feel about my body”. In this his embodied sense of self is 
acting as a barrier to the form of intersubjectivity he desires – he suggests that his subject will not be 
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seen if you will, but rather an erroneous object will be perceived. Some existential philosophy would 
posit that we can never be truly seen by the Other – but again some animals are more equal than others 
in this regard, and it is a fairly universal desire to wish to be seen for who we are in our sense of ourself 
– rather than the facticity of the physical world, including the body habitus – we happen to have been 
thrown into. This is especially the case because (as Butler, 1999 argues) body parts come with culturally 
inscribed meanings which may not ring true to the person who has them – for example, the person in a 
wheelchair who is assumed to have a learning difficulty; the person with a penis assumed to be 
masculine; the person with long hair assumed to be feminine; the person with dark skin assumed to be 
dangerous, etc. 
Ezio also considers time in his explanation, noting that; “at some point the barriers will go” and again 
he is living in reference to non-linear time - here wrapping the future in his present. Tellingly he also 
notes that “The boat will travel round to different ones at different times and be a certain way in a 
different situation. Uh but I don’t feel I can be all that at one point in time”. That is he has a 
multiplicity of elements which are distributed across time and circumstance. Of course this explanation 
is set in time and circumstance, and so we have an iteration of foregrounded elements with one 
explaining the others. This phenomena questions the notion of identity labels for gender and sexuality 
as anything but the most cursory of placeholders – politically vital ones as I have argued above and 
elsewhere (e.g. Richards & Barker 2013; 2015), but perhaps not fully explanatory of Ezio’s (or 
anyone’s?) worlding which involves “…lots of… different heads with different faces”. 
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Group Responses 
Within the whole group, themes of barriers to appropriate interventions and especially a lack of 
support from Gender Identity Clinics (GICs) figured largely. This was accompanied by a consideration 
of time and the process of transition; as well as a wish for support which was informed by the full range 
of trans experience - especially relating to sexuality - and which was accommodating of multiplicity and 
fluidity. There was also a key theme of embodiment relating to sexuality. As with the individual 
responses above, we will examine the responses descriptively – the hermeneutic of description - before 
turning to the theoretically contextualised hermeneutic of suspicion below. 
Hermeneutic of description 
The group discussed a range of topics with Tara commenting very early on that: “there seems to be a 
common theme of barriers… either ones people have put up themselves for protecting themselves or 
ones that people face for trying to access spaces. It’s just the loss of freedom to move”. The two parts 
to this - the barriers and the chronological adaptation of experience – were repeated throughout the 
group discussion. We will return to the key theme of barriers throughout, however with reference to 
time, this was evident when Scot Sam commented on “…a past identity and a present identity, or a 
future identity.” and Charlie spoke about “how I’m going to be for the rest of my life”, indeed time, 
and specifically change over time, occurred repeatedly as key themes. 
Concerning time and barriers, the relation to health professionals was a major theme in the group 
discussion - with frustration with the GICs being voiced by many participants. Mr Fox stated: “I 
realised what it was is that they’d stopped seeing us as human beings. They’d started to see us as units in 
a healthcare system to be processed, they’d lost sight of our humanity…. we are so dehumanised I 
think as sexual beings in so much else of the way that society deals with us.” Jenbury-Handlebar-Smythe 
agreed referring to clients in a gender service as a “product” and stating that: “I certainly have the strong 
impression that no one who’s involved in the medical care and treatment of trans people knows a damn 
thing about it. At all. Endocrinologists don’t have a clue, the shrinks don’t have a clue. It all, seems very 
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disconnected from our realities…” This was a key theme which recurred throughout in terms of the 
limitations and barriers participants felt were imposed. For example, Jenbury-Handlebar-Smythe said 
that “The GICs are far more ‘No this is you must want this particular set of configuration and you must 
go all the way through to the end or you’re not valid’. Um there’s no sense of understanding that a big 
part of it for a lot of people is um becoming comfortable with who they are, what they are, um yeah 
and that isn’t part of it it’s about turning men into women and women into men.” Cee Cee echoed this 
saying that they had to “follow the script” to get what they wanted in terms of physical interventions 
and stated that: “I think it’s medical practitioners and psychiatric practitioners having a fixed idea of 
what a man is and what a woman is and – just do the swap.” They also voiced concern with the 
limitations of GIC clinicians stating that they use; “…sort of the heteronormative model. And they’re 
not, but the worst thing is that a lot of practitioners are not aware, of of these biases that they’re 
bringing into their assessments…” and consequently that: I never went to to them for support or for 
guidance for that I went to my community…” Indeed Mr Fox stated that: “In my experience the GICs 
that I have encountered are actually professionally negligent in the the lack of support that they give 
you around sex and relationship stuff.”  
Notwithstanding this concern with the abilities and unexamined stance of GIC clinicians, there was a 
call for more support for trans people from professionals with Mr Fox stating that: “The idea that any 
gender identity clinic in this country as far as I can perceive, from my involvement with them is 
offering any meaningful support whatsoever to people around sex and relationship stuff is laughable”. 
Martin found the support “in terms of sex and relationships" offered by GICs to be “too medicalised” 
and was concerned that his therapist “Wanted to know from me, what the options were for men for 
lower surgery, rather than finding out through training channels”. 
Quite commonly in terms of transition, and again in relation to the GICs, the theme of time recurred - 
sometimes in the form of a ‘process’ - most often towards a more positive place. For example, Charlie 
referred to being “Early in this process [of transition]” and hoped to “grow and flourish a bit further 
down the line” noting that he was in his early thirties and was in the process of waiting for an 
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appointment at a GIC. Martin used a door to represent pre- and post-transition with more colour 
afterwards to represent “lots more in terms of my identity” and spoke of having “evolved in terms of 
my identity”; Mr Fox stated that: “…pretransition this [masculine] world was closed to me…” and 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe; “Pretransition… there was kind of like interference… post, um physical, uh 
transition, it... provided more… avenues for enjoyment.” and Jane Crocker: “…I have used kind of 
masculinity as a kind of like as a protection both in the past and in the present, and so before and after, 
uh, transition.” 
Alongside this, some participants spoke on the theme of feeling constrained by their assigned gender 
with Charlie avoiding his gender and sexuality as a “grey blank wall” until able to address it. Similarly 
Martin felt “bricked in” until transition when “the wall bits exploded out… [into] lots of different 
colours because there’s lots more in terms of my identity.” These constraints come from a number of 
different places, most commonly from societal expectations around gender (and sometimes from GICs 
perceived to be representing those expectations, as detailed above). For example, Cee Cee said: “for me 
how society sees my gender and sexuality and how I feel it to be, it’s or most of the time is always in 
conflict. So I see myself as genderqueer genderfluid but society... if I’ve got really very short hair I’m 
treated as male, assumed to be male. If my hair is a bit longer I’ve got earrings in I’m assumed to be 
female… whereas for me I feel… I neither feel female or male.” And [relating to GICs] “…the 
heteronormative model. And they’re not, but the worst thing is that a lot of practitioners are not aware, 
of of these biases that they’re bringing into their assessments”. Tara similarly: “It’s not it’s not who or 
what I am it’s just what I put on to actually navigate society because you have to have an identity. Um, 
so it’s I guess it’s the one that’s sort of forced on you by the assumptions in society on what you want 
to do, and the one that’s most useful for navigating it.” and Mr Fox; “…we are so dehumanised I think 
as sexual beings in so much else of the way that society deals with us.” Haramit felt constrained only 
after puberty came; “I’ve never really felt too much in the ways of pressures starting trying to conform 
me into anything until I hit puberty”. 
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Indeed many participants located the difficulties within society as specifically due a lack of knowledge 
beyond heteronormativity and consequently a difficulty with being comprehensible. Haramit stated: “I 
don’t really, I don’t really care too much about my own gender or how people perceive me. But it 
seems that other people are a lot more interested in whether I am a boy or a girl or something else.”  
Martin stated: “as long as I’m seen as male then actually I can be whatever that means to me” and used 
the term queer to refer to himself. Similarly, as mentioned above, Cee Cee stated: “I see myself as 
genderqueer genderfluid but society...” With regard to the GICs, Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe stated of 
clinicians that “There’s no sense of understanding that a big part of it for a lot of people is um 
becoming comfortable with who they are, what they are, um yeah and that isn’t part of it it’s about 
turning men into women and women into men.”, There was some resistance to this, however with 
Martin referencing the gaze of other people stating that: “Once I start on T41… I don’t care what sort 
of man I’m seen as, as long as I’m seen as male” which perhaps links to the theme of change over time 
above. 
Possibly in order to be intelligible, many participants did reference normative models of identity and 
sexuality, whether accepting or resisting them. For example Mr Fox identified his sexuality as being 
“very binary” clarifying; “I identify as bisexual not queer” and stating that he was attracted to 
“masculine men” and “femme women”. He expressed concern that: “I feel there is a bit of a sort of a 
tyranny of cool in the sense that there is a pressure to kind of be pansexual, to be open to people on the 
spectrum of genders and sexualities and that and kind of stuff, and that’s absolutely cool if that works for 
you, but it doesn’t work for me.” Jane Crocker also referenced binary gender stating that: “there’s 
certainly a binary there in terms of femininity and masculinity” but going on to expand; “but um, the 
rotation [of the model] is what makes, uh the whole thing like fluid”. And “I I transitioned from, uh to 
put it in a very, what I would consider to be a binary way, I have transitioned from male to female.” 
and Charlie spoke about being “in a female body”. Perhaps because of the semiotic nature of the 
medium participants used stereotypes to represent gender such as lipstick (Jane Crocker), beards (Sack 
                                                 
41 Testosterone 
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Boy, Mr Fox), and some made reference to binary expectations elsewhere such as skirts for women 
(Jane Crocker) with Charlie commenting “How in a female body you’re expected, you know there is an 
expectation of the role you are supposed to play…”.  
These understandings about culturally comprehensible signifiers of gender were also noted by Owen 
(2012) in their phenomenological research on trans. Owen states: "Because the realm of any meanings 
and cultural practices are intersubjective... Trans-sexuals (sic) appropriate pre-existing gender codes in 
order to express themselves like anybody else." (p.210); however in the current research this was made 
more complex with a wide range of gender identities being held by the participants beyond only male 
and female. These included female, trans man, gender queer, genderqueer, genderfluid, queerish, trans-
man, male, trans (almost) male. And a range of sexualities labelled including romantic, queer, kink, 
S&M42, gay male Bear culture, bisexual, leather, dykey. There were also a range of relationship 
structures recognised including being single, poly, having a partner. A further mode of complexity was 
the mixing of commonly gendered items such as Jane Crocker’s use of lipstick and a sword for one of 
her feminine figures and the notion of fluidity represented by movement which occurred in several 
models such as Harmit’s letter, Jane Crocker’s turntable, and Cee Cee’s multiple people for example. 
While terms such as Bear implicitly linked sexuality and gender, some participants explicitly linked them, 
for example Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe stated that: “My gender does influence my sexuality” and 
Martin used the term “queer” to identify his “sexuality” and “sexual orientation” as well as his “gender 
identity” which he referred to as “queerish”. Naturally, implicit links will be discussed within the 
Hermeneutic of Suspicion subsection below, but here it is worth noting also that there was a common 
theme linking embodiment to sexuality. For example Mr Fox commented; “If you are trying to have a 
sex life with a penis that looks like Chewbacca43 [laughter] that is going to affect your ability to have a 
functioning sex life…You know trying to have, or given a blowjob, and trying to have that kind of 
sexual conversation with someone when you’re trying to have to explain why your penis is covered in 
                                                 
42 This commonly means Sadism and Masochism (Richards & Barker, 2013) 
43 Chewbacca is an extremely hairy humanoid from the Star Wars film series. 
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hair.” And that “[GICs need to provide] support in terms of sex and relationships… if somebody 
doesn’t even know what surgeries are available how can you then advise somebody on what it is that 
they then might want to do with what, what is available to do with those body parts, what you might 
want to get into.”  
This was not always simply that participants were not able to be sexual with their pre- or non-surgical 
bodies. While Charlie said: “…I think for me a lot of it is, you know, body related.” the necessity for a 
certain type of embodiment was both embraced and resisted with Martin stating that:  
“I did enjoy my body but I repressed that because I wasn’t supposed to. As a 
trans person I was supposed to hate my body. And that was what I got from 
the clinics was that I should not enjoy my body. I should be having lower 
surgery because there is something wrong with my body. Um there’s not 
something wrong with my body. My head doesn’t fit and I’m not comfortable 
with it at that particular point. But actually now I’ve had certain surgeries and 
I’ve had hormones I am no longer gender dysphoric but I am still trans.”  
Tara also stated that “….if you indicate any enjoyment [with your body] you’re seen as a pervert”. 
Martin also expressed concern about the undue attention health professionals gave to physicality: “The 
first question I was ever asked every single time was ‘So have you thought about lower surgery yet?’” 
Similarly, Sack Boy was frustrated that his contentment with his penis was not recognised: “It’s like ‘no 
you’re not listening to me you’re basically thinking like I’ve made a mistake because I want a small willy’ 
[laughs]. And it’s like I just don’t think they could get it in their head that I would be happy with 
something that maybe biologically is under, under the average, but I’m more than happy with it.” And 
“I um pretty much I would say I I’ve gone for metoidioplasty44 because it suits me as a person my 
sexuality. Um I’m a bottom more much more than top so then I’m not really interested in penetrating 
                                                 
44 The surgical creation of a penis which is smaller than average for the cisgender population from the person’s clitoris 
which has enlarged after the person has taken testosterone. 
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someone.” Thus sexuality and [embodied] gender formed a key intertwining theme in many 
participants’ statements. 
Hermeneutic of suspicion  
As can clearly be seen above, the participants’ responses were heterogeneous. Some participants 
identified within the gender binary and within heterosexuality, and others did not. Some participants 
were explicitly queer or non-binary, and some were perhaps implicitly so, with identities at odds with 
their body habitus. Consequently situating all of the participants within a single unifying notion or 
philosophy would be so procrustean as to do a violence to their contributions – and therefore naturally 
that will not be attempted here. 
Nonetheless there were some overarching contexts and themes which the participants referenced – 
whether through accepting or resisting them. One of the key themes concerned the inadequacy of the 
GICs – especially (and sadly ironically) with regards to sexuality and gender. It is notable that the 
participants chose to spend a good deal of their time considering this inadequacy rather than 
endeavouring to add to the knowledge they felt was lacking through the medium of the study. This will 
consequently be considered further within the Discussion section below. A key model which may 
contextualise this here, however, is that for many trans people sexuality is dependent upon having a 
body which is an appropriate means of expressing that sexuality - and the link from their identity to 
that body is via the GICs. It follows therefore, that any discussion of trans sexuality is likely to include 
this vital - and apparently flawed - link. Consequently we might visualise this chain as follows: 
 
Figure 12. The place of GICs in trans sexuality. 
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For some participants this chain was in evidence as they understandably felt that they needed to have a 
body which was culturally comprehensible within their explicitly stated sexuality – thus if one wishes to 
engage with heterosexuality one needs a partner with a body configuration different to one’s own: Or if 
one wishes to engage with gay male bear culture one needs to have a gay male bear body. This is the 
commonly represented theme in the literature (e.g. Barrett, 2007) and it follows that people who are 
precluded from having a congruent body will be unhappy with it. Indeed this does seem to be the case 
for many trans people (ibid), but it is not the whole case. Martin noted that things were: “…in the 
support group that I set up… very much different because I was enjoying my body where the other 
people in it seemed like they weren’t.” Several participants felt that this discourse of necessarily hating 
one’s body being a precondition of being trans came from GICs – Martin again: “I did enjoy my body 
but I repressed that because I wasn’t supposed to. As a trans person I was supposed to hate my body.” 
And Sack Boy: “The first question I was ever asked every single time was ‘So have you thought about 
lower surgery yet?’. I’d been very, very clear from the very beginning as soon as I knew it was available 
that I never wanted lower surgery”. Thus for these participants physical interventions (via GICs) were 
more about enhancement rather than removing a deficit; or about addressing specific elements of their 
bodies – rather than addressing bodily dysphoria in toto. Both Tara and Martin noted, however, that this 
discourse of necessarily hating one’s body was situated within trans communities as well as within the 
GICs:  
Tara: It’s just to say that when you are talking about the, um about not being 
able to enjoy your body when it comes from outside, well it comes from the 
community as well… 
Martin: Oh year it comes from the community as well. 
However this is not to deny the reality of some trans people’s actual discomfort with the body. For 
example Charlie said:  
“I think for me a lot of it is, you know, body related. And how, how in a female 
body you’re expected, you know there is an expectation of the role you are 
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supposed to play, and and that has never been comfortable for me. But, so it’s 
good to hear stories of people who have found other, other ways of being and 
ways to express that, and are happy with that, so that’s good.” 
The difficulty which arises for many trans people then, is that in expressing either discomfort or 
comfort with one’s body, the discourse of this is situated within a power relation - with the source of 
the production of this discourse being both the GICs and the trans communities. Foucault (1991 
[1977]; 1998 [1976]) characteristics this as a power/knowledge integration where knowledge (in this 
case whether one is comfortable) and power (whether such comfort is socially acceptable) is 
constitutive of discourses of this type, and arguably also constitutive of the actors (the participants 
here) also – as we have seen above with the participants in this study who have necessarily taken a 
stance in relation to it. This stance, one might argue, is aimed at being existentially authentic, in that the 
participants are arguing for the right to self determination – a will to power if you will (Nietzsche, 1968 
[1895]) in which they are able to express their freedom and, crucially, to take responsibility for that 
freedom (Sartre, [1943] 2003) without the GICs taking it from them through determining appropriate 
treatments. Indeed the reiteration of the difficulties with the GICs here, and the knowledge/power 
production so produced might be considered to be a part of that freedom and responsibility. 
Some participants appeared to suggest  that this discourse of power/knowledge integration concerned a 
normative model of gender and sexuality, and often a specifically heteronormative one - as Sack Boy 
commented: “It’s just um I think there is a lot of hetero heteronormativity… and they [the GICs] just 
presume that. ‘Oh you want to be with a woman’, and that is why… I just pretended [to the GIC] I 
did”. And again participants reported embracing or resisting this - Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe:   
“…but [GICs] were concerned about um trans women getting on hormones 
and then not having genital surgery. Oh yeah, they were creating a a they were 
creating shemen (gasp in background) was the term the clinician had used.”  
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It was also suggested that trans people were telling GICs that they were heteronormative in order to 
access treatments (cf. Bockting, 2008), but in fact (as seen in this research) that they were not - Jenbury 
Handlebar-Smythe again: 
“[I’m] aware that [trans] people’s relationship with gender tends to be… a lot 
more complicated, and, very much, the the people who are happiest are the 
people who know who they are and can get to the place where they need to be 
to be comfortable in themselves.” 
He also stated that: 
“It was quite well known within the uh trans communities at the time, and I 
assume it’s still the same, is that the um, the the psychologists uh, are purely 
gatekeepers and here’s what they want to hear. And that’s what you tell them, 
because if you tell them anything else they won’t let you through the gate, so 
they have this constant positive reinforcement of ‘oh these people are all saying 
this thing and they’re all checking off our list therefore anyone who deviates is 
obviously not conforming therefore not really trans.” 
Thus explaining how GIC clinicians were reinforcing heteronormativity and having it reinforced to 
them by their trans patients in a problematic feedback loop. Further, Cee Cee commented that: 
“I think that  um what the the experts – air quotes here- um, what influences 
how they see male and female will always be influenced by their own idea of 
sexuality, you know man’s sexuality and women’s sexuality. So sort of the 
heteronormative model. And they’re not, but the worst thing is that a lot of 
practitioners are not aware, of of these biases that they’re bringing into their 
assessments and work that you’re doing just now, us talking is really important 
that they get that.” 
 109 
 
Consequently one of the key elements from a counselling psychological perspective appears to be either 
a lack of reflexivity on the part of the professionals the participants have seen; or that those 
professionals were applying heteronormative practice deliberately – possibly as a result of having it 
reinforced by the trans people they saw. Either way, this was reported as being at odds with several 
participants’ identities. This led to the common practice of telling GIC clinicians a certain 
[heteronormative] story in order to access treatments as Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe noted above and as 
Jane Crocker stated: 
“Before I set foot [in a GIC] I had spoken to a lot of people that had been 
there that had been through it that had been through that system for many 
years to know what was wanted of me and what was expected of me and I did, 
I never deviated from that because I knew what I wanted and what I needed. 
Um, and so I did not, um I never went to to them for support or for guidance 
for that I went to my community outside of that.” 
Other elements participants took issue with regarding GICs included a simple lack of knowledge: 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe: “I certainly have the strong impression that no one who’s involved in the 
medical care and treatment of trans people knows a damn thing about it. At all. Endocrinologists don’t 
have a clue, the shrinks don’t have a clue.” And Mr Fox: “I was trying to explain it to these very very 
eminent people who work with us every day and they could not get it and I thought ‘why can’t they see 
this very obvious thing?’” 
This lack of knowledge, and associated appropriate treatments had a knock on effect on sexuality as Mr 
Fox above had been trying to explain why penile hair removal was important for trans men as it allows 
them to receive a blowjob, for example; or Sack Boy who was frustrated that surgeons could not 
understand his decision that “I would say I I’ve gone for metoidioplasty because it suits me as a person 
my sexuality.” This is more evidence for the link for some participants between embodiment and 
sexuality – or rather an embodied sexuality and fits with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of sexuality as 
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“…relationship to other persons, and not just to another body, it is going to 
weave the circular system of projections and introjections, illuminating the 
unlimited series of reflecting reflections and reflected reflections which are the 
reason why I am the other person and he (sic) is myself.” (1996 [1945], p.230) 
To weave this “circular system” the circle must be intact. Perhaps because some clinicians have failed 
to see this, some participants felt that clinicians were no longer seeing trans people as people - Mr Fox 
regarding penile hair removal again: “ 
“The fact that these men, and they were almost all men, there were no women 
there, the fact that these men can’t get it. Why not? Why can’t they get it? And 
I realised what it was is that they’d stopped seeing us as human beings. They’d 
started to see us as units in a healthcare system to be processed, they’d lost sight 
of our humanity. So think what was really important for me was that this was 
about, this is little people this is me as a person these are little people this is real 
human beings.” 
This “seeing us as real human beings” is, of course, the sine qua non of counselling psychological 
practice – meeting people as they are, rather than as a ‘unit to be processed’ - I-Thou relating (Buber, 
1958) where we see people as fully people, and here integrating identity, gender, physicality, and 
sexuality together in nuanced [circular, intersubjective] ways. 
Perhaps seeking such engagement, some participants felt that a greater amount of therapeutic time, 
presumably while being seen as a person, was needed. For example Tara stated:  
“In that case it’s the difference between what you see in the ‘States people go 
through so much psychological counselling. We’ve maybe, people might have 
seen a psychiatrist five times and then they’re sent of for pretty, relatively 
major surgery without actually having dealt with things.” 
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Again such exploratory, rather than didactic or directive, practice fits well within existential-
phenomenological counselling psychological tradition (van Deurzen-Smith, 1997; van Deurzen & 
Adams, 2011).  
Of course clinical practice from other traditions also continues to evolve. It should be noted therefore, 
that participants drew upon a range of experiences from different time periods. For example Jenbury 
Handlebar-Smythe stated that: “I transitioned at the tail end of the nineties and early two-
thousands…”; Tara stated: “it was the late nineties that I first got involved and it was even worse back 
then, than it is now…”; and Cee Cee noted: “Friends of mine that transitioned late nineties early two-
thousands talked about the very same thing of having to answer certain questions in such and such a 
way”. Martin commented that: “I started transition early two thousands…” whereas Jane Crocker 
spoke about her transition: “this was in two thousand and eleven”. Consequently some of these 
experiences of GICs (but not, of course, of identity formed by such memories) will predate recent 
guidelines such as the Good practice guidelines for the assessment and treatment of gender dysphoria. (Royal College 
of Psychiatrists, 2013); the Standards of Care for the heath of transsexual, transgender and gender nonconforming 
people (7th ed) (WPATH, 2011); and the Interim gender dysphoria protocol and service guideline 2013/1445 (NHS 
England, 2013). However for our purposes here this should not draw undue attention as the field is 
evolving at such a rate that practice will always be (one hopes) developing so that it has evolved from 
people’s past experiences. In addition, the discourse concerning treatment by gender clinics is the 
phenomena – it is the thing being presented by participants as an important part of their current 
worlding. No matter when their personal experience of it; it informs and inflects current experience of 
living in the world. Indeed the discourse also informs and inflects the current experience of people who 
are attending clinics now or recently (as we saw with Jane Crocker) due to trans people communicating 
about it via the internet or face-to-face. Thus, while some aspects of trans people’s experiences of GICs 
will become outdated, the discourse will remain current and important to attend to. 
                                                 
45 This is still extant at the time or writing in 2015 due to political difficulties. 
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One of the key barriers to self actualisation participants noted, and indeed modelled in LEGO®, was 
therefore the GICs. Another was societal opprobrium – although in referencing the heteronormativity 
expected within GICs participants may have felt this was part of wider societal heteronormativity as 
when Cee Cee commented: “I think I think it’s medical practitioners and psychiatric practitioners 
having a fixed idea of what a man is and what a woman is…” This is against the positioning of both 
those existential thinkers such as Spinelli (2014) Cohn (2014) who cannot accept an “inflexible cultural 
grid” of gender and sexuality (p.66) as well as thinkers such as Langdridge (2014) who accept a more 
rigid notion of a person’s declaimed sexuality and gender, but commented that:  
“For me, it is my duty to offer more, to use the weight of my authority and 
privilege not only to listen and understand but also to act as co-critic of the 
heterosexist and homonegative world we inhabit so that my clients receive as 
much from me as I can possibly give”. (p.172) 
This wider societal heteronormativity is evident in how participants saw society as viewing whether they 
have a sexuality. If one assumes that within a narrow reading of heteronormative discourse trans people 
are ‘really’ of their birth assigned gender, then it would follow that trans men are ‘really’ women and 
therefore don’t have a sexuality; whereas trans women are ‘really’ men and therefore are perversely 
sexual in identifying as women (cf. Serano, 2007). This is, of course, nonsense (Richards & Barker 2013; 
2015), but it does drive some societal discourses. Mr Fox again:  
“I think, I think when I think about how trans people are represented in terms 
of our sexuality we’re very, very dehumanised. So it’s either, you know, there’s 
either the sort of stereotypes of, you know – and this is vile language and I 
don’t like it –  but kind of you know shemale porn and that kind of thing or 
trans men,  so we don’t have a sexuality at all.”  
Thus heteronormativity is difficult both for trans people who adhere to heteronormative societal rules, 
but are found wanting through being trans (Serano, 2007); and also those who wish to live outside of 
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such rules and therefore have their gender (of whatever sort) questioned (Bornstein, 2004). As Cee Cee 
commented: 
“I want to, um and be sexually free… of labels, sexuality labels. And be free of 
having to define my gender either way. But this does represent… a confusion. 
But not a confusion for what I feel like and what how I see myself, but 
external society’s assumptions about me, can just be too too heavy sometimes 
and it’s just… yeah psychologically it can be very demanding. That’s it.” 
It follows therefore that the barrier is, in fact against participants having a body and/or a self which is congruent 
with their internal [sexual] selves; (which may of course be any sexuality [or none] one might think of; 
Richards & Barker, 2013) - rather than against any particular body configuration or sexuality. The need 
is to be comprehensible and congruent within whichever body-sexuality-self the person has and wishes 
to have as it interrelates with their preferred Other (again, be that a person, or sexual practice, or both) 
and with society more broadly. Thus when Sack boy says; “I’ve gone for metoidioplasty because it suits 
me as a person my sexuality. Um I’m a bottom more much more than top so then I’m not really 
interested in penetrating someone” and Mr Fox states; “…that kind of masculinity, that kind of very 
heavy, um, you know the kind of leather scene, all that kind of stuff it’s a really powerful form of 
sexuality. Um and that was kind of closed to me because I couldn’t have sex with men, or relate 
sexually to men, when I was living as a woman”, these utterances may be from within the same 
philosophical frame. 
This wish to overcome barriers and therefore be congruent, naturally occurs over time, and was 
another of the major group themes. As stated above, time in this sense is not unidirectional, but is 
rather composed of the past and future inflecting the present. The notion of transition is of course 
bound up in time, but it is not simply a transition from male to female or vice versa formed through 
time – or even from one gender (of whatever sort) to another. Instead it is a consideration of the whole 
of a person and how time is inflecting that person, infusing their being if you will. For example Ezio 
said “…a boat will travel round to different ones at different times”. Certainly gender and sexuality, in 
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the intertwined way we have been considering them here (and with whatever labels attached), form a 
key part of this self-worlding-in-time, but we must be careful not to limit transition to a matter of only 
gender in the simple sense. As Martin said: 
“And I remember if I started on testosterone walking along seeing the sun 
rising somewhere or other, and just that image has stayed with me as a kind of 
epiphany moment of once I start on T… I don’t care what sort of man I’m 
seen as…” 
This transition is also not necessarily from one unitary place to another unitary place, but rather may 
embrace fluidity or multiplicity - thus it is not a single unified step from one ‘self’ to another. Some 
participants demonstrated this through their models having multiple mini figures – sometimes grouped 
to form a rough set and sometimes not. Others reflected fluidity and multiplicity in the nuance of the 
transition, referencing growth and change rather than a simple break from one thing to another. This 
was reflected in the language used also - with identities such as queer being claimed as well as identities 
with nuance – for example Haramit was; “…far more inclined to form a romantic relationship with 
someone rather than physical.”; others detailed varying sorts of BDSM; and Scot Sam, for example 
noted: “[the mini figures are] just sort of random they all have, or some of them have like whips, some 
of them have, kind of dykey, some are fluffy girlie, some are S and M leather men, it’s kind of a bit of a 
mixture.” 
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Discussion 
The participants presented a range of different themes with heterogeneity being perhaps the 
overarching theme. This heterogeneity was evident in both the information the participants gave about 
themselves and also in their relation to the themes which emerged. This rather belies the assertion 
made by Person and Ovesey in 1974 that; “To know one [trans person] was almost literally to know all” 
(p.18). Such assertions in the historic literature about the homogeneity of trans people (and indeed 
other minority groups) have, as we have seen, been overturned by the current literatures of which, it is 
hoped, this thesis will form a part. 
One might assume, however, that in a research project a finding of heterogeneity is a failing in so far as 
the object of research is to find themes which must necessarily have a degree of coherence or 
homogeneity. However, the nature of the research, and the epistemology that underlies it, is to see (in 
so far as is possible) the phenomena for what it is – and so heterogeneity (as a coherent, if ironic) 
overarching theme it is. Indeed, as can be seen from the literature review, this is not an unusual finding 
in this field. This intersects clearly with existential understandings, as Milton (2014c) notes; “for 
psychotherapists reductionist thinking is a problem as it cannot offer us the wider awareness that 
human science needs and existential thinking can contribute to” (p.11). Indeed Manafi (2014) suggests 
that the authors included in Milton’s (2014b) edited collection Sexuality: Existential Perspectives; “Give 
voice to the complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, diversity and plurality of the most intimate, and at the 
same time public, aspect of our being – namely our being-in-the-world sexually” (p.xi). Heterogeneity 
then, is both acceptable within the existential tradition, and also appears to be a tenable finding from 
this (and other) research. 
Notwithstanding this, there are some tentative themes which have nonetheless been found in the 
present research. These primarily concern Barriers; Time; Reference to multiplicity or binary identities: and 
Gender Identity Clinics. These will be discussed below. However, due to the nature of the analysis detailed 
in the method section, the hermeneutic of suspicion sections above will have covered some of the 
discursive material more commonly found in the discussion and so I will not needlessly reiterate them 
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here. Consequently in the section below I will concentrate on the wider implications of the research 
findings and their implications for existential-phenomenological counselling psychological practice 
particularly; as well as the limitations of this research, and possibilities for future directions which 
workers in this field might consider. 
Limitations and strengths of the study, and future directions 
A key element of this study, and indeed phenomenological enquiry in general, is that the participants 
were asked to communicate about themselves, while being aware that such communication is 
necessarily flawed. Butler (2005) comments in Giving an Account of Oneself that a true account is not 
possible as people will necessarily not have been aware during the formative period of the Self in 
childhood and, further, that such a Self will evolve and change – even in the process of giving the 
account. Additionally, language is such that there is no absolute shared meaning – both interlocutors 
will have different understandings of a communicative act. As she makes clear: 
“…the “I” has no story of its own that is not also the story of a relation – or 
set of relations – to a set of norms… The “I” is always to some extent 
dispossessed by the social conditions of its emergence.” (Butler, 2005 p.8) 
Gadamer (2004 [1960]) suggests that this interlocution will therefore involve a fusion of horizons and 
indeed in terms of the hermeneutic of description above that is what is sought. However when 
considering the hermeneutic of suspicion, even allowing for a degree of reflexive epoché, there will still 
be something of me, as a researcher and invariably as a person, which will bleed through (Langdridge, 
2007; 2015). Indeed there is a further iteration in what you, the reader, make of my words here as you 
too will have understandings which differ from my intended communication – despite my (our) best 
efforts (Richards, 2011a). 
Another issue with regards to receiving the intended communication is that of the medium through 
which such communication flows. In the case of the present research this is approximately as follows 
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(although this diagram does not allow for the added complexity of the group discussion with multiple 
participants): 
 
Figure. 13. Medium of communication flow 
We have dealt elsewhere with the complexities of responding to the Other and within oneself (as in the 
feedback loops in Figure 13), but here it is worth considering the actual medium – the LEGO®, the 
description, the writing (and the reading). The issue here is that there will necessarily be a disjoint 
between the mediums in what may be considered to be an expansion of Derrida (1998 [1967]) who 
argued against Saussure's (1916) assertion that “Language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; 
the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first” (p.45). This is poststructuralist, of 
course, as Derrida suggested that writing would always be a different representation of meaning than 
language and indeed, in the present study writing must represent the LEGO® model rather than just 
language per se. This is effectively insoluble, of course46 and it is hoped that the benefits of the media 
outweigh the costs.  
A key element of these communication problems concerns labels – not just in the sense of words – but 
in the literal sense of strong [restricting] signifiers - especially for sexual and gender identities and 
practices. As we will see below under the theme of Reference to multiplicity or binary identities, many 
participants dislike the restrictive nature of labels, while still requiring them, and indeed fighting for 
them, in order to navigate the social world. To an ethical social scientist such as myself this presents a 
quandary. When Cee Cee says; “I want to, um and be sexually free… of labels, sexuality labels.” How 
do I write about them without using words as labels? Of course in the crass sense I can refrain from 
                                                 
46 Unless I am allowed to defend this thesis in viva voce by means of a LEGO® model… Viva parvis plasticus lateres 
similiter imperantur inter profeci, densis,  if you will. Ahem. 
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using Labels such as Bisexual, Gay, Lesbian, Heterosexual, etc., but in a subtle sense all writing is fixing, 
determining, setting down and in that sense I am concerned that I am therefore doing a disservice to 
the participants which might act as an ethical violation of an already marginalised group. Nonetheless 
the participants were fully aware of the intent of the research and that it involved writing; and so I have 
endeavoured to tread lightly while not asserting overmuch academy-derived power in fixing participant 
identities. 
An interrelated area of issue is that it is difficult to find an ontological space concerned with trans 
people qua trans people as this study was undertaken (as it must be) within a global context of the 
marginalisation of trans people and adherence to cisgender norms. This is analogous to Irigaray’s 
arguments concerning [cisgender] female subjectivity on which Spinelli (2014) comments; “Irigaray 
argues that female subjectivity has not, as yet, been identified because it continues to be assimilated to 
male subjectivity.” (p.48). I agree, and therefore would like to make the same argument here for trans 
and cisgender subjectivities respectively. In so long as trans people wish to ‘pass’ as cisgender and 
indeed relate their lives to those of cisgender people in terms of legal recognition, reproduction, etc., 
trans subjectivities will be simply a shadow of cisgender subjectivities. This is not to say that trans 
people should not have precisely the same things which make up cisgender subjectivities (and much 
else besides), but that they should be on their own terms – trans qua trans. Only at this point will 
research and therapy with trans people truly be with trans people – whether they and cisgender people 
live in the same way or not. Thus this global context forms a significant limitation for the study in 
terms of establishing a ‘truth’ about trans people, but perhaps is useful in finding out about trans 
people now and the implicit relation to cisgender people.  
One element of contention in the literature which may be a result of this lack of emancipated trans 
subjectivities (and perhaps including an argument for such subjectivities) is that concerning 
autogynephilia and autoandrophilia. It is notable that none of the participants chose to reference this 
contentious subject. This could be because it is such a contentious subject, yet the participants felt free 
to disagree on other matters. It may be that it is more of a Unites States of America (USA) 
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phenomenon – certainly it occurs much more in USA literatures and is extremely uncommon in clinical 
contexts in the UK (Richards & Barker, 2013). Or perhaps it is just not a useful concept for considering 
trans people’s erotic thoughts which include themselves as sexual subjects. Indeed, Bettcher (2014) 
argues instead for erotic structuralism:  
“Which replaces an exclusively other-directed account of gendered attraction 
with one that includes a gendered eroticization of self as an essential 
component. This erotic experience of self is necessary for other-directed 
gendered desire, where the two are bound together and mutually informing.” 
(p.605).  
Certainly this would seem to accord more with the participants’ responses which included both their, 
and their sexual partners’, genders. That trans people wish to include their and their partner’s gender in 
their sexual expression seems trivial and is certainly also the case for cisgender people (Attwood, et al 
2013). 
More prosaically in terms of limitations, as this was a qualitative study all of the usual positives and 
negatives associated with that (which are detailed in the method above) will apply. Most notably, given 
the findings associated with heterogeneity, it is likely that a different group, especially one from a 
markedly different cultural background, would likely have different understandings regarding sexuality 
and gender. Consequently further work with explicitly chosen cultural groups may yield interesting 
findings. Indeed, it is tempting to consider specific demographic details beyond culture as another 
avenue of enquiry and again there may be interesting findings to be found. One detail which may be of 
note is that of genital surgical status, as sexuality can change after surgery (Coleman & Bockting, 1989; 
Lawrence, 2005; Rowniak & Chesla, 2013). However trans communities, especially online ones, are 
becoming ever more heterogeneous - with more people becoming non-operative rather than simply 
pre- or post-operative and so researchers should exercise caution in creating artificial divisions where 
they do not exist; especially as we move into a more complex [internet connected] world. As ever, close 
attention to the research question and the appropriate demographic to that will be key. In the current 
 120 
 
study, for example, consideration was given as to whether to have only a group of trans men or trans 
women or non-binary trans people. A single group may indeed have lead to interesting participant 
responses, however, given the complexity and heterogeneity of the responses regarding gender, what 
this would actually mean would be difficult to ascertain. Indeed it may actually act as a false researcher 
imposition on the responses rather than a reasonable structural research procedure. Certainly the cross-
trans themes elicited here could not be recognised if such a division were to be put in place. 
It was, in fact, one of the key methodological considerations underlying this research that researcher 
impact be minimised. For example, in order to minimise researcher impact upon the participants’ 
explanations and discussion it was decided after the pilot to minimise researcher ‘presence’ in this work. 
Consequently, further work (whether with a similar or different cultural range from the present study) 
in which the participant responses are more closely interrogated at the time may yield fruitful findings - 
although this will, of course, mean more researcher ‘presence’ which will likely affect the explanations 
for both good and ill, and the ethics of this should naturally be considered carefully in light of the 
ethical considerations detailed above. Indeed, even in the current study the use of interjections such as 
“great” by the researcher as encouragement may have still been taken as affirmation from a position of 
power by participants, and could usefully be considered in future research. 
There was an ethical tension also in representing the humanity of the participants given that they were 
anonymised. Each participant chose their pseudonym in order to mitigate this to some extent, and my 
hope is that there has not been too much over-theorisation as can too often be found in work which 
treats participants words and identities as just things – indeed, one might argue, treats participants as 
just things, because this would be entirely unethical (c.f. Pratchett, 1998). 
I am hopeful, however, that a strength of this research is the ethical stance which was taken. It seems 
apposite, therefore to cede the floor to one of the participants, Mr Fox, for the last word on this: 
“I was really sort of surprised, and I really enjoyed the kind of richness that came 
out of people’s different models and the way that they talked about it and stuff 
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so I thought that was that was quite a, kind of, useful, um kind of tool really... 
There’s something about [the research which is] very much kind of, human, 
humanising process. And I think, I think when I think about how trans people 
are represented in terms of our sexuality we’re very, very dehumanised.” 
Themes  
Barriers  
One of the main themes found was that of barriers – both with regards to society and concerning 
transitioning. This theme intersected with the theme of Gender Identity Clinics in that the clinics were 
sometimes seen as a barrier to transitioning and consequently matters pertaining to them will be 
discussed below in the relevant section. 
One of the key elements concerning barriers was that of relating to others in an authentic manner and 
of the difficulties associated with that. For some participants this was mediated by having a congruent 
body though transition and for others this was about society having a greater and more nuanced 
understanding of the diversity of trans identities. In both cases it is about not being seen as who one is. 
This can also be extended to not seeing oneself as who one is due to the disjoint between identity and 
gender(ed body, expression, and so on). Of course folded up in this is sexuality which is both implicit 
and permeating as Merleau-Ponty would have it (Merleau-Ponty, 1996 [1945]); and the literal, explicit 
(in both senses of the word) act of fucking. In considering barriers then, we must consider 
intersubjectivity and the overcoming of such barriers, for such intersubjectivity might be between two 
individuals or within a single being. Within a single being it can concern relating either over long spans 
of time (how to I relate to my younger or older selves) or more recently (I want the cake, but don’t 
allow myself). In addition we might consider ideas within our self which are not fully in consciousness, 
which we nonetheless relate to – why am I singing this song now? Why was I so mean to my friend on 
the phone? If sexuality does indeed permeate our selves like an atmosphere, especially if it does indeed 
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permeate intersubjectivity, it should permeate such self-self encounters also. Indeed it may permeate 
whether we see our full selves as selves or as objects as in Cooper’s (2003) I-I or I-me relating.  
Thus gender/sexual relating interacts in complex ways, both within the conceptual limits of the 
person’s body, and also in the wider sense in which gender and sexuality permeate the person’s self, and 
on to society. In this vein Gagne & Tewksbury (2002) suggest the idea of “gendered sexualities” which 
are “The ways in which individual and societal constructions of gender overlay and intermingle with 
sexual behaviours, ideations, attitudes, identities, and experiences” (p. 4), however this does not include 
the internal interactions between gender and sexuality; the biological substrates; and the way body and 
self are situated within society (and the epistemic feedback of this situation). A diagram may assist 
(although please assume the drawn boundaries are fuzzy): 
 
Figure 14. Sexuality and gender in body and society 
We can see here that the barriers that trans people feel towards intersubjective authentic relating may 
be from others (or to others) or within one’s self in various ways; and as such may form part of the 
clinical encounter which considers gendered and sexual intersubjectivity(ies). Consequently when 
Manafi, (2014) suggests that “Being sexual is an embodied interrelational engagement…” (p.xi) there 
may be a single embodiment (within oneself), or two, or many (indeed there may be none in the 
traditional sense if one allows virtual embodiment online). 
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In terms of addressing such barriers within counselling psychological practice it may be useful to 
establish the location and type of such barriers: Are they within the client as a sort of internalised 
transphobia where the trans self is split off; or are they from society; or towards society as a means of 
keeping safe. As ever, a phenomenological explanation and getting alongside the client will be useful. I 
would also suggest (following Langdridge, 2014) that being affirmative of trans identities in general may 
be useful to mitigate against some of the discourses against LGBT lives.  
Time  
One of the key themes which intersects with Barriers is that of Time as naturally the formation and 
overcoming of barriers will be situated within time. Indeed (as we change levels of analysis) existentially 
it may be said that Being is being in time; or indeed the Being is time (Heidegger, 2008 [1962]) as both 
our prereflective and reflective consciousness is thrown into a world where we exist towards death. 
Certainly, the sense of becoming we all experience is writ large in trans people’s lives when 
transitioning; but as stated above, this becoming will be inflected by both past and future and should 
not be seen as a uni-directional becoming (or indeed a trans-specific state of affairs as there are many 
different forms of transition in people’s lives). In the simple sense, such becoming will reflect the 
greater congruence trans people feel after transition, and so the greater possibilities for sexuality and 
sexual expression. As Schilt and Windsor (2014) note, for example:  
“Trans men’s transformed gendered embodiment can result in a greater sense 
of continuity between their bodies, their personal gender identity, and their 
social gender (how they are seen by others).” (p.744) 
This reflects the efficacy of interventions for trans people (Gijs & Brewaeys, 2007; Ruppin, & Pfafflin, 
2015), but does not situate such interventions fully within the complex flow of prereflective 
understanding and reflective understanding that being-in-the-world invites. Indeed it is trite to suggest 
that an embodied sexuality may be improved if a congruent body is available, but it is also true to say 
that a new understanding may inflect a memory of a previously incongruent body such that it is 
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reconstrued. Further, in being towards death, time inflects understandings of embodiment and sexuality 
- not just directly in the sense of ‘time running out’ and ‘waiting’ as some participants explained, but 
also in less apparently chronological concerns such as the type of sexual expression available, as it is 
what is available now – with understandings drawn from the past; thoughts of what may be thought and 
felt in the future; and a consideration that such an opportunity may or may not be available in the time 
to come. 
In this way we may see embodiment as situated within time; indeed as constituted of time. Further 
intersubjectivity - indeed what I have characterized above as the interobjective gaze of the Other - 
capturing anOther happens in a moment, but a moment in time. If one is to agree with Sartre (2003 
[1943]) who posits that sexuality is where one acquires and is acquired by the Other, that process must 
be one of intentionality where the (likely prereflective) sexuality of a person is expressed through the 
ready to hand body, or between individuals in some other way, in an evolving process in time in which 
both becoming beings (be)come together47.  
Another way to contextualise this is in a consideration of the different forms of time posited by 
Ricoeur (1984; 1985; 1988), being cosmological time (time in the vast stretches in which the universe 
operates); phenomenological time (our, far briefer, experienced time); and historical time (in some 
sense the bridge between the two in which events are marked and recalled or considered for the future). 
As seen above, trans community themes of previous policy and practice by GICs, for example, may fall 
into historical time, which inflects the phenomenological time which trans people currently experience. 
Time then, is a theme which resonates with many trans people as considerations of past (both 
phenomenological and historical) and future inflect the present. For counselling psychologists it can be 
tempting to consider the past in terms of whether physical alterations have been undertaken and, while 
this may be a question to be considered, it is only a small part of the meaning of time for trans people. 
Similarly, future wishes may again be brought into the therapy room; not uncommonly whether to 
transition or not, and if so, how? (Richards & Barker, 2013). But again this is only a part of the meaning 
                                                 
47 Please insert your own pun as necessary… 
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of time. While perhaps not explicitly considering all of the above with all trans clients, it may be useful 
to consider how such philosophies and understandings may affect this client work. 
Reference to multiplicity or binary identities 
Both binary and multiple identities figured largely in the participant’s responses. Both discourses were 
readily available, with several participants resisting binary identities, quite often as being societally 
normative constructions. However, some participants, notably Mr Fox, also resisted the notion of 
multiplicity (in the form of queer) specifically as it pertained to him. Indeed, the notion of multiplicity 
itself had varying meanings being both something fluid and changing and also something with discrete, 
yet multiple categories. These elements pertained both to sexuality and gender and, again, sexuality and 
gender intertwined in complex ways so as to not be wholly distinguishable from one another, yet at the 
same time often being linguistically discrete. An exception to this was the term queer, which was used, as 
it often is, to trouble the notion of a split between gender and sexuality – and indeed queer theory was 
cited, which troubles the notion of ontological splits in any field (Barker, et al, 2009). 
Intersecting with the theme of barriers and time above; binaries were considered in both the sense of 
overcoming a discrete barrier (across time) and also in moving in a more fluid way within and between 
different identities and practices. Consequently, for some participants, binary conceptions of sexuality 
and gender were coherent and authentic ways of expressing themselves in the world – for example as a 
man who is attracted to other men and their identity as being gay; or as a woman who is attracted to 
men and their identity as being heterosexual. However, other participants used discrete terms for 
entities associated with sexuality and of gender because non-discrete terms were not available in 
English; while feeling this fell short of their intended communication. In this way a disjoint was formed 
between the ‘text’ of the LEGO® model and the conversion into English for the explanation. Butler 
(1999; 2005) speaks to this when she suggests that language breaks down when endeavouring to 
address such identities and practices, as language is structurally more discrete and contiguous than such 
fluidity and complexity warrants. This is, in a sense, similar to that which we have noted above with 
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regard to Derrida (1998 [1967]) in that it is a poststructuralist position in which experience and 
language are decoupled which makes the task of research in this field difficult without doing a 
disservice to those participants for whom the language I am using is insufficient. I do not, of course, 
wish to be the ‘society’ which some participants felt was constraining their expression in this way. 
Notwithstanding this, it is evident that some participants rear-grounded their fluid identities on a day-
to-day basis, and especially when engaging with the GICs, in order to be comprehensible to their 
interlocutors and so navigate the social world without undue difficulty. In this way the Other can be 
seen to be acquiring and socially constructing some more fluid trans participants through the [lack of] 
available discourse. Indeed even those trans participants with binary identities often felt constrained by 
the language available for their explanations as the binaries available did not always encompass trans 
experience – perhaps because some binaries have a non-binary element in the sense of moving between 
two [binary] nodes. This paradoxical engagement with language and labelling concerning sex and 
gender in particular was noted several times and is of particular relevance for counselling psychologists 
engaging with trans clients as language may not be a fully effective medium for such engagement. For 
example, a client who says that they are heterosexual may have a great deal more meaning within that 
label than may at first be apparent 
Having said this, labels are, as we have seen, politically necessary. The arguments made above 
concerning the ethical difficulties of deconstructing a client’s stated identity into a multiple, fluid, entity 
will not needlessly be repeated here, but this quote from Crabtree (2009) speaks eloquently: 
“An over emphasis on the fluidity and plasticity of our sexual experiences may 
lead to a therapeutic practice which is out of touch with the client’s lived 
experience of their sexual attractions and sexual identity”. (p.258) 
This is pertinent because cisgender and heteronormative clients seldom experience such deconstruction 
of identity, even if it is deemed to be philosophically valid (which I am unsure of). Consequently we 
have another paradox: Clients may both have a label which they use and which they disagree with; and 
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relatedly Counselling Psychologists may wish to consider the multiplicity of meaning with a binary 
frame. An example of this might be found with cisgender people where it is commonly accepted that 
there are men and that there are women: But it is also understood that there are no psychological 
categories in which these entities are discrete. Indeed those people who have more flexibility [within the 
extant binary societal frame] to undertake masculine and feminine tasks and thought process are 
psychologically healthier (Bem & Lenney, 1976). Another example would be a man who has sex with 
other men and for whom we might use the sexual health term MSM, but who does not accept the label 
gay because he does not identify as such. As Hicks and Milton (2010) note:  
“What does knowing someone's sexual identity48 actually tell us? The answer is 
arguably nothing. Knowing an individual’s sexual identity does not 
automatically convey any information regarding a person's sexual behaviours 
or attractions, rather it might simply be a sign of a current identification with a 
particular social grouping.” (p.261)  
Thus a split between practice and identity can be a useful frame for viewing such fluidity and fixity (cf. 
Richards & Barker, 2013; 2015) which does not needlessly impose a philosophy of reduction onto the 
client’s worlding. 
Gender Identity Clinics 
The last major theme which arose was Gender Identity Clinics (GICs). It is notable that this theme 
arose at all considering that the research question posed concerned the participants’ sexuality and did 
not mention GICs. Consequently one of the first queries regarding this theme is why did it arise at all? 
A possible answer to his requires a little explanation, so I beg your forbearance for a paragraph or two.  
What I endeavoured to do in this thesis, indeed what I imagine most phenomenologists49 try to do in 
their work, is to get to the heart of the participant’s worlding, to hear how things are for them. Theirs, 
(indeed everyone’s) worlding will necessarily be an intersubjective worlding, which will draw on 
                                                 
48 Italics my own. 
49 Even nascent ones such as myself. 
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available discourses as a means of both construction and communication (Butler, 2005). Although 
aware of this intersubjectivity, my hope, (my fantasy?) is that the participants’ own creative reality could 
be touched in some way without undue interference from me; that my part in the intersubjectivity 
would be as passive as possible. (If the reader will forgive a metaphor) I hope the participants felt their 
communication was as free as if they are in an area, perhaps a field, in which they could roam as they 
chose, to point out their privileges and their passions, the boundaries and the freedoms which form 
their world. I imagine a field on the moon so there is even more freedom of travel away up and gently 
down again too. Of course there are some constraints in such a field, but freedom is inherent in the 
domain. It seems however, that much discourse - even that acquired phenomenologically - is something 
more akin to a road network - still with a good deal of freedom, but constrained too - often within 
certain boundaries of class, culture, language, the wish to please the researcher, and the such.  
Trans, however, seems sometimes to be more akin to a railway leading always back to the GICs - the 
rails laid together by clinicians50 who circumscribe lived experience through protocols (RCP, 2013; 
WPATH, 2011) and by the participant-patients who, in acceding or resisting these, are constructed by 
that discourse. This is why studies on such things as trans people’s partners so often refer to the GICs 
(Sanger, 2010) and why studies on bodily aesthetics do also (Davy, 2008). To some extent this was the 
purpose of use of LEGO® in the current study – to try to circumnavigate these accreted scripts, and 
yet the wider discourse pertaining to the gender clinics seems so central to the realities of many trans 
people that it will out regardless - it will inflect, inform, indeed construct trans people’s worlding - 
including their gender and sexuality.  
How could it not we may ask? A protocol which is wary of fetishism on the grounds that it is likely to 
lead to regret after surgical interventions will likely inform practice in this area (Barrett, 2007); as is one 
which examines penis and/or vagina intercourse on the grounds that people using their penis or vagina 
may regret losing them (ibid). New ways of being intimate must be discussed (Ettner, Monstrey & 
Eyler, 2007), as must fertility and the development of secondary sexual characteristics (Richards & Seal, 
                                                 
50 Who may be trans of course. 
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2014) – all in order that a trans person can have their embodied self realised. In many cases these 
discussions literally take years. How could this not so often create an overarching discourse inflecting 
many trans people’s [sexual] worlding?  
This, I believe, is why the theme of the GICs was so pertinent, and perhaps especially so in the group 
discussion. Discussions among trans people, both online and face-to-face, about clinics and clinical 
protocols are commonplace and therefore will have been a familiar discourse to many participants. 
Perhaps this is why there was less (although not none) consideration given to the GICs in the model 
discussions as the models had performed their job of avoiding accreted scripts. These group discourses, 
both in this research and elsewhere, will inform and construct personal, internal, trans discourses also 
and it may be argued are also therefore constitutive. We can imagine that trans people who have not 
had to attend a clinical setting to access treatments may nonetheless have a view of clinical settings, for 
example. Thus the GICs are a common constituent factor in many trans people’s worlding, even if they 
were not intended to be. Indeed such constitution may act as a barrier in people’s lives – both with 
regards to the reality of their encounters with the clinics and also intrapsychically. This will occur in 
time as it inflects the experience of people who attend the clinics both before and after engagement; 
and also within discussion groups on and off line - so inflecting the worlding of trans people who have 
not attended such clinics. 
This anger and distrust of the GICs is clearly a difficult issue which needs addressing (and which is 
being so). Indeed, it should be noted that participants will be aware of my position within the GICs and 
some of the purpose of their discourse may be in communicating their message back, both through the 
formal research process and possibly in the hope that I will carry the discourse with me personally. This 
is not a forlorn hope, as I explicitly stated I will carry the findings back to the GICs; and I cannot but 
be inflected and impacted through undertaking the research. Hopefully in this way participants can feel 
that I, (and by extension others) have got ‘alongside’ them rather than being in some way adversarial. 
Indeed, an extension of this approach may be a key means of addressing the anger and distrust of GICs 
mentioned above - it may be useful for clinical protocols too to borrow from Counselling Psychological 
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and existential philosophies and to recommend that an attempt is made to get ‘alongside’ the client 
through a phenomenological investigation of their worlding. Once a full(er) picture has been sketched 
out, assistance may be offered which is apposite for that client and which includes both freedom and 
responsibility. In this way the protocol-driven procrustean approach, which many participants felt was 
unhelpful as it did not reflect their own reality, may be changed instead to the creation of a safe space 
in which clients can make a ‘leap to faith’ – in this case the faith being their own 
biopsychosociospiritual authenticity regarding sexuality, gender, and the worlding which is permeated 
by these. 
Implications for practice 
While these findings cannot be said to be universal or true in all times and all places as, of course, they 
will be peculiar to this group; there is some degree of generalisability for similar groups in that such 
themes may be regarded as philosophically likely to apply to other trans people also. The research is 
also ‘generalisable’ in the sense that it is factually true, almost tautologically so, that some trans people do 
these things, i.e: of the general body of trans people some do these things. This may seem trivial, 
however, it allows us to rebut universalisation from research and theory which suggests that all (or 
none) do such things. Thus this research rebuts the assertion that all trans people are heterosexual in 
their identified gender, for example. 
The key implication for practice derived from this research therefore is arguably that counselling 
psychologists should attend to the lived experience of their clients. Again, this may seem so trivial as to 
be trite, given this stance is so central to counselling psychological practice (Woolfe, Dryden & 
Strawbridge, 2003), however, this research has at least reiterated this most important point which 
occasionally gets forgotten when counselling psychologists endeavour to work in reductionist fields 
such as the NHS and funded research (Clark and Loewenthal, 2015) and indeed may be of use to other 
professions also. As part of this attending to the client’s lived experience there will necessarily be the 
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use of extreme caution in the application of theory as this has not always well served non-heterosexual 
and non-cisgender clients (cf. Judd & Milton, 2001). As one of the participants, Cee Cee, noted:  
“The worst thing is that a lot of practitioners are not aware, of, of these 
[heteronormative] biases that they’re bringing into their assessments and work 
that you’re doing just now, us talking is really important that they get that.” 
Instead, the basis of phenomenological, and indeed existential-phenomenological, practice should be 
attended to – that of being with the client and exploring their world in a supportive manner.  
Of course this does not mean that clients should not be challenged. Indeed clients often come to 
therapy for one of two reasons – they can’t fully see what their difficulty is and would like assistance 
uncovering it; or they know what their difficulty is but don’t feel able to do anything about it (whether 
in terms of acceptance or change). Either of these may involve challenge, both regarding acting in the 
world, and acting intrapsychically. One of the key issues commonly requiring such challenge with 
regard to both sexuality and gender is that of prejudice (Richards & Barker, 2015). Such prejudice may 
come from external sources and so cause marginalisation stress; but may also come from internal 
sources and so be internalised *phobia – be it trans-, homo-, bi-, etc. Judd and Milton (2001) comment 
that: 
“With its attentiveness to issues such as relatedness, personal responsibility, 
choice and meaninglessness, the existential-phenomenological paradigm 
provides trainees (and training providers) with a theoretical and therapeutic 
approach which is equipped to challenge sedimented, [trans- and] homo-
negative biases and assumptions which may be maintained, minimised, silenced 
or simply ignored through other models of therapy.” (p.7)  
I quite agree. One key means of doing this is recognising the latitude which is available within people’s 
worldviews and moving from there: If it is ok to be trans for other people why not for you [the client]?; 
Where is the line between spicy sex and unacceptable BDSM?. Indeed, crucially, what does it mean to be 
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trans and gay, or trans and heterosexual? What does it mean for each individual client to be these 
things? In this way sedimented beliefs may be able to be loosened through supportive enquiry and 
horizontalisation rather than crass reductionism. 
This is not to say that counselling psychologists should utilise this theory in an unconsidered manner 
either. As seen throughout the analysis above, both labels and complexity should be allowed. Indeed, 
given that trans and non-heterosexual people often have to defend their identities due to these 
identities not being given to them by society at birth, extra care should be taken not to reiterate such 
structural oppression though doubting the label; or indeed questioning it’s veracity – Milton (2005); “As 
Frankl and others highlight the ignoring of identity can be as difficult personally and politically 
powerful as the enforcement of another identity” (p.247). This does create a challenge for ethical 
counselling psychologists who wish to investigate sexuality and gender, and perhaps will be especially 
so for those clients who have non-binary or genderqueer identities as these naturally invite a 
consideration of fluidity and the inappropriateness of labels. Indeed as these identities are only recently 
emerging into wider public discourse, labels themselves are likely to change and counselling 
psychologists should be wary of appearing to misunderstand such identities through correlating a 
change of label with an instability of identity – although again without throwing out the baby of enquiry 
with the bathwater of erroneous theory.  
This use of a wider frame of phenomenology, and perhaps also existential-phenomenological practice, 
instead of strict theory-driven practice (as in psychoanalysis and some other modalities), may also 
address the ethical practice and research quandary over who controls trans people’s stories. As seen 
with the autogynephilia debates detailed in the literature review, the appropriation of trans narratives 
and lives to buttress theory has a long and troubling history (cf. Richards, et al, 2014). Indeed this 
history continues to impact therapy as trans people who are aware of these debates often instinctively 
distrust clinicians whom they assume will misinterpret their narratives though this [false] theoretical 
lens or, it is feared, may appropriate the narrative to build or adapt a theoretical lens. Instead, given the 
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complexity we have seen in this analysis, only the most light touch theory should be used and a frame 
consisting of ethical practice alongside the client would seem far more appropriate. 
Lastly, the matters we have considered above in relation to trans people, including how bodies, gender 
and sexuality inflect and inform one another, should also be considered for cisgender people. Cisgender 
people will almost invariably not have considered their gender in the depth that a trans client will and, if 
they state they are heterosexual, may not have considered their sexuality either and so may give a less 
reflective account of themselves. This means that cisgender clients may not have mapped out areas of 
disjoint and so be straining to fill them in order to fit with an assumed universal norm of a given gender 
and sexuality which is apocryphal. For example a cisgender man may be concerned about his penis and 
what it means to be a man – and much can be learned here in considering trans male experience. 
Erectile dysfunction and various forms of sex may be usefully explored – again drawing on trans 
women’s experience. These parallels may not be explicit, of course, as some cisgender people resent 
comparison to trans people; but nonetheless useful consideration can be undertaken which informs 
both trans and cisgender people. 
Another useful element to take from the trans research detailed here which may be applied in 
counselling psychological work with cisgender people, is that of labels and the complexity and fluidity 
within them. Cisgender people have a number of labels which are used, and indeed in some cases have 
labels which are so prevalent as to be effectively invisible (for example cisgender). These labels will 
contain within them significant fluidity and diversity in both identity and practice; and consequently 
counselling psychologists may do well to explore the fluidity without necessarily challenging the 
veracity of the cisgender client’s labels.   
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Summary of recommendations for Counselling Psychological practice 
 Be aware of the diversity of trans experience. 
 Be aware that people may be both binary and non-binary. 
 Refrain from inserting trans and non-binary people into either reductionist or postmodernist 
philosophical frameworks in a procrustean manner.  
 Consider allowing ethics to trump philosophy when in a therapeutic quandary. 
 Consider how findings concerning authenticity and the considered life in trans experience may 
also be of use with cisgender clients’ considerations of sexuality and gender. 
Conclusion  
The trans people in this study were heterogeneous but, as seen above, shared several common concerns 
- most pertinently those of being constrained and misunderstood, both in regards to the complexity of 
their identities and practices concerning sexuality and gender; and with regards to the simplicity of 
them. Indeed the very notions of sexuality and gender as discrete categories and their intersections with 
wider identity became troubled. Consequently any overriding theory presented here would be suspect 
and indeed may be unethical in that it would seek to constrain the participants’ contributions which 
spoke to both identity as a felt concrete entity and a complexity within that. Therefore only such wider 
themes as are detailed above; and the overarching theme of the necessity of recognising both identity 
and fluidity as ontologically non-conflictual entities are given here. To reiterate, this is not to say that all 
trans people have a fluid identity, but that a variety of meanings can be found within any given identity 
which is nonetheless valid and true as a discreet identity. In this way we may see trans people’s sexuality as both 
postmodern and reductionist. Therefore the diagnostic terms we referred to at the beginning of this 
thesis appear to be perhaps somewhat philosophically flawed in that, as entities designed to demarcate 
strict boundaries, they lack the power to fully encompass fluidity, multiplicity, and the complex 
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relationship to time seen here; as well as the discrete reductionist categories and process of labelling 
they sit within. 
Trans people then, are identifying and practicing a number of different genders and sexualities and 
these are, of course, all valid. These things inflect and inform more widely – both within the person 
(including how they relate to themselves) and also, of course, in relation to others in the world. These 
others will, in a sort of epistemic feedback loop, naturally inflect, and indeed constitute, the trans 
person themselves – just as the trans person is inflecting and constituting the other. Thus for a 
counselling psychologist concerned with intersubjective relating, the ‘sexuality’ we are considering here 
is not so much fucking as Being; which is of course a being-in-the-world (with others including 
ourselves). It would be perverse for our practice to attempt to subvert this into a reductionist theory-
driven notion of pure complexity or fluidity – or indeed to concretise identity alone. Consequently this 
research finds that for a counselling psychologist to act ethically a paradox may have to be held; 
So be it. 
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Appendix 1 Information sheet 
Information about a research project 
 
An Enquiry into the Sexuality of Trans People with 
Implications for the practice of Counselling 
Psychology and Psychotherapy51 
 
 
 
 
Being carried out by Christina Richards as a requirement for a Doctorate in Existential 
Counselling Psychology and Psychotherapy from the New School of Psychotherapy and 
Counselling (NSPC) and Middlesex University 
 
NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT and Middlesex University 
          
Dated:   
 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide to participate, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please take your time to read the following information carefully, and discuss it with others 
if you wish. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take your time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
Writing about trans people’s sexuality in the academic and clinical literature is often based 
on theories, rather than what trans people themselves say about their sexuality. It is 
important that people involved in providing services for trans people have an 
understanding of what trans people’s sexuality is from trans people themselves.  
 
For example, it might be helpful for clinicians seeing trans people for sex and relationship 
counselling (especially if it is the first time they have had a trans client) to understand a 
little more deeply about different trans people’s sexualities. Consequently the aim of this 
study is to fill the gap in the clinical and academic literature to gain a greater 
understanding of this under-researched area.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
The study involves meeting as a group of trans people for about an hour. It is only open to 
adults who identify in some way as trans and are happy to be open about that fact in the 
group. If you are a current or former client of the researcher - Christina Richards - 
unfortunately you will not be able to take part. This is because being, or having been, a 
                                                 
51 Please note the formal title of the study is: Trans sexuality: A Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Enquiry into 
the Sexuality of Trans People with Implications for the practice of Existential-Phenomenological Counselling 
Psychology and Psychotherapy. Please contact the researcher or supervisor if you would like an explanation 
of the terms. 
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client of the researcher may affect your contributions. Also, if you are an intimate partner of 
anyone in the group only one of you will be able to take part. This is because if two or 
more people know each other very well it may affect the contributions. 
 
If you are an adult trans person, are happy to speak about your gender and your sexuality, 
do not have an intimate partner in the group, and have not been a client of Christina’s then 
as a member of the group you will be asked to make a model out of Lego or modelling clay 
which represents your sexuality (whatever that means to you) - especially in terms of how 
it intersects with your gender. The model will have about 10-30 pieces so no artistic skill is 
required! It's really just a jumping off point for discussion. After this you will be asked to 
explain what your model means and then we will discuss the themes that have come up as 
a group (of course it is important that everyone’s views are respected and allowed – even 
if they are not agreed with by other group members). No one will say what your model 
means except you - neither the researcher nor the group members. Your explanation of 
the model will be audio recorded as will the group discussion that follows where everyone 
talks about trans people’s sexuality. A photo of the model will be taken to be included in 
the final report. 
 
What will you do with the information that I provide? 
 
The recording of the group will be transcribed by myself, and at this point anything 
identifying you will be altered (e.g. names, places, occupations). The recordings of the 
discussion will be deleted upon publication of the research. The transcripts will be sent to 
any participants who wish to give me their e-mail address and they will be able to correct 
anything they have said within a time limit of two weeks. Otherwise I’ll assume they are 
happy for me to publish what they have said. If people want me to change something I will 
or I will just leave that bit out. In that way I won’t make it look like you have said something 
you didn’t mean, which I think is especially important in areas such as gender and 
sexuality. 
 
I will then write about what has come up within the context of what other people have 
written about trans people’s sexuality. I will use bits of the discussion to show my points. I’ll 
also include the pictures of the models for clarity. 
 
All of the transcripts and photos will be held securely on an encrypted computer in a 
locked room and will be kept for at least until 6 months after I graduate. They will be 
treated as confidential.  If my research is published, I will make sure that neither your 
name nor other identifying details are used.  
 
Data will be stored according to the Middlesex University policy within the UK the Data 
Protection Act and the Freedom of Information Act. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
 
It is possible that taking part in this study will bring up issues you haven’t considered 
before, or leave you feeling distressed or emotional. The researcher will be available after 
the group discussion to talk with you briefly, if this is the case, and can also provide details 
of additional support if you decide that you would like to talk further. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
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You will have contributed to clinicians and policy makers having a wider understanding of 
trans people’s sexuality. To do this I will ensure that the research gets distributed to a 
variety of people including other trans people and clinicians who work with trans people, 
who may, of course, be trans themselves. This will include feeding back to BiReCon next 
year. 
  
Discussion of sexuality in a group may have no direct benefit, although some people may 
find it an opportunity to reflect on their sexuality, and could find this beneficial. 
 
6.  Consent 
 
You will be given a copy of this information sheet for your personal records, and if you 
agree to take part, you will be asked to sign the attached consent form before the study 
begins.   
 
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary.  You do not have to take part if you do 
not want to. If you decide not to take part you may withdraw at any time without giving a 
reason. 
 
7.  Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research has been organised and funded by Christina Richards as part of her studies 
at the NSPC Ltd. 
 
8.  Who has reviewed the study? 
 
All proposals for research using human participants are reviewed by an Ethics Committee 
before they can proceed. The NSPC research ethics sub-committee have approved this 
study. 
 
9. Expenses 
Unfortunately this is not a funded project and so expenses will not be paid. 
 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. 
 
If you have any further questions, you can contact me at: 
NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT  
SC466@live.mdx.ac.uk 
 
If you any concerns about the conduct of the study, you may contact my supervisor: 
 
Dr Peter Martin 
NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT  
contact@peteramartin.co.uk 
 
Or 
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The Principal 
NSPC Ltd. 254-6 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT 
admin@nspc.org.uk 
0044 (0) 20 7624 0471 
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Appendix 2 Consent form 
Consent Form 
 
An Enquiry into the Sexuality of Trans People with 
Implications for the practice of Counselling 
Psychology and Psychotherapy52 
 
 
 
 
Being carried out by Christina Richards as a requirement for a Doctorate in Existential 
Counselling Psychology and Psychotherapy from NSPC and Middlesex University 
 
NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT and Middlesex University 
          
Dated:   
 
Researcher: Christina Richards 
Contact: SC466@live.mdx.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor: Dr Peter Martin  
Contact: contact@peteramartin.co.uk 
 
 
I consent to be involved in Christina Richards’ study of trans people’s sexuality. I 
understand and consent to be audio recorded in a group setting and that that recording will 
be held securely before being deleted after publication, and any resultant writing will be 
anonymised. I understand and consent to having a picture of my model used for the same 
work. 
 
I understand that the resultant work may be published, but that I will not be identifiable 
within it. I understand that I may withdraw at any time and that I do not have to give a 
reason for my withdrawal. 
 
I am happy to be out as trans for the purposes of the group session, but to be anonymised 
in the written work afterwards.  
 
                                                 
52 Please note the formal title of the study is: Trans’ sexuality: A Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Enquiry into 
the Sexuality of Trans People with Implications for the practice of Existential-Phenomenological Counselling 
Psychology and Psychotherapy. Please contact the researcher or supervisor if you would like an explanation 
of the terms. 
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I confirm that I am over 18 years of age. 
I confirm that I am not now, and have never been, a client of the researcher – Christina 
Richards. I also confirm that I am not an intimate partner of any other member(s) of the 
group. 
 
I agree not to discuss other group member’s contributions, or information about them, after 
the group. 
 
 
Signature of Participant  ___________________   Date  _____________   
 
 
Printed Name  __________________________  
 
 
Email (if you want the transcript) – BLOCK CAPS unless your email is case sensitive 
please. 
 
                          
                          
                          
     
 
 
 
Signature of researcher  ___________________   Date  _____________   
 
 
Printed Name  Christina Richards 
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Appendix 3 Debrief after group 
 Participant Debrief Sheet 
(after group) 
 
An Enquiry into the Sexuality of Trans People with 
Implications for the practice of Counselling 
Psychology and Psychotherapy53 
 
 
 
Being carried out by Christina Richards as a requirement for a Doctorate in Existential 
Counselling Psychology and Psychotherapy from NSPC and Middlesex University 
 
NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT and Middlesex University 
          
Dated:   
 
Researcher: Christina Richards 
Contact: SC466@live.mdx.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor: Dr Peter Martin  
Contact: contact@peteramartin.co.uk 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in this investigation into trans people’s sexuality for my DPsych 
at the New School of Counselling and Psychotherapy and Middlesex University. I will 
transcribe the things we have discussed and, if you have given me your e-mail address, I 
will send you the transcript. After you have received it you will have two weeks to send me 
any changes after which I will assume you are happy for me to go ahead and publish the 
work as outlined in the information sheet. You may of course still withdraw in full at any 
time without giving a reason. 
 
As stated in the information leaflet please do not discuss other people’s contributions and 
keep information about them confidential. 
 
I will ensure that the research gets distributed to a variety of people including trans people 
and other clinicians who work with trans people, who may, of course, be trans themselves. 
This will include feeding back to BiReCon next year. This is in order for a wider 
understanding of trans’ sexuality to be available to them than that which is currently 
available. 
 
If you have any questions you can contact me at: SC466@live.mdx.ac.uk 
 
Or via the New School of Counselling and Psychotherapy at: 
                                                 
53 Please note the formal title of the study is: Trans’ sexuality: A Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Enquiry into 
the Sexuality of Trans People with Implications for the practice of Existential-Phenomenological Counselling 
Psychology and Psychotherapy. Please contact the researcher or supervisor if you would like an explanation 
of the terms. 
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NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London 
NW6 4BT 
 
Or if you feel the need  to talk to my supervisor Dr Peter Martin you can contact him at: 
contact@peteramartin.co.uk or at the NSPC as above. 
 
If you have found that any difficult issues have been raised from today’s group you can 
contact your GP or: 
 
The Samaritans: www.samaritans.org, 08457 909090 
 
PACE Counselling Service (London): www.pacehealth.org.uk, 020 77001323 
 
Lesbian and Gay Foundation (Manchester): 08453 303030 
 
Thanks once again for contributing to this research. 
Christina Richards 
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Appendix 4 Debrief after transcription 
 Participant Debrief Sheet 
(after transcription) 
 
An Enquiry into the Sexuality of Trans People with 
Implications for the practice of Counselling 
Psychology and Psychotherapy54 
 
 
 
Being carried out by Christina Richards as a requirement for a Doctorate in Existential 
Counselling Psychology and Psychotherapy from NSPC and Middlesex University 
 
NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT and Middlesex University 
          
Dated:   
 
Researcher: Christina Richards 
Contact: SC466@live.mdx.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor: Dr Peter Martin  
Contact: contact@peteramartin.co.uk 
 
 
Please find attached my transcript based on the group you attended on trans’ sexuality. 
Please make such changes as you see fit to your bits – please remember that, even if you 
don’t agree with them, it’s important other people are allowed their voices too.  
 
Please can you make the changes in a different colour or using ‘track changes’ so I can 
tell what’s changed. If you don’t want to use a computer then I can mail you a printout for 
written comments and provide a P.O Box address for return. Thanks. 
 
You have two weeks from today to make any changes, after that time I will assume you 
are happy with what I have written and I will publish it unless you withdraw in full. You may 
do this at any time without giving a reason in which case I will remove your contribution 
from the work. 
 
If you have any questions you can contact me at: SC466@live.mdx.ac.uk 
 
Or via the New School of Counselling and Psychotherapy at: 
 
NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London  
                                                 
54 Please note the formal title of the study is: Trans’ sexuality: A Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Enquiry into 
the Sexuality of Trans People with Implications for the practice of Existential-Phenomenological Counselling 
Psychology and Psychotherapy. Please contact the researcher or supervisor if you would like an explanation 
of the terms. 
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NW6 4BT 
 
 
Or if you feel the need  to talk to my supervisor Dr Peter Martin you can contact him at: 
contact@peteramartin.co.uk or at the NSPC as above. 
If you have found that any difficult issues have been raised from today’s group you can 
contact your GP or: 
 
The Samaritans: www.samaritans.org, 08457 909090 
 
PACE Counselling Service (London): www.pacehealth.org.uk, 020 77001323 
 
Lesbian and Gay Foundation (Manchester): 08453 303030 
 
Thanks once again for participating. 
Christina Richards 
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Appendix 5 Debrief after participant amendment 
 Participant Debrief Sheet 
(after participant amendment) 
 
An Enquiry into the Sexuality of Trans People with 
Implications for the practice of Counselling 
Psychology and Psychotherapy55 
 
 
 
Being carried out by Christina Richards as a requirement for a Doctorate in Existential 
Counselling Psychology and Psychotherapy from NSPC and Middlesex University 
 
NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London NW6 4BT and Middlesex University 
          
Dated:   
 
Researcher: Christina Richards 
Contact: SC466@live.mdx.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor: Dr Peter Martin  
Contact: contact@peteramartin.co.uk 
 
 
Thank you for any responses you made to my transcript or indeed if you were happy with it 
as it is then Thank you! 
 
I will ensure that the research gets distributed to a variety of people including trans people 
and other clinicians who work with trans people, who may, of course, be trans themselves. 
This will include feeding back to BiReCon next year. This is in order for a wider 
understanding of trans’ sexuality to be available to them than that which is currently 
available. 
 
If you have any questions you can contact me at: SC466@live.mdx.ac.uk 
 
Or via the New School of Counselling and Psychotherapy at: 
 
NSPC Ltd 
258 Belsize Road 
London  
NW6 4BT 
 
 
                                                 
55 Please note the formal title of the study is: Trans’ sexuality: A Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Enquiry into 
the Sexuality of Trans People with Implications for the practice of Existential-Phenomenological Counselling 
Psychology and Psychotherapy. Please contact the researcher or supervisor if you would like an explanation 
of the terms. 
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Or if you feel the need to talk to my supervisor Dr Peter Martin you can contact him at: 
contact@peteramartin.co.uk or at the NSPC as above. 
 
If you have found that any difficult issues have been raised from today’s group you can 
contact your GP or: 
 
The Samaritans: www.samaritans.org, 08457 909090 
 
PACE Counselling Service (London): www.pacehealth.org.uk, 020 77001323 
 
Lesbian and Gay Foundation (Manchester): 08453 303030 
 
Thanks once again for participating. 
Christina Richards 
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Appendix 6 Demographic Details 
Pseudonym Age Ethnicity Gender 
Relationship 
Status 
Disability Religion 
Ezio 
 
23-27 
White 
British 
Male Single 
Learning 
difficulty 
None 
Scot Sam 
 
28-32 White UK Trans Man Poly None Pagan 
Mr Fox 
 
38-42 
White 
British 
Male- Trans 
Man 
Single / in 
poly 
relationship 
None None 
Martin 33-37 
White 
British 
Trans Man 
Poly with wife 
+ boyfriend + 
lovers 
Hearing 
difficulties 
Pagan 
Jane 
Crocker 
28-32 
Jewish-
Hispanic 
Female 
Polyamorous 
(2 current 
partners) 
Clinical 
depression 
None 
Sack Boy 23-27 
White 
British 
Male 
In an open 
relationship 
Arthrogryposis None 
Cee Cee 28-32 
African 
Scot 
Gender Queer Single 
Mental Health 
Issues 
Spirituality 
Tara 33-37 Scottish Female Single 
Borderline 
Personality 
Traits 
Roman 
Catholic 
(Non-
practicing) 
Jenbury 
Handlebar-
Smythe 
 
28-32 
Caucasian- 
Irish 
Female Single Autistic Atheist 
Charlie 28-32 White 
Female bodied, 
experiment 
(sp?) trans 
Single None Buddhist 
Haramit 18-22 
White 
Scottish 
Trans (almost) 
male 
Taken (in a 
monogamous 
relationship) 
N/A N/A 
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Appendix 7 Reflexivity Affidavits 
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. 
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Appendix 8 Transcript 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe 
 
Researcher: Ok, who would like to go first? 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe: Meee. 
Researcher: ok go for it. 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe: Mine’s quite simple, oh you want my pseudonoym, ah it was Jenbury 
Handlebar-Smythe 
Researcher: Jen, Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe? 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe: Yes 
Researcher: Excellent thank you. 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe: Alright, um so I built two columns, and one represents gender, uh, the other 
one represents sexuality, uh, the gender one is one solid colour – it’s red, it’s not particularly gender 
specific – and , um about halfway, the one that represents sexuality is lots of different colours. And 
about halfway up the columns I, branched the gender out one into the sexuality one because, my, uh… 
gender does, influence my sexuality. And… the change of one sex to another was, had impacts on that. 
And then the uh sexuality one kind of fades to grey at the top… because, it’s all gone a bit dry recently. 
Researcher: Thank you very much indeed. 
Jenburg Handlebar-Smythe: There you go. 
Researcher: Can you say, you said your gender influences your sexuality? 
Jenburg Handlebar-Smythe: Yes 
Researcher: Can you expand a little bit on that point please? 
Jenburg Handlebar-Smythe: Uhmmm… How to explain that… Uhmmm… (Exhales) 
Researcher: You don’t have to if it’s… 
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Jenburg Handlebar-Smythe: …no no, I’m just trying to think how to, phrase it, in a way which won’t just 
be me rambling on, forever. Uhmmm… Pre… Well it’s kind of like, uh, uh pretransition, um physical 
sort of modifications to the body via hormones and etcetera, um my physical sex and how I felt sort of 
inside my head kind of um… during sort of sexual experience and, um how I experienced sort of 
sexuality and relationships with other people, there was, there was kind of like interference, uh that’s the I 
can describe it, sort of like a cognitive dissonance, um distraction was the main thing. It provided lots of, 
distraction while, um, post, um physical, uh transition, it... provided more of a sort of a, a source of um 
– how do you describe it? avenues for enjoyment? Would that be a way of putting it? Um, so, being 
aware of sort of my physical sex was previously distraction, negative, taking away from any experiences 
and these days is more of a, a positive, thing… 
Researcher: Thanks 
Jenburg Handlebar-Smythe:  I did ramble a bit, but hopefully that made some kind of sense to someone, 
somewhere. 
Researcher: That’s excellent, thank you so much. 
Researcher: Ok. Who would like to go next? 
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Martin 
 
 
Martin: Ok. Um so my name is Martin…um., what is it just go into this (indicates model) now? 
Researcher: If you describe it briefly, what it looks like, and then explain it, that would be great. 
Martin: Ok, so I’ve got a blue, box here, um which is quite high, and squishing people in, um with a 
door going out to various bits of the walls are now exploded onto the, thing, and I’ve got a snowflake, 
because each one is unique [low laughter], and that is definitely me, and a turnie, moves around, movable 
pieces kind of thing. 
(inaudible in background) 
Martin: Um, so this is, oh god it’s not central. I didn’t see that one. 
Researcher: The blue thing? 
Martin: The blue thing yeah – is um, is me kind of bricked in, and it’s specifically blue because I am 
supposed to be a boy, and I am supposed to do boy things, which is blue. Um so this is kind of 
pretransition and pre…discovery of me… so the door represents that kind of line, so you come 
through the door and the the wall bits are now exploded out and kind of uh epiphany kind of stylie, uh 
and lots of different colours because there’s lots more in terms of my identity rather than just being this 
one boy, this is what I am what I do what I have to be. Um, and then like I say there is a snowflake 
because I realised that I could be unique, as a boy. And I remember if I started on testosterone walking 
along seeing the sun rising somewhere or other, and just that image has stayed with me as a kind of 
epiphany moment of once I start on T… I don’t care what sort of man I’m seen as, as long as I’m seen 
as male, although, (laughs) I’ve evolved in terms of my identity since then, but as long as I’m seen as 
male then actually I can be whatever that means to me, kind of thing, so that image in my head of the 
sun rising, um, kind of stays with me, for that.  
Um yeah and then I’ve got this kind of turntabley thing which is just very flexible and mobile and it 
kind of. I identify as queer and I think that’s a (laughs) really good way of explaining it, because it 
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doesn’t stay in one place or space, so my gender identity is queerish, my sexuality is queer, my sexual 
orientation within that is queer, my um, the way that I have relationships is also, could be seen as queer, 
so that kind of fits within that. 
Researcher: Thank you so much, excellent. 
Researcher: Wonderful. Who’s next? 
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Charlie 
 
 
Charlie: I’ll go with mine then. So um. It’s a long, uh kind of flat grey surface with in one corner a 
female Lego person and a grey kind of block. Um in the middle there’s a little clock thing if anybody 
can see that? Um, and on the other side there’s kind of a forest and a male Lego character um. So for 
me, for somebody whose still fairly early, in this process um, this side of it with the female and the grey 
block represents, um, I suppose a sexuality that I have had, that I have, told was supposed to be a 
certain way and a sexuality and a body that I’ve never connected with so I avoided it pretty much all 
together. Um, it was, you know, or I didn’t I didn’t get it it was just kind of a grey blank wall, um. And 
since kind of uh, starting to think, um more in terms of of gender and trans and everything else, I’ve 
got glimpses of a, of a sexuality that I could have. It’s like if I have a body that I’m more comfortable 
with then the trees and the flowers on this side represent that I might be able to grow and and kind of 
flourish a bit further down the line. Um the clock in the middle represents time. Um I feel like I’ve lost a 
lot of time I suppose, I’m [early thirties] now. Um, time I’ve uh, I’m waiting for my appointment for the 
Gender Identity Clinic in [place] so it’s the time now and the patience of having, having to wait. Um and 
at [early thirties] I know that the time that I have ahead of me and the rest of my life and how I want to 
live with that so. 
Researcher: Excellent. Thank you so much. 
Another Participant: Just a detail I don’t think you’ve said your pseudonym? 
Charlie: Oh. Charlie it was. 
Researcher: Oh and [nods towards Another Participant] thank you so much. 
[ripple of laughter] 
Researcher: Thank you who’d like to go next? 
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Mr Fox 
 
 
Mr Fox: I will. Um so. Um my um little imagery thing – oh I’m Mr Fox by the way – um so uh so my 
uh my little kind of set up here. I’ve got two little kind of grey kind of squares which are two kind of 
little islands and it’s populated. Each of the little squares is populated by little people. There’s nothing 
else really in my model apart from a motorcycle, which is a prop. Because what’s quite important about 
the little people is that they have certain characteristics. So, for example, quite a lot of them are wearing 
kind of uniforms. And you’ve got one of the character’s whose got one of them on a leash. So the prop 
is the kind of butch motorcycle fetish type thing. That’s the only reason the bikes there really. They’ve 
all got bad hair by the way but I didn’t have any control over that [laughter]. 
So um, so what’s quite important about these, the two groupings is that Martin was talking about 
identifying as queer. I absolutely understand queer theory, I’m very confident and competent in 
understanding it. It doesn’t describe my experience at all in terms of sexuality. My sexuality is very 
binary, I have a very binary sexuality which is why I identify as bisexual and not queer. In a sense that 
what I tend to be attracted to are masculine men and, I don’t like the word feminine because I 
distinguish feminine and female, but I’m very much attracted to, you know um women who display, um 
a type of femaleness that I find very attractive. More femme rather than feminine I would say. And 
that’s a very, kind of clear binary thing for me. I tend not to be attracted to androgyny and that kind of 
thing. Which is why my people are on two little kind of islands. My sexuality is a very binary kind of one. 
Um, so, and we’ve got um kind of definite elements of kind of fetish and kink over here. I love the little 
people. I mean we’ve got like little uniforms which is nice, I approve, um and we’ve also got people 
here, um this, I love him so much he’s gorgeous. He’s got like a special little beardy thing going on 
which is great. And under here you can’t quite see it, but he’s got a tattoo as well, um so I’m really 
attracted to, um very stereotypical masculine forms, um in terms of what I’m interested what I’m 
attracted to in men. And very much, kind of stereotypically feminine or female things in women so one 
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of my little people here has got  a corset on, how good is that?,  look a corset up the back, and um 
some of them have got , you know, long hair and that kind of thing so what I’m trying to represent here 
is I’m trying to say, you know, I’m over, you know I think I really want to stress that it is very much a 
binary kind of thing for me because I feel there is a bit of a sort of a tyranny of cool in the sense that there 
is a pressure to kind of be pansexual, to be open to people on the spectrum of genders and sexualities and 
that and kind of stuff, and that’s absolutely cool if that works for you, but it doesn’t work for me. I’m 
very much on those um binaries. 
So yeah, so I’ve got a bit of kink, definite binaries on the gender thing going on, um that’s mine. 
Researcher: Excellent. Um does your gender have anything to do with that? 
Mr Fox: Um it’s a really interesting question, that what what is really significant is that pretransition this 
world [the masculine world] was closed to me, I absolutely, I, and I’m really sad about that, that kind of, 
I’m really, I find that really, a very powerful kind of statement of human energy, that kind of masculinity, 
that kind of very heavy, um, you know the kind of leather scene, all that kind of stuff it’s a really powerful 
form of sexuality. Um and that was kind of closed to me because I couldn’t have sex with men, or 
relate sexually to men, when I was living as a woman. Just not possible to do. I did and it was rubbish, 
and I hated it and didn’t do it for a long time. Now that I’m, you know, I’m a man and I’m kind of in 
my own masculinity that form of relating becomes possible, whereas it wasn’t before. So um, yes, so my 
gender does matter actually. And now that I’m comfortable with my gender I can explore my sexuality 
fully in a way that I couldn’t before. 
Researcher: Excellent, that you so much.  
Another Participant: Um would you like a black leather hat for one of your dudes? 
Mr Fox: Oh I’d so love that! Thank you [laughter] I can get rid of his rubbish hair now. Oh he’s lovely! 
Researcher: Ok who would like to go next? 
 
 
 188 
 
Cee Cee 
 
 
Cee Cee: Shall I go next? 
Cee Cee: Um my name’s Cee Cee. Um, what I’ve got here is a, green bit of land and round the edge of it 
it’s got, a, flat fence, and then there’s uh, in the inside of it there’s another fence, a fence square with a 
higher wall, and then each, there’s five… people here and they all represent different things to do with 
sexuality, gender and sexual expression. Um, for me how society sees my gender and sexuality and how 
I feel it to be, it’s or most of the time is always in conflict. So I see myself as genderqueer genderfluid 
but society... if I’ve got really very short hair I’m treated as male, assumed to be male. If my hair is a bit 
longer I’ve got earrings in I’m assumed to be female… whereas for me I feel… I neither feel female or 
male. I like playing around, but with all types of images of masculinity and femininity and what it means 
to be a man physically, what it – in terms of imagery – what it means to be female in terms of imagery. 
So this, the tree here, um kind of represents hope and what, and the person in the middle here who is, I 
use the word bisexual because it it, at least it explains that I find… females and males attractive, 
femininity and masculinity attractive sexually. But this little person here would love just to be… Cee 
Cee. Or and if I feel like being Cee Cee , my first name, but had the um choice to use a different name 
if I want to, um and be sexually free… of labels, sexuality labels. And be free of having to define my 
gender either way. But this does represent… a confusion. But not a confusion for what I feel like and 
what how I see myself, but external society’s assumptions about me, can just be too too heavy 
sometimes and it’s just… yeah psychologically it can be very demanding. That’s it. 
Researcher: Thank you very much. Can you say, a little bit more about the two walls please? 
Cee Cee:Oh yes. Um. Basically when, um when I’m being, when I have very short hair and I’m just 
wearing jeans and a t-shirt or something, then how people treat me in terms of the assumption being 
male, but also how that behaviour, how people treat me as different to when I’m being assumed to be 
female and how, like how other people, men and women, treat me. And so, I think that over the years 
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that affects, that has influenced how… I dunno me as a person, as a growing person through my 
teenage years to my adulthood, forced me to think about it. Because quite often, um, I’m mistaken for a 
boy but I don’t. If I spent every single time saying no I’m not I’m a girl, no I’m not I’m this de de de. 
You know I’d be worn out by now. So it’s kind of I accept things from society, but sometimes it’s out 
of convenience rather than because it’s rather than because I’m actually ok with it. 
Researcher: Ok thank you. Can you remind me of the pseudonym you chose? 
Cee Cee: Ah Cee Cee 
Researcher: Cee Cee thank you. 
Researcher: Thank you very much. Who’d like to go next? 
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Scot Sam 
 
 
Scot Sam:  I’ll do mine. 
Scot Sam:  Um you want me to describe this? [Laughter]. Ok, um, on one side there is a kind of dungeon 
fortress thing with, and inside is um the closest thing to a girlie Lego thing that I could find. Um and fire 
and two treasure chests and a skeleton. And on the outside is a garden with lots of happy, figures with 
various things about them just having a nice time. And the, the thing on the left, the kind of dungeony 
fortress thing, the fire in there is because it’s really hot and uncomfortable and you want to get out. 
And, the, the sort of girlie figure in there is sort of sandwiched between two chests [laughs] and a 
skeleton [laughter].  So, and so the fortress thing kind of represents the constrains that were placed on 
me by the world and the culture in which I live in terms of the way I wanted to express my sexuality 
and the way I was constrained from being able to do that by having the body that I had… and … 
obviously chests, well you know, um and so that’s kind of like being contained, and also the, you know, 
not, not feeling able to to express who I wanted to be. And then, um, on this side, um so we’ve got like 
a mixture of kind of different gendered figures in different ways, and it’s a garden and everyone’s 
having a party and its brilliant and really exciting and that’s kind of where I feel I am now in 
comparison to where I was. So, yeah. 
Researcher: Thank you very much indeed. You you’ve chosen the couple of Lego figures in the garden, 
can you say what they’re, what they are? Are they just, random figures or are they? 
Scot Sam:  Oh yeah! They’re just sort of random they all have, or some of them have like whips, some of 
them have, kind of dykey, some are fluffy girlie, some are S and M leather men, it’s kind of a bit of a 
mixture. I’ve got a little [item] in the front because my partner really likes [item]s so yeah. That’s kind of 
all really – it’s not that deep [laughs]. 
Researcher: Ok great. Thankyou. Oh and um can you remind me of your pseudonym? 
Scot Sam:  Oh yes sorry I’m Scott Sam 
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Researcher: Thank you. Thank you very much. Who’d like to go next? 
 
 192 
 
Sack Boy 
 
 
Sack Boy: I will. Um my pseudonym is Sack Boy and I’ve got a green bit of Lego. Um it’s got like a 
couple of uh mobile pieces which are raised up. It’s got, uh, a man and a woman which represents me 
and my partner and I kind of see the rest of the green bit as like a [laughs] playing field. Uh which has 
got a man with a beard, and a sort of gender-queer, person with, no bits, uh who’s genitals don’t really 
mean anything to me. Um I’m attracted to the person, and whatever’s in their pants is… whatever. Um 
yeah, and the reason that me and my partner are on a sort of pedestal is that, from being single for 
quite a few years I’m now in a sort of relatively stable relationship and I feel at home and a bit safe with 
her. Um but we’re in an open relationship so the sort of open field sort of represents that openness, um 
but I’ll always sort of return to her. 
Researcher: Wonderful. Thank you. So you’ve got sort of, did you say ‘open field’? 
Sack Boy: Yeah yeah. Um well we go and play on the field and then come back [laughs]. 
Researcher: Excellent thank you so much, thank you. Who’d like to go next? 
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Haramit 
 
 
Haramit: I’ll go. Uh pseudonym is Haramit. Um my model is a car thing with a monkey with a helmet 
on it with a letter in the back with a frog in the front [laughs]. Um, the monkey kind of represents, me in 
that it’s… well kind of because I like monkeys, but also because they are very like, they are kind of 
social animals – they are very focussed on like their family,  and well it kind of depends, but they are 
mostly focussed on their family and socialisation, and making sure that everything is like… going to 
plan and stuff. And it’s wearing a helmet because, safety… obviously. Um the frog on the front kind of 
because they are always like jumping around. So that like they are always kind of, yeah they are just 
hopping around, but also like, um, I dunno what the word is? I know it begins with A, but they like, 
they can it’s like they’re water and land animals. So it’s kind of like they can, they live in sort of two 
different worlds. Kind of.  
Researcher: Yup 
Haramit: Which is how I kind of feel sometimes with regards to… my gender. Um because I don’t 
really, I don’t really care too much about my own gender or how people perceive me. But it seems that 
other people are a lot more interested in whether I am a boy or a girl or something else.  
Um the letter on the back kind of represents romance a bit, because I am far more inclined to form a 
romantic relationship with someone rather than physical. And it’s in a car because it moves and it kind 
of  it kind of represents a bit of, fluidity and freedom, in kind of… everything… That was a really bad 
explanation [laughs]. 
Researcher: No that was great. Thank you very much. Is there anything you want to add? Or are you, you 
happy with that? 
Haramit: I don’t know, uh. Because I just like, the way I was like, the way I was brought up was very, it 
was in a slightly more… there was less pressure on me to conform to one particular gender. Erm I was 
very free to, erm play with male or female toys or dress how I wanted to dress so long as I looked 
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presentable. Erm, so like I’ve never really felt too much in the ways of pressures starting trying to 
conform me into anything until I hit puberty. Which is where everyone was discovering themselves, but 
I still went along with the whole. I will discover who I am when I’m ready to discover who I am. Erm, 
so I’ve always been quite free and accepting of myself. So. 
Researcher: Thank you very much. 
Haramit: Thanks. 
Researcher: Who’d like to go next? 
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Tara 
 
 
Tara: Erm I guess it’s me because I, Erm I’ve used the name, Tara because of my imagination, my 
original name that I think I ever used on the internet years and years ago. And my model is basically, 
um it would be much bigger than this if I didn’t have to share the Lego [laughter] and it’s a little fort. 
Um, battlements, flag flying, cannon on top and just a person sitting inside. Um, basically it is me that’s 
who I am it’s, not something that I share with other people, it’s something that I very much hide. 
There’s a flag that people see that they’ll assume is what I am and who I am, but it’s not what I am. I 
guess that’s it apart from it’s not, um, I think that because, rather than making it a defensive sort of 
thing the canon is representing the fact that I can be quite, um, can be quite aggressively protective of 
my own sexuality and gender that’s more… that’s what it is it’s it’s something I keep locked away from 
people and don’t share with, um people. I let them see what I want them to see and that’s about it. 
Researcher: Thank you very much. Thank you. Excellent. What, what’s the flag for? Sorry. 
Tara: That’s. Just to say that’s the distraction, it’s what other people see. It’s not it’s not who or what I 
am it’s just what I put on to actually navigate society because you have to have an identity. Um, so it’s I 
guess it’s the one that’s sort of forced on you by the assumptions in society on what you want to do, 
and the one that’s most useful for navigating it. 
Researcher: Thank you very much indeed.  
Researcher: Who’d like to go next? 
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Jane Crocker 
 
 
Jane Crocker: Um 
Ezio: I’ll fight you for it! [Laughs]  
Researcher: Sorry? 
Ezio: I’ll fight you for it! [Laughs]  
Jane Crocker: You look like you work out – how about no? [Laughs]  
Jane Crocker: Um yes my pseudonym is Jane Crocker. And um, I built this, um it’s a raised platform that 
rotates and there are five figures on it. There’s one in the centre and then four in kind of like north, 
north – north east south and west so I’m going to describe them like that. So um. The uh, north and 
south would be um, more um feminine figures. One of them has epaulettes and a wizard’s hat and a 
sword and lipstick and they both have makeup. And the north one is a wizard, a magician, no a 
magician not a wizard, um but they both have magic sort of thing. The ones on the, the one on the 
west is an armoured knight with a sword and a shield. And the one on the east is some sort of noble 
person with armour and a beard and, uh, handcuffs. And in the middle there is skeleton with a crown. 
So, uh what this represents for me is, um it’s a bit hard to explain, um so um so I mean there’s certainly 
a binary there in terms of femininity and masculinity but um, the rotation is what makes, uh the whole 
thing like fluid and it can be like slow and pleasant or really really fast and violent…um… for the two 
more kind of feminine figures, um they both have like, um kind of beauty and they have magic and 
power and and they and they’re strong. And, and so are the masculine figures. But the masculine figures 
have more have armour which is more – I find – defensive and I feel um for instance that the one that is 
the the knight in complete, completely clad in black armour represents the times that I have used kind 
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of masculinity as a kind of like as a protection both in the past and in the present, and so before and after, 
uh, transition.  
Um the the other one, the noble man represents a kind of like a masculinity that is that I find more 
related to sex and hence the handcuffs, so kind of like kinky and such. Um um and so there’s the 
magician who also has the little bag of tricks that also represents like um kink and stuff and toys and 
such things. So um… the, uh in the middle the skeleton with a crown it represents um it’s I call it the 
dead king and it’s kind of it represents both like what is past in my life but also like the remaining 
insecurities uh that have come with transition. I I transitioned from, uh to put it in a very, what I would 
consider to be a binary way, I have transitioned from male to female. And so um, kind of the dead king 
is like some of the privilege I I feel that I have lost that um um, that is gone and kind of like that past 
that is gone. But at the same time it is still there and has a crown so it is like, it has power so it’s kind of 
like, you could see it as a sort of skeleton in the closet sort of thing. So um, so yeah that is basically um, 
yeah that is basically, um and it rotates as I said so it it’s fluid and it keeps going around. 
Researcher: Thank you very much indeed. That’s great. 
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Ezio 
 
 
[Inaudible] 
Ezio: Yeah. My pseudonym on there is Ezio. Um... I I’ve done a boat um with lots of little different 
heads in with different faces um and I’ll describe a few of them. I’ve got one, I’ve like um I’ve got one 
with like a helmet and I’ve got a shield and uh like a sword and  like a little like key and a jester’s hat and 
things and they’re sort of like that represents me and so, it’s a boat because it can travel between all the 
different bits um. And that’s on a board with different colours… um, so really I’ve just sort of 
envisaged myself sort of going between these different parts and these are different aspects of my life. 
Uh where I sort of have different, or act differently or have different um ways of being myself in 
different situations. And some of these also have barriers, um which I found that I’ve hit I’ve hit on, um 
at certain points um. It’s like for example this er which is a brown one and I put a set of stairs on, uh 
because that like represents to me the bear community – like the gay male sort of bears which I am I 
very much consider myself a part of now. Um but also I feel that there are barriers there because I get 
to a certain point and I don’t feel comfortable or say anything that’s to do with um my trans history or 
um, like bits and bobs of genitals and different ways of how I feel about my body. Um so maybe yeah 
that’s the um, the sort of barriers that I hit on so I’ve got examples so I’ve got other ones. But some 
like are smaller barriers but they’re all raised up so yeah I don’t know what else to say about that. 
Researcher: That, that’s great and um you’re saying that there are other barriers there? 
Ezio: Yeah. I’ve kind of not thought too deeply, but one’s got a window so it’s kind of like I can see 
through them, and I think at some point the barriers will go and I can see through them, but right now 
they are still there. Um, so, I I guess um, I don’t think there’s anything what they would be [laughs] 
specifically... but… um.  
But yeah the idea is at the boat will travel round to different ones at different times and be a certain way 
in a different situation. Uh but I don’t feel that I can be all that at one point in time. 
 199 
 
Researcher: Thank you very much indeed.  
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Group Discussion 
Researcher: Excellent has everyone been? If not…  
Researcher: Yup? Ok. Does anyone have any thoughts um given everything that people have discussed 
today. So not about other people’s models but in general from the themes that have arisen today.  
Unknown Participant:  I was quite, sorry, 
Tara: There seems to be a bit of a common theme of barriers. 
Researcher: Sorry um. 
Tara: There seems to be a bit of a common theme of barriers. 
Researcher: Of barriers, yeah. 
Tara: Either one’s that people have put up themselves, for protecting themselves, or ones that people 
face for trying to access spaces it’s just that’s the loss of freedom to move. 
Researcher: Yeah 
Tara: In some ways that seems to be a little bit of a common theme – some people seem to get past, 
but other people a bit more trapped by it. 
Researcher: Yeah – what do people think about that? 
Unknown participant: Yes, yes definitely. 
Researcher: People are nodding. [Laughter] 
Mr Fox: I think what surprised me actually was when I first looked at this, because I don’t think about 
my sexuality in terms of, um, you know either my sexual orientation or my sexuality in visual terms like 
this – I think about it linguistically, verbally. So when I first looked at this I thought ‘I actually don’t 
think I can do this, I don’t think I can conceptualise it in that way’ and I was, I suppose I was really sort 
of surprised, and I really enjoyed the kind of richness that came out of people’s different models and the 
way that they talked about it and stuff so I thought that was that was quite a, kind of, useful, um kind of 
tool really. It was more a comment on the process than… 
Researcher:  Thank you very much, that’s really usefully received, thank you. 
Scot Sam: I think something that has sort of stood out for me is that there is a lot about comparison that’s 
happening. So it’s either where you are compared to where you want to be – a past identity and a 
present identity, or a future identity. It’s about, there seems to be a lot of, I dunno, that’s all it just 
strikes me. 
Researcher:  Yeah, I hear that. I’m sorry can can you say what your pseudonym is? 
Scot Sam: Yeah I’m Scot Sam, yeah. 
Researcher:  Excellent. And preceding that we heard from? 
Mr Fox: Mr Fox 
Researcher:  And proceeding that we heard from? 
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Tara: Tara 
Researcher:  Thank you, excellent. When it comes to transcription I won’t now be pulling my hair out 
trying to… 
[Laugher] 
Researcher:  Um anyone, anyone else. Any other thoughts on all of those points? 
Charlie: I think it’s really affirming to hear some of the stories, um from down at the end from people 
who are now enjoying their sexuality and who have found a way to enjoy it. Um because I, you know, I 
don’t or haven’t until this point and I thought to sort of maybe resign myself to that was how it was 
going to be for the rest of my life, but it’s now, you know, I now know that it’s not necessarily true. 
There are other options, there are other ways of being. And everybody wants, well not everybody wants 
to, but I would certainly like to be in a position where it’s fun and enjoyable and um, I think for me a lot 
of it is, you know, body related. And how, how in a female body you’re expected, you know there is an 
expectation of the role you are supposed to play, and and that has never been comfortable for me. But, 
so it’s good to hear stories of people who have found other, other ways of being and ways to express 
that, and are happy with that, so that’s good. 
Researcher: Great stuff. Can, can you say… 
Charlie: Ah Charlie it was. 
Researcher: Thanks, excellent. 
Mr Fox: I think the other thing that occurred to me thinking about the process of doing this is that 
because I don’t, because I do think verbally more than representationally it was, you know, I could, I 
had to relate, there had to be little people I couldn’t. You know the sort of clever symbolic stuff that 
other people kind of did you know. I just, I don’t, my brain just doesn’t work like that. And it was, it 
was really important actually that the little figures had physically identifiable representational 
characteristics. So, you know, the things like you know the little beards and the tattoos and the 
uniforms and all of that sort of stuff. It was it’s very much about um. It was a it had to be humanised 
and personified for me. If if the little people hadn’t been here I wouldn’t have been able to do this 
exercise I don’t think. So there’s something about human – I’m not quite sure what I’m trying to to 
grasp, but there’s something about it’s very much kind of, human, humanising process. And I think, I 
think when I think about how trans people are represented in terms of our sexuality we’re very very 
dehumanised. So it’s either, you know, there’s either the sort of stereotypes of, you know – and this is 
vile language and I don’t like it –  but kind of you know shemale porn and that kind of thing or trans 
men,  so we don’t have a sexuality at all. Um, so, and the reason that I was thinking that. Sorry this is a 
bit of a long story but I will get to the point, um. I was in I was in a group of um, very very senior, 
senior clinicians who – and I don’t want to compromise you Christina [the researcher] who run the 
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GIC56s in this country and um I was in a very senior group and we were talking, um, we were talking 
about the issue of how to decide what gets included in um the core procedures that are are funded by 
the NHS57 for gender transition. And I was trying to, they they were talking about the issue of hair 
removal for men having phalloplasty on the penis. And they were literally, ridiculously splitting hairs 
about whether or not, so you could fund hair removal for surgical reasons because the surgeon had 
demanded it, but you couldn’t fund it afterwards because the patient had asked for it because that was 
cosmetic. And what I was trying to explain in this context, I was trying to say If you, um basically if you 
are trying to have a sex life with a penis that looks like Chewbacca58 [laughter] that is going to affect your 
ability to have a functioning sex life and I was trying to explain it to these very very eminent people 
who work with us every day and they could not get it and I thought ‘why can’t they see this very obvious 
thing?’ And I thought – I had to think it through – and I thought either these people have never had a 
blowjob, ie you know trying to have, or given a blowjob, and trying to have that kind of sexual 
conversation with someone when you’re trying to have to explain why your penis is covered in hair. 
The fact that these men, and they were almost all men, there were no women there, the fact that these 
men can’t get it. Why not? Why can’t they get it? And I realised what it was is that they’d stopped 
seeing us as human beings. They’d started to see us as units in a healthcare system to be processed, 
they’d lost sight of our humanity. So think what was really important for me was that this was about, 
this is little people this is me as a person these are little people this is real human beings and I think that 
for me is really important to kind of capture, because f So it was a bit of a long ramble but I hope I got 
to the point. 
Researcher: Thank you, thank you. 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe:  I’ve just been thinking as… 
Researcher: People are indicating59… can you say verbally, because I don’t want to interpret? Can you say 
what you think to that? 
Martin: Oh yeah I was waving my hands in the air in solidarity in support of what, um whatever your 
name 
Mr Fox: Mr Fox 
Martin: Mr Fox said. [Laughs] 
Researcher: And you are? 
Martin: Uh Martin [Laughs] 
                                                 
56 Gender Identity Clinics 
57 National Health Service 
58 Chewbacca is an extremely hairy humanoid from the Star Wars film series. 
59 Several participants were using an indication of applause, cheering or support consisting of raising 
one’s hands with fingers outstretched and twisting one’s wrists, which was originally derived from 
hearing impaired people, and is now in more common usage. 
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Scot Sam: I’m Scot Sam and I’m thoroughly agreeing with what Mr Fox says. 
Researcher: Thanks, thanks very much. 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe: I’ve just been thinking from just before Mr Fox spoke. Um I was remarking 
inside my head how everyone else has used little people and I’ve just used colours and shapes. Um I was 
I was just, I was just… 
Scot Sam: A monkey is a person! Monkeys are people! Monkey people! You’ve got a person in your little 
cave. 
Tara: No I haven’t 
Scot Sam: Don’t you? Oh. Oh right! [Laughter] I thought you said someone was imprisoned in there.  
Tara: Yeah me. Virtually. 
Scot Sam: I thought there was a little figure.  
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe: And my pseudonym was Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe 
Researcher: Thank you Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe. 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe: So I thought everything you said was Yes. You know, Yes. 
Researcher: So, so so you were? 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe: Product and gender service. 
Researcher: Sorry? 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe: I was agreeing with Mr Fox 
Researcher: Excellent. So you agree with Mr Fox about the need for humanity? Is that? [participant nods] 
Does anyone have any any other feelings about because I think it’s a really, I think it’s a point that’s 
cropped up here on a few occasions, does does anyone? 
Tara: I don’t know when people when through it, but for me it was the late nineties that I first got 
involved  and it was even worse back then, than it is now and it very much was. That and it’s just that 
it’s the fact that in this country everything concentrates very much on the process and getting everyone 
though, and not for getting you prepared for life on the out, the other side to be honest. It’s just sort of 
here’s the process this is what is. And when you go and see the other side when you go and see a 
surgeon they’re obsessed over how much depth you want. Um it’s there and then you’ve got to make a 
decision whether, particularly if you’re not particularly well endowed, you need to make a decision, well 
are you ever going to have sex with a man. I don’t know, it’s sort of why do I have to make the 
decision? Do you want to have the more complicated surgery, and it’s sort of well yeah I’ll do it in case, 
but it might not work, but this. And it’s the pressure rather than, sorting out. So yeah you go through 
all this and in that case it’s the difference between what you see in the ‘States people go through so 
much psychological counselling. We’ve maybe, people might have seen a psychiatrist five times and 
then they’re sent of for pretty, relatively major surgery without actually having dealt with things. I think 
that can sometimes have an effect, on, how people perceive themselves. I’m Tara 
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Researcher: Thank you Tara. 
Jenbury Handlebar-Smythe:  I certainly have the strong impression that no one who’s involved in the 
medical care and treatment of trans people knows a damn thing about it. At all. Endocrinologists don’t 
have a clue, the shrinks don’t have a clue. It all, seems very disconnected from our realities and, those, 
sort of historical, you know I transitioned at the tail end of the nineties and early two-thousands and 
um, it was quite well known within the uh trans communities at the time, and I assume it’s still the 
same, is that the um, the the psychologists uh, are purely gatekeepers and here’s what they want to hear. 
And that’s what you tell them, because if you tell them anything else they won’t let you through the 
gate, so they have this constant positive reinforcement of ‘oh these people are all saying this thing and 
they’re all checking off our list therefore anyone who deviates is obviously not conforming therefore 
not really trans’ – uh I did air quotes with that for the benefit of the recording – um and you just end up 
with the ludicrous situation where uh, you know people will go through the process presenting in a 
certain way and as soon as they’ve actually got on hormones and got whatever surgery they they want, 
then they will actually start living their lives the way that they want to. Once they no longer need to 
impress upon uh a GIC a a particular way of being that actually fits them. There was a a, I dunno if it 
was a leak or just a um, freedom of information thing, uh from a organisational group of all the, or at 
least some of the GICs over the last year where uh some of the senior clinicians were talking about how 
there was this, they were concerned about how they seemed to be making uh – what was, they used 
some horrible tem – but um but they were concerned about um trans women getting on hormones and 
then not having genital surgery. Oh yeah, they were creating a a they were creating shemen [gasp in 
background] was the term the clinician had used. Um and it’s just the, having been sort of, you know, in 
and out of the sort of trans community over the years, being aware that people’s relationship with 
gender tends to be… a lot more complicated, and, very much, the the people who are happiest are the 
people who know who they are and can get to the place where they need to be to be comfortable in 
themselves. But the GICs are far more ‘no this is you must want this particular set of configuration and 
you must go all the way through to the end or you’re not valid’. Um there’s no sense of understanding 
that a big part of it for a lot of people is um becoming comfortable with who they are, what they are, 
um yeah and that isn’t part of it it’s about turning men into women and women into men. And that’s 
how they see it and they have a very specific view about what those things are. Or at least they certainly 
did, um, historically. Sorry I’ve kind of gone off on one there, um. Jenbury speaking, sorry now I’m 
finishing. 
Cee Cee: Um you’re referring to the previous speaker, sorry Cee Cee speaking now [laughs] um, yeah I 
can, uh totally understand what you’re saying. Friends of mine that transitioned late nineties early two-
thousands talked about the very same thing of having to answer certain questions in such and such a 
way. Even with like the psychiatrists assessments as well, you know, um, almost having to present um, 
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as the completely sanest person that has ever lived on earth. And the only issue you have ever had about 
anything is you’d like to be, you’d like to have a different body. Everything else is fine! Apart from 
that…. And then, like you’ve said once they’ve got what they want and fought, then they start um, you 
know friends of mine start living the life that they’ve wanted to. But I’ve always found it so…. Sort of 
disrespectful and repulsive and dehumanising… that, um, people. Trans people go through physical 
transitions, um having to, jump through the hoops I think that’s absolutely outrageous. And that in 
itself, for some people, must cause additional psychological or mental health issues just because you’re, 
the sense you’re like living in the closet again but you’re having to sort of play the game to get what you 
want but you’d much rather be able to be you so yeah. 
Researcher: Can I clarify? Do you think that’s to do with your… um sorry, to do with people’s sexuality 
and gender, give that’s what we’re talking about here today as as part of that or is it… how how does it 
fit together? 
Cee Cee:  I think I think it’s medical practitioners and psychiatric practitioners having a fixed idea of 
what a man is and what a woman is and – just do the swap. 
Researcher: Right. 
Cee Cee:  And I think that  um what the the experts – air quotes here- um, what influences how they see 
male and female will always be influenced by their own idea of sexuality, you know man’s sexuality and 
women’s sexuality. So sort of the heteronormative model. And they’re not, but the worst thing is that a 
lot of practitioners are not aware, of of these biases that they’re bringing into their assessments and 
work that you’re doing just now, us talking is really important that they get that. 
Researcher: I think so. I think I can say that safely without fear of bias. Um shall we have a point here 
and a point here and then wrap it up. Is that ok? Yup, alright so let’s have this one and then we’ll go… 
Jane Crocker: Yeah I just want to continue on what the two previous speakers were saying and I’m just 
going to get up and say this. My name is Jane Crocker and I’m a deceptive transsexual [laughter]. Now 
what I want to say about that is this. I have never had any problems with gatekeeping um ah I have 
gone through the system mostly within the [European country] which, you know, doesn’t have the NHS 
but I you know, I know from knowing a lot of people that my experiences are not exactly unique and 
they’re not too dissimilar to the UK. Now, um, I have never had any issue with gatekeeping because I 
have uh, no I mean I don’t know how it would have worked out otherwise but I’ve always known what 
was expected and required of me from other people. Like before I ever before I ever set foot in, the um 
endocrinology unit - because we don’t have gender identity clinics yet – um before I set foot there I 
had spoken to a lot of people that had been there that had been through it that had been through that 
system for many years to know what was wanted of me and what was expected of me and I did, I never 
deviated from that because I knew what I wanted and what I needed. Um, and so I did not, um I never 
went to to them for support or for guidance for that I went to my community outside of that and my 
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friends and everyone that I kept meeting though the [European country] trans community. So, I um, so 
for me I never, and this is this kind of like  relates a bit to my politics and that I didn’t I didn’t go there 
thinking these are people that will help me. I went there thinking these are people that can give me 
access to what I need if I follow the script. And every now and again I could see like the little windows 
to the things that they wanted me to do, like you know after  after a few months ah, of ah of going 
having been to a couple of appointments I was asked when I was going to start dressing because um I 
didn’t wear skirts or dresses I just wore jeans and t-shirts never mind the fact that if you want to be 
binary they were purchased on the girl’s side of the store. So um when when I finally got a psychiatric 
evaluation which actually came a few years after, a kind of second opinion if you will. Um I made sure 
to to femme up and to pretend in a way that, that I was comfortable with that wasn’t like a complete 
fib, but that was what the person wanted. The psychiatrist was very interested in hearing of any time I 
had been with men and very very uninterested in any times that I had been sexually with, uh women, 
and my history is that I’ve mostly been with women or gender variant people, uh of other gender 
identities not male or female. But I noticed as we were speaking that he kept asking me more and more 
questions about whenever I had mentioned having sexual relations with men and so I talked those up 
much, as much more than they were. Even though they were much less significant in my life they didn’t 
ask me anything about my current relationship that he knew I was in. And it was, uh it was very 
gruelling and it was very very strange and this was in two thousand and eleven. Ah so, you know I I got 
what I needed I got my letter60 and everything, but what I always tell, Um what I always tell friends or 
people that I know that are going through the system. I always say listen, get good people in the 
community, I will give you support get other people get support groups get all that sort of stuff because 
when you go there you just go there to get your your prescription and to get your bloods checked to 
see that your health is ok, so its physical and stuff. Don’t, you know. That’s my perspective, that’s been 
my perspective my experience and I am Jane Crocker and I am a deceptive transsexual. 
Researcher: Thank you very much. 
Mr Fox: Can I make one more point that is actually directly relevant to that. 
Researcher: We’ve got a point here then… 
Mr Fox: Yeah well I mean I just absolutely reinforce you know what you were saying in a sense that I 
think in my experience the GICs that I have encountered are actually professionally negligent in the the 
lack of support that they give you around sex and relationship stuff. Um my issue was that I was in a 
ten year relationship that meant absolutely everything to me I could, look the prospect of losing 
everything else I could deal with but not that that was the one thing I couldn’t bear to lose I got 
absolutely no support of any description whatsoever it was never offered to me all I was offered was 
                                                 
60 A letter of recommendation for genital surgery. 
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gatekeeping. Um you know a psychiatric assessment in order to - exactly as you describe - play the 
game get my hormones get my referrals and it was never even, it was never even considered as offered 
to me that the one thing the only thing that I wanted form them, the only thing I truly needed was 
support around dealing with the loss of this profoundly important relationship and that was the one, I I 
was never offered it I was never offered any support of any kind. Just pure gatekeeping and I think that 
that’s professionally negligent actually and if I you know I try and do my thing in terms of changing the 
kind of system but in in terms of the idea that any gender identity clinic in this country as far as I can 
perceive, from my involvement with them is offering any meaningful support whatsoever to people 
around sex and relationship stuff is laughable. I’ve I’ve never seen it and I know that there are small 
pockets of maybe group work that you can get involved with. Nobody I know is involved in them and 
from people who have tried to get in them the waiting list and the recourses is so limited that you 
couldn’t get on it even if you desperately needed it. So you know I just reinforce it I think I think it’s 
professional negligent when you have people who are undergoing a massive massive programme of life 
change which transition can be and to say that you are supervising their clinical care and offer them 
nothing about such a fundamental part of that which is sex and relationships is I can only say it again, I 
think it’s negligent. 
Unknown participant: I agree. 
Martin: Yeah yeah. I um I started transition early two thousands as well and um I’ve got a couple of 
different points. And one was, my own personal experience was in terms of, um, this idea of it being 
very medicalised, it’s not about you as an individual that Mr Fox was talking about, um… is is my 
experience as well. I’ve always, um when I first went into the clinics I I didn’t do the this is the story that 
I ought to be telling to get treatment, uh because I had  I didn’t really have any links with the 
community at the time. So I was honest and uh that buggered up my treatment, uh for a number of years 
um, in terms of I didn’t get any because I was there with a partner who was also wanting to transition 
who was very sure about his identity and who he was, and I wasn’t and therefore, me being the younger 
person was being influenced by this other person. And I’ve said that I didn’t feel male because actually 
I didn’t know what that meant and I didn’t understand that there were hormones available that there 
was surgery available etcetera etcetera. Um, once I did find out that surgery and hormones were 
available, from the very beginning of that kind of knowledge, every single time I saw the lead psych-
iatrist in the clinic, um, including when I was discharged, um, because of some stupid reason. Um and 
then I’d got back in five years later. The first question I was ever asked every single time was ‘So have 
you thought about lower surgery yet?’. I’d been very very clear from the very beginning as soon as I 
knew it was available that I never wanted lower surgery, um and it had been written in my notes a 
number of times, so I know this because I have various copies of all of my notes. Um, but that was 
always the emphasis was on you know so when have you thought about having lower surgery?. But an 
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experience that I had later on when I went back into the clinic, um, which was, two thousand and 
eleven, um… because I had to wait five years to get back in to get a letter to my gynaecologist to say 
that I’d been treated there so that I could have my hysterectomy. So I had to go through the whole 
rigmarole again. And as I was there when I was seeing my therapist, um, my therapist would ask 
questions, we’d have a chat. Basically it wasn’t going in to get a kind of therapy to to do anything in 
particular but I had to have these appointments. So I’d get there and me and my therapist would just 
have a chat. And they also have a private, um service available in the same clinic. And at one point my 
therapist said, ‘um, I do… I’ve got uh a patient, a trans man who is looking at options for lower surgery 
what options are available for him?’ because the work I do outside of the clinic is working with trans 
men mainly around sex relationships intimacy body positivity. And knowing that she wanted to know 
from me, what the options were for men for lower surgery, rather than finding out through training 
channels, or and she’d been working there for eight years so I’m really worried about what she’d been 
telling people before that, she wanted to find out from me. So I explained that there’s the option to go to 
Belgium there’s the team in London, that there’s the option for phalloplasty but there’s also option for 
metoidioplasty. At which point, bearing in mind again she’s been working at that clinic at least eight years 
…um she said ‘what’s a metoidioplasty?’ and this is one of the forms of lower surgery that you can 
have as a trans man. And I thought this is, I mean it’s it’s really strange because their emphasis is on 
surgeries let alone what you might do with those particular surgeries um… and she doesn’t even know 
what’s available, and I mean apart from the fact that she was coming to me for information which 
made me really angry, um, but that she had no clue what was available and his was one of the more 
liberal supportive friendly, um open-minded therapists, and …um… and I think you know just to 
reiterate that point about the the… the support in terms of sex and relationships is that if somebody 
doesn’t even know what surgeries are available how can you then advise somebody on what it is that 
they then might want to do with what, what is available to do with those body parts, what you might 
want to get into. And I went to a uh group session, that they held at the clinic, and they had a surgeon 
come in who was talking about lower surgery for women. And the amount of women who said ‘oh is it 
possible to have sex afterwards’ and it’s just you know working with community in terms of looking at 
sex and relationships, um intimacy, bodies, um what’s available with surgery, this kind of thing that just 
isn’t talked about anywhere. We’ve created a space like this because it’s not talked about. And it shouldn’t 
be the community creating this space. It should be especially when we are talking about surgeries. 
[Organisation name] which is the organisation that, um whatever your name is, runs. 
Researcher: Can you say if you want it I’m going to. 
Scot Sam: Scot Sam 
Researcher: Thanks. 
 209 
 
Martin: We provide information for people on what surgery is available for trans guys what it looks like 
what it feels like. People at our retreats get to talk to each other about these things and one of the 
things that really irritates me is that it’s supposed to be about informed consent. When you go for lower 
surgery or any surgery it’s about informed consent. You are not given that information. So when you are 
then not even given that information let alone, what you can do with these things about and you are 
not allowed to enjoy your body as a trans person and this comes from the medical community as well 
and it. 
Researcher: Is that something you feel yourself? 
Martin: Yes 
Researcher: Yup, ok. 
Martin: I feel that from various aspects in my life as a trans person I am not allowed to be happy… This 
from people who know about trans people as well um another I don’t I won’t go into that one. Um 
you’re not allowed to be happy you are not allowed to enjoy your body. And actually I felt very strange 
when I first set up the support group that I set up in [City] because I did enjoy my body but I repressed 
that because I wasn’t supposed to. As a trans person I was supposed to hate my body. And that was 
what I got from the clinics was that I should not enjoy my body. I should be having lower surgery 
because there is something wrong with my body. Um there’s not something wrong with my body. My 
head doesn’t fit and I’m not comfortable with it at that particular point. But actually now I’ve had 
certain surgeries and I’ve had hormones I am no longer gender dysphoric but I am still trans. 
Researcher: Thank you.  
Researcher: Can I say that we’re we’re pushed for time and I think we could probably continue this on 
for a year or so. So, um can we finish up there and can we continue the discussion informally later on if 
people want to. Or to finish with that as the part or the formal part of the discussion? Are people 
comfortable enough with that, or is there anything someone wants to put on record now? 
Sack Boy:: Can I Can I just I’ve been trying to get in, but… 
Researcher: Ok yes. 
Sack Boy: It’s really, about what Tara was saying as well, It’s just um I think there is a lot of hetero 
heteronormativity within, um, and they just presume that. ‘Oh you want to be with a woman’, and that 
is why, um. Which I just pretended I did, was with the lower surgery. I um pretty much I would say I 
I’ve gone for metoidioplasty because it suits me as a person my sexuality. Um I’m a bottom more much 
more than top so then I’m not really interested in penetrating someone. But all my surgeon is is I think 
he still comes across, even though I’ve said to him I don’t care about having a really big, willy it’s it 
wouldn’t suit me I don’t feel that I want that um. But he he’s even said like ‘But if you want it in future 
you can come back’. It’s like ‘no you’re not listening to me you’re basically thinking like I’ve made a 
mistake because I want a small willy’ [laughs]. And it’s like I just don’t think they could get it in their 
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head that I would be happy with something that maybe biologically is under, under the average , but 
I’m more than happy with it. 
Researcher: Ok thank you very much. 
Tara: Just one final, It’s a few words just to add to something. 
Researcher: Ok go on then. 
Tara: It’s just to say that when you are talking about the, um about not being able to enjoy your body 
when it comes from outside, well it comes from the community as well… 
Martin: Oh year it comes from the community as well. 
Tara: Um I don’t know like, It’s not an interaction so much but it’s very much if you indicate any 
enjoyment you’re seen as a pervert. 
Martin: Yeah that’s what I was saying about the support group being in, the support group that I set up 
being very much different because I was enjoying my body where the other people in it seemed like they 
weren’t. 
[Inaudible] 
Mr Fox: Christina61  
Researcher: Thank you very much indeed. 
Mr Fox: Can I make a suggestion? About this – It’s related to this piece of research. 
Researcher: Yeah. 
Mr Fox: What strikes me is listening to these people and how passionately people have told their stories 
and the things that they’ve wanted to say and the thing that has motivated that is because there is a lack 
of dialogue clearly between a lot of us who who are trans, and the clinicians and the people that we 
work with. And there, there is no space where we actually come together and tell them these things. It 
feels like they hide in the clinics, with certain notable exceptions. And they don’t come out in the 
community and they don’t meet us. So maybe in the presentation of this research it would be really 
helpful to get a group of clinicians together with a group of trans people so we can actually think about 
this and what it means and what positive change might come out of research. 
Researcher: I I I will certainly take that on board, obviously I can’t promise anything at this point 
Mr Fox: Sure 
Researcher: But that’s a useful suggestion so thank you. 
Researcher: I’m going to turn this off now… 
[laughter] 
Researcher: So thank you very much indeed. 
Participant: No problem. 
                                                 
61 The researcher’s name. 
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Participant Thank you so much. 
Participant Thank you. 
 
 
